Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was charged with several offenses stemming from two separate shootings. Appellant was age seventeen when the offenses were committed. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Appellant contended that his sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s sentence was proper under Miller v. Alabama because the sentence imposed in this case was not mandatory but, rather, an exercise of the trial court’s discretion; and (2) the trial court did not violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to consider Appellant’s youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to consider youth as a mitigating factor when sentencing a child to life without parole for homicide, and the record must reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile offender’s youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing when a prison term of life without parole is imposed; and (2) because Appellant might not have been given the benefit of the consideration of youth as a mitigating factor, his sentence did not comport with the procedural strictures of Miller. View "State v. Long" on Justia Law

In 2006, U-Store-It, L.P. acquired several self-storage facilities in Franklin County in a bulk purchase. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopted the 2006 sale prices as the value of those properties for the 2006 tax year. U-Store-It appealed, arguing (1) the sale involved related parties and thus could not qualify as an arm’s-length transaction for purposes of valuing the properties; and (2) the sale prices could not be used because they included consideration paid for personal property as well as real property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in adopting the 2006 sale prices as the value of the properties at issue. View "Hilliard City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellee was charged with criminal child enticement. The complaint alleged that Appellee had asked a child to carry some boxes to his apartment in exchange for money, which conduct allegedly constituted a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2905.05(A). Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the criminal child enticement statute was unconstitutional because it was overbroad. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that section 2905.05(A) was unconstitutionally overbroad. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the criminal child enticement statute could not survive constitutional scrutiny due to its overbreadth. View "State v. Romage" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to a third-degree felony violation of former Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(A), which resulted in his fourth DUI conviction and second felony DUI conviction. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a lifetime drivers license suspension. Nine years later, Defendant moved for limited driving privileges. The trial court granted those privileges for daylight hours only. The State appealed, arguing that granting limited driving privileges violated former Ohio Rev. Code 4510.54(A), which prohibited the modification of lifetime suspension for the first fifteen years. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 4510.13(A)(5)(g)(i) gives a trial court discretion to grant limited driving privileges during a lifetime suspension. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that when a trial court grants limited driving privileges and issues an entry in compliance with Ohio Rev. Code 4510.021(A), which directs that driving privileges shall be for certain enumerated limited purposes, that grant is not a modification of a lifetime suspension within the meaning for former section 4510.54(A). Remanded for the trial court to issue a new entry in conformity with section 4510.021(A). View "State v. Manocchio" on Justia Law

Defendants executed a promissory note in favor of FirstMerit Bank secured by a mortgage on several parcels of real estate. After Defendants defaulted on the promissory note, FirstBank initiated foreclosure proceedings. The common pleas court entered a decree in foreclosure, and the properties were sold at auction. Because the sale of the properties resulted in a deficiency, FirstMerit obtained a cognovit judgment against Defendants. Defendants moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B), asserting as a defense that they had reached an oral settlement agreement with FirstMerit under which FirstMerit had agreed to cease legal proceedings and release Defendants from their obligations. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the statute of frauds barred their defense. The appellate court reversed, determining that Ohio Rev. Code 1335.05 did not prohibit Defendants from raising as a defense that the parties orally agreed to modify the terms of their agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the oral agreement in this case fell within the statute of frauds, and therefore, Defendants were precluded from raising the agreement as a defense in a motion for relief from judgment. View "FirstMerit Bank, N.A. v. Inks" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to aggravated robbery, robbery, and aggravated possession of drugs. The sentencing court imposed a term of imprisonment and $19,000 in fines. Defendant appealed his sentence, and Defendant’s newly-appointed appellate counsel moved to view and supplement the record with the presentence investigation report. The court of appeals denied the motion to disclose the report to Defendant’s appellate counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term “defendant’s counsel” as used in Ohio Rev. Code 2951.03, which permits a defendant’s counsel to inspect and use a presentence investigation report, encompasses both a defendant’s trial counsel and a defendant’s appellate counsel; and (2) therefore, under section 2951.03, Defendant’s appellate counsel was entitled to obtain a copy of Defendant’s presentence investigation report. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a motion for leave to amend his omnibus motion, which the trial court did not rule on. The court of appeals remanded for a ruling on the motion, but the court’s entry mistakenly indicated Appellant’s motion was one to withdraw his guilty plea. The court then corrected its mistake. Unaware of the correction, the trial court recognized the court of appeals’ error and denied Appellant’s motion for leave. Appellant then filed petitions for writs of mandamus and/or procedendo in the court of appeals to compel the trial court to rule on his motion for leave to amend. The court of appeals dismissed the first petition as procedurally defective and the second petition as moot because the trial court did rule on the motion for leave. The court also revoked Appellant’s in forma pauperis privileges due to his “repetitious and frivolous conduct.” The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the dismissal of Appellant’s first mandamus/procedendo action did not operate as res judicata, but, on the merits, Appellant was not entitled to an extraordinary writ; and (2) Appellant’s complaint did not warrant a revocation of his in forma pauperis privileges. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Logan" on Justia Law

In 2010, Appellee was convicted of a drug offense and a related offense and sentenced to eleven years in prison. In late 2010, Appellee’s convictions were reversed. Appellee was released on bond and the charges against him were dismissed. Appellee then filed a complaint asserting that he was a wrongfully imprisoned individual. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellee satisfied all five requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48(A)(1) through (5). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when a defendant seeks a declaration that he is a wrongfully imprisoned individual and seeks to satisfy subsection 2743.48(A)(5) by proving that an error in procedure resulted in his release, the error in procedure must have occurred subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment; and (2) Appellee did not satisfy subsection 2743.48(A)(5) in this case. View "Mansaray v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant had been employed as a nurse with Progressive Parma Care, LLC since 1995. During her tenure at Parma Care, Appellant was disciplined on several occasions. On April 10, 2008, Appellant was injured at work. On April 16, 2008, the director of nursing terminated Appellant for cause. On April 21, 2008, a physician certified that Appellant was temporarily and totally disabled from all employment beginning on the date of her injury. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, concluding that Appellant’s discharge from employment for violating written workplace rules had been a voluntary abandonment, making Appellant ineligible for benefits, and that the medical evidence did not support Appellant’s claim that she had been temporarily and totally disabled at the time of her termination. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion when it denied her request for TTD compensation. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant compensation for TTD. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Indus. Comm'n " on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellant was tried on charges of aggravated burglary and rape. A mistrial was declared due to a hung jury. After a retrial in 2005, Appellant was convicted by a jury of both charges. Appellant’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant subsequently asked the court of appeals to issue a writ ordering immediate release or a new trial, alleging that the retrial was jurisdictionally unauthorized because, in 2003, the trial court had discharged the jury without satisfying the requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 2945.36 that the reasons for the discharge be entered on the journal. However, Appellant failed to raise this objection before his second trial. The court of appeals’ dismissed Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant waived his mistrial argument, and moreover, Appellant had other adequate legal remedies at law. View "State ex rel. Bevins v. Cooper" on Justia Law