Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant made a public-records request to the City of South Euclid in care of the clerk of the city council. The clerk stated that he would forward the requested information, but because of an internal breakdown in communication, the City did not fulfill the request for nearly six months. Appellant filed a claim for a writ of mandamus, after which the oversight was discovered. The City subsequently provided the records responsive to Appellant’s request. Appellant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, contending that although the mandamus action was mooted by the production of records, she was entitled to a mandatory award of attorney fees. The court of appeals denied the motion for fees, concluding that Appellant had “failed to establish any viable public benefit.” The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) in considering the question of mandatory attorney fees, the court of appeals should have followed Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(C)(2)(b) rather than looking to public benefit; and (2) because the court did not have to render a judgment ordering the City to produce the records within a reasonable time, Appellant was ineligible for mandatory attorney fees under section 149.43(C)(2)(b). View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law

George Smith suffered an injury while working for Ohio State University. The Industrial Commission of Ohio allowed Smith’s claim for bilateral inguinal hernia. Tragically, Smith suffered brain damage resulting from postoperative complications from surgery to repair the hernia, leaving him in a persistent vegetative state. A doctor later concluded that Smith had bilateral vision and hearing loss caused by the loss of brain function. Smith sought additional scheduled awards for the loss of vision and hearing. However, no test could be performed to determine whether Smith suffered an actual loss of sight or hearing, and the medical evidence showed that Smith was unable to process sights and sounds because of damage to his brain, not because of any injury to his eyes or ears. The Industrial Commission denied Smith’s request for additional compensation based on the lack of any objective testing showing vision or hearing loss. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s denial of Smith’s claim, holding that the evidence supported a finding that Smith suffered from a loss of brain-stem function, a loss that has not been included in the schedule for compensation set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57. View "State ex rel. Smith v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant stole $550 worth of merchandise from a department store. At that time, Ohio Rev. Code 2913.02 classified that theft offense as a felony. Prior to sentencing, however, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 86, which made theft of property valued at less than $1,000 a misdemeanor. Thereafter, the trial court convicted Defendant of a misdemeanor. The appellate court reversed, holding that nothing in H.B. 86 provided that Defendant was entitled to benefit from the decrease in classification of the theft offense and should have been convicted of a felony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial court properly convicted and sentenced Defendant for a misdemeanor conviction, as the Legislature intended to afford the benefit of a decreased theft offense classification to offenders like Defendant. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, among other offenses. Judge Patricia Oney sentenced Appellant was sentenced to seven years’ incarceration. Appellant filed a petition in mandamus and prohibition in the court of appeals against Judge Oney regarding the legality of his sentence. The court of appeals granted Judge Oney’s motion to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant had brought an earlier mandamus case raising the same sentencing issues, which was previously dismissed by the court of appeals, Appellant’s mandamus claim was precluded by res judicata and was properly dismissed; and (2) because Appellant had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal and Judge Oney had subject-matter jurisdiction to try Appellant and to sentence him, the court of appeals properly dismissed the prohibition claim. View "State ex rel. Harsh v. Oney" on Justia Law

In 2003, Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravation with a firearm specification. The State and Defendant later agreed that Defendant could withdraw his guilty plea and instead plead guilty to aggravated robbery without a firearm specification and to one count of an attempt to have weapons while under a disability. The new agreement decreased Defendant’s sentence by six months. In 2009, Defendant pled guilty to attempted felonious assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment, to run consecutively to the sentence from the 2003 case. Defendant subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his 2007 plea and resentencing were void and he was therefore entitled to immediate release. The appellate court denied the writ, concluding that Defendant had already unsuccessfully pursued an adequate legal remedy to challenge his 2007 conviction and could not use habeas corpus to try again. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant’s claim was barred by res judicata. View "Smith v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission ("PUCO") approved of the first electric security plan of American Electric Power operating companies (collectively, “AEP”). The Supreme Court held that the Commission committed reversible error on three issues, including (1) approving the recovery of carrying costs associated with environmental investments without proper statutory authority, and (2) authorizing the provider-of-last-resort (“POLR”) charge without sufficient evidence. On remand, the Commission determined that the environmental-investment carrying costs were lawful but determined that the AEP had not presented evidence of its actual POLR costs and directed the company to deduct that charge from its tariff schedules. Following rehearing, the Office of Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) filed an appeal raising several challenges to the Commission’s remand orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Commission, holding that OCC and IEU did not carry their burden of showing reversible error in the Commission’s remand orders. View "In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty a violation of Ohio’s RICO statute and a predicate offense of trafficking in marijuana. The trial court imposed a six-year sentence for the RICO offense and an eight-year sentence for the trafficking offense, to be served consecutively. On appeal, Appellant asserted that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive prison sentences violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant’s separate sentences. Appellant appealed, arguing that the appellate court was required to apply the standard set forth in State v. Johnson in deciding whether the imposition of multiple convictions and sentences for a RICO offense and one or more of its predicate felonies violated the Allied Offenses statute and his rights under the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that State v. Johnson is not applicable to a RICO violation and that a RICO offense does not merge with its predicate offenses for purposes of sentencing. View "State v. Miranda" on Justia Law

In September 1991, Appellant was convicted in federal court of criminal offenses and sentenced to federal prison. Meanwhile, in January 1991, the Crawford County Sheriff’s Department served a warrant on Appellant for his arrest after his indictment in Crawford County. Appellant was arraigned in Crawford County then returned to federal custody. In April 1992, Appellant was returned to Crawford County, tried in a jury trial, and convicted of criminal offenses. On appeal, Appellant argued that his speedy-trial rights were violated under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The court of appeals affirmed on appeal and dismissed Appellant’s subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ denial of a writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) because Appellant was not returned to federal custody after April 1992 until his state court trial had been held, no violation of the IAD occurred; and (2) the court of appeal’s determination on appeal that no violation of the IAD occurred was res judicata as to Appellant’s claims in this case. View "State ex rel. Dye v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was visiting a friend, who was a tenant at an apartment building owned by Defendant, when Plaintiff suffered an injury while descending the common area stairs. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant had negligently failed to maintain adequate lighting on the premises. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant, holding (1) since Plaintiff was not a tenant but a business invitee, Defendant only owed her a duty of ordinary care; and (2) the open-and-obvious doctrine applied in this case to negate the duty of ordinary care. The court of appeals reversed, holding that tenants’ guests are entitled to the protections of Ohio Rev. Code 5321.04, that a landlord’s violation of section 5321.04 constitutes negligence per se, and that the open-and-obvious-danger doctrine does not apply when the landlord is negligent per se. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a landlord owes the statutory duty under section 5321.04 to keep all common areas of the premises in a safe condition to a tenant’s guest properly on the premises; and (2) a breach of that duty constitutes negligence per se and obviates the open-and-obvious-danger doctrine. View "Mann v. Northgate Investors, LLC" on Justia Law

After a car accident involving David Fraley and Timothy Oeding, Oeding’s insurer (“Auto-Owners”) placed an investigative hold on Fraley’s truck for several months. Fraley filed a negligence action against Oeding’s estate, Oeding’s employer (“J&R”), and Auto-Owners, alleging, among other things, that Auto-Owners’ investigatory hold caused Fraley intangible economic loss due to the loss of use of the truck. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding (1) the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Oeding and J&R solely because their insurer did business in Ohio, and (2) Fraley was not entitled to maintain a direct action against Auto-Owners because he had not obtained a judgment against Auto-Owners’ insureds. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in its determination that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Oeding and J&R because Auto-Owners’ investigatory hold and its communication with Fraley brought Auto-Owners, and by extension J&R and Oeding, within Ohio’s long-arm statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an Ohio court may not impute an insurance company’s conduct to its nonresident insured for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction over the insured. View "Fraley v. Estate of Oeding" on Justia Law