Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated arson and arson. The trial court sentenced Appellant to ten years imprisonment for aggravated arson and five years for arson, to be served consecutively. The trial court notified Appellant that a postrelease-control sanction would be imposed but failed to state the duration of the sanction and which conviction it was part of. After Appellant completed his prison term for aggravated arson and began serving his prison term for arson, the trial court imposed postrelease control related to Defendant's aggravated-arson offense. Appellant appealed the sentencing judgment, arguing that because he had served the prison sentence for his aggravated-arson offense, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose postrelease control related to that offense. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a trial court may resentence a defendant in order to correctly impose postrelease control if the defendant is still serving a prison term for any of the other offenses included in the same judgment entry of sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when Defendant completed his prison term for aggravated arson, the trial court lost the authority to impose a postrelease-control sanction for that offense. View "State v. Holdcroft" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of one count each of possession of heroin, trafficking in heroin, and conspiracy. After a series of motions seeking resentencing, Appellant filed a motion to vacate a nunc pro tunc order that had corrected an error in a sentencing entry, claiming that the order was void. Judge Jody Luebbers did not rule on the motion, arguing that she was divested of jurisdiction to entertain Appellant's subsequent filings once she had corrected the erroneous sentencing entry on remand. Appellant subsequently filed this action in procedendo, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court reversed and granted a writ of procedendo to compel Judge Luebbers to rule on Appellant's motions, holding that the judge had general jurisdiction in this case, and therefore, Appellant's action for the writ of procedendo had merit. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Luebbers" on Justia Law

Appellants requested a tax refund from the City of Worthington in connection with municipal income tax they paid on stock-option income earned from 2005 through 2007, as reported on Form 1040, Schedule C of their federal income tax return. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of Appellants' refund based on its view that Ohio Rev. Code 718.01 governed the case because the City's definition of net profits in former Worthington Codified Ordinance 1701.15, which defined net profit for purposes of the City's income tax for an individual taxpayer "as the individual's profit, other than amounts required to be reported on schedule C," contravened the statutory definition of net profits set forth in section 718.01(A)(7). The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the City to refund the municipal taxes paid by Appellants on Schedule C during the tax years at issue, holding that the decision of the BTA was unreasonable and unlawful because the General Assembly did not exercise its power to limit or restrict the municipal power of taxation through section 718.01, and therefore, the statutory provisions at issue did not preclude the refund. View "Gesler v. City of Worthington Income Tax Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

The Mount Vernon City School District Board of Education terminated Appellant for insubordination for refusing to remove religious displays in his classroom and injecting his personal religious beliefs into his pattern of instruction, all after being forbidden to do so. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence in the record supported Appellant's termination for insubordination in failing to comply with the district's orders to remove religious materials from his classroom. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not err in affirming the termination, as there was ample evidence of insubordination to justify the termination decision. View "Freshwater v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of failure to comply with a police officer and obstruction of official business. The trial court imposed separate sentences for the two offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that the offenses should have merged at sentencing as allied offenses of similar import under Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25. The appellate court remanded for a determination as to whether the offenses were allied offenses under State v. Johnson, which instructs courts that a defendant's conduct "must be considered" when determining whether multiple offenses merge at sentencing pursuant to section 2941.25. The trial court determined that the offenses were not allied offenses of similar import and imposed separate prison terms for the two offenses. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant's sentences merged under Johnson because they were based on the same conduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when deciding whether to merge multiple offenses at sentencing pursuant to section 2941.25, a court must review the entire record to determine whether the offenses were committed separately or with a separate animus; and (2) the court of appeals erred by relying on Johnson for the proposition that a court may consider a defendant's conduct only as it was described by the state's theory at trial. View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law

Appellant, who worked for Employer, filed a workers' compensation claim that was allowed for hypersensitivity pneumonitis and hypersensitivity-induced reactive upper-airway disease. Claimant returned to work, but after his symptoms returned, he stopped working in 2004. In 2005, a staff hearing officer with the Industrial Commission denied Appellant's request for temporary total disability compensation, concluding that Appellant's smoking-related disease caused his exacerbated symptoms. In 2007, a staff hearing officer awarded Appellant permanent total disability compensation. Employer filed a complaint for mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because the Commission had conclusively established in 2005 that the exacerbation of Appellant's symptoms that forced him to stop working in 2004 was caused by smoking, not by the allowed conditions in his claim, the Commission erred by determining that Appellant's decision to stop working was not a voluntary abandonment of the workforce. View "State ex rel. Kelsey Hayes Co. v. Grashel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a 33,000-square-foot residential lot in 1974 that was adjacent to another lot owned by Plaintiffs upon which they had built their residence. In 2004, the village of Ottowa Hills denied Plaintiffs' request for a variance seeking to have the vacant lot declared a "buildable" lot because the zoning code at that time included a requirement that no structure could be built on a lot smaller than 35,000 square feet. This new size restriction was enacted in 1978. At the time Plaintiffs purchased the lot, the minimum buildable lot size was 15,000 square feet. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully appealed the village's decision to the Ottawa Hills Zoning Commission. The trial court upheld the Commission's decision, concluding that there was no regulatory taking. The court of appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court determined that a taking had not occurred because Plaintiffs had not taken any affirmative steps to build a house on the lot. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the analysis that is applicable to determining whether a variance should have been granted in this case, the appropriate result would have been to grant the variance. Remanded. View "Boice v. Village of Ottawa Hills" on Justia Law

After the person elected in 2012 to the office of County Sheriff could not assume the office for health reasons, County Commissioners appointed Relator as acting Sheriff until someone could be appointed to occupy the office. The County Democratic Central Committee (DCC) appointed Respondent to occupy the office. Relator filed this original action in quo warranto, claiming that Respondent did not meet the qualifications to assume the office of Sheriff. Relator asserted that he had standing to bring this action because he remained acting Sheriff. The Supreme Court granted the writ and reinstated Relator as acting County Sheriff until the DCC could appoint a qualified person, holding (1) Relator had standing to bring this action in quo warranto; and (2) Respondent failed to meet the statutory qualifications to be a County Sheriff. View "State ex rel. Swanson v. Maier" on Justia Law

As part of a negotiated agreement, Appellant pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. The sentencing court issued two nunc pro tunc orders to correct an error in the original sentencing entry. On appeal, Appellant argued, inter alia, that the sentencing court lacked the authority to issue the nunc pro tunc entries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus because (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (2) sentencing orders are, in general, not cognizable in habeas corpus; and (3) a nunc pro tunc order correcting a clerical error in a sentencing entry is not unlawful. View "Daggett v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

This appeal involved two separate actions that were consolidated. In the first action, a married couple raised allegations of fraud and other claims against Residential Finance Corporation (RFC), which had brokered two refinancings of the couple's residential mortgage. The first action was consolidated with a foreclosure case filed later against the couple. Appellant and RFC were named as third-party defendants in the foreclosure case. After consolidation, the case was bifurcated on the basis of subject matter for trial purposes and was scheduled to go to trial only on the refinancing issues. Judge Robert Nichols denominated Appellant as a codefendant in that trial. Appellant field an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent Nichols from requiring him to be a defendant in the trial. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not establish the elements for a writ of prohibition, as Appellant had an adequate remedy at law and Nichols did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Appellant. View "State ex rel. Shumaker v. Nichols" on Justia Law