Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Village of Richfield petitioned in municipal court to unseal certain criminal records, claiming that the records were improperly sealed under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.52. Judge Kathryn Michael, the presiding judge of the municipal court, denied the motion to unseal the records. Richfield subsequently made a written request to the clerk of courts for the official criminal case records, claiming that because the records had not been properly sealed, they were public under Ohio Rev. Code 149.43. The request was denied. Richfield then filed this action in mandamus, asserting that the records were sealed unlawfully. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Richfield improperly requested the court records under section 149.43 rather than Sup. Ct. R. 44 through 47, which control access to court records; and (2) even if Richfield had properly requested the records, Richfield had an adequate remedy at law of the denial of its motion to unseal the records, and therefore, Richfield could not satisfy the requirements of a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Richfield v. Laria" on Justia Law

In 2005, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to serve twenty-five years to life. In 2012, the common pleas court judge overruled Appellant’s motion in arrest of judgment. In 2013, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of procedendo in the court of appeals, seeking to compel the common pleas court judge to rule on his motion in arrest of judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. Appellant appealed, arguing that the judge erred in denying his motion so it was incumbent upon the court of appeals to compel her to reconsider her decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy to correct any alleged error in the judge’s decision through a direct appeal. View "State ex rel. Roberts v. Marsh" on Justia Law

Cheryl and John Gallenstein, Kentucky residents, purchased a boat in Indiana. The couple docked their boat in Indiana but chose Cincinnati as the hailing port. In 2003, the Division of Watercraft of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources issued a registration certificate to Cheryl. in 2005, the Ohio tax commissioner assessed a use tax, imposed a penalty, and assessed pre-assessment interest, determining that Cheryl’s use of the boat in Ohio, combined with her declaration of Cincinnati as the boat’s hailing port and her registration of the boat in Ohio created a nexus between the boat and Ohio and that she did not qualify for the transient use exception. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully in affirming the commissioner’s use tax, penalty, and pre-assessment interest because Cheryl qualified for the transient use exception contained in Ohio Rev. Code 5741.02(C)(4). View "Gallenstein v. Testa" on Justia Law

In 2008, the county auditor assigned a value of approximately $5 million to certain property located in the Mason City School District. The former owner of the property subsequently filed a valuation complaint seeking a reduction from the auditor’s valuation. The Warren County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the value. The Mason City School District Board of Education appealed. After a hearing, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) raised the value of the property, concluding that the 2006 sale price of $5,350,000 was the value of the property as of 2008. After the BTA hearing and before the BTA issued its decision, Squire Hill Properties II, LLC acquired the property. Squire Hill appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding (1) under the circumstances, the BTA was not required to give Squire Hill notice of the BTR hearing; but (2) the BTA erred by not properly considering the finding of the BOR that the 2006 sale was not recent in regard to the tax-lien date. Remanded. View "Mason City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Warren County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ohio Rev. Code 4921.25, which grants the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) authority to regulate towing companies as “for-hire motor carriers.” The City of Cleveland filed an action seeking a declaration that the statute violated the Home Rule Amendment of the Ohio Constitution because it was a general law that displaced municipal tow truck ordinances. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State, determining that the statute was a general law that does not violate the Constitution by infringing on the City’s home rule authority. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the statute was not a general law and therefore unconstitutionally attempted to limit municipal home-rule authority. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the second sentence of the statute violates the Home Rule Amendment by prohibiting the “licensing, registering, or regulation” of entities that tow motor vehicles and so will be severed; but (2) the first sentence of the statute is a general law. View "Cleveland v. State" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant for felonious assault and domestic violence. During a bench trial, the victim testified that Defendant was her boyfriend and had lived with her for about a year. The trial court found Defendant not guilty of felonious assault but guilty of attempted felonious assault and domestic violence. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction for attempted felonious assault but reversed his conviction for domestic violence, ruling that the state must prove the victim and Defendant shared living expenses in order to convict Defendant of domestic violence. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that because the state proved that the victim was a family or household member, Defendant’s crime fell within the purview of the domestic violence statute. View "State v. McGlothan" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a motion for reclassification of his sex-offender status based on the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Williams, which held that it was unconstitutional to apply sex-offender classifications under Ohio’s Adam Wash Act to defendants convicted prior to the effective date of that legislation. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of procedendo in the court of appeals to compel a ruling on his motion. The common pleas court subsequently issued a judgment granting Appellant’s motion and reclassifying Appellant’s sex-offender status. Thereafter, the court of appeals dismissed the petition for a writ of procedendo as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed because procedendo will not issue to compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed and because procedendo will not issue to address Appellant’s argument that the common pleas court judge failed to perform his duty. View "State ex rel. Clay v. Gee" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with felony domestic violence, which contained an allegation that Defendant had been previously convicted of two offenses of domestic violence. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of domestic violence as charged. The appellate court reversed Defendant’s conviction, determining that the state failed to establish the necessary element of Defendant’s prior domestic violence convictions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that because, during trial, the defense stipulated to the authenticity of Defendant’s two prior first degree misdemeanor domestic violence convictions, the state did properly prove the instant conviction. View "State v. Tate" on Justia Law

Appellant sustained a work-related injury and collected temporary total disability (TTD) compensation on her claim for certain injuries. Appellant later filed an application to add a psychological condition to her claim, at the same time requesting TTD compensation as a result of the condition. A hearing officer approved the additional condition but denied TTD compensation. Appellant subsequently filed another request for TTD compensation. A staff hearing officer awarded TTD compensation. The full Industrial Commission granted reconsideration and denied Appellant’s request for compensation, concluding that Appellant had voluntarily abandoned the entire workforce, and thus the claimed period of disability was not caused by the allowed conditions. Appellant filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant’s lack of earnings was not due to her psychological condition and that her failure to seek other employment was evidence she had voluntarily abandoned the workforce. View "State ex rel. Roxbury v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to several felonies. On March 11, 2002, the common pleas court entered a judgment entry of sentence. Eleven years later, Appellant filed a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition, arguing that the March 11, 2002 judgment entry was defective because it did not indicate the manner of his conviction. On April 18, 2013, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc judgment entry of sentence, this time indicating the manner of conviction. Appellant filed an amended petition, arguing that the nunc pro tunc entry did not cure the defective March 11, 2002 judgment entry. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s challenge to the validity of the March 11, 2002 judgment entry had no merit because the entry contained all four of the required elements under Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C). View "State ex rel. Snead v. Ferenc" on Justia Law