Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the wrongful-death action underlying this case, the trial court found a certain term in a commercial general liability policy, which was not defined in a policy, to be ambiguous and construed this language against the insurer. The court then found that the policy provided coverage in the wrongful-death action. The insurer appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in determining whether a policy provision is ambiguous, courts must consider the context in which the specific language of the provision is used; and (2) based on this rule, the policy provision in this case was not ambiguous and did not provide coverage. View "Sauer v. Crews" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Ohio Rev. Code 5721.25 permits a mortgage holder to redeem the mortgaged property when it is the subject of a tax foreclosure proceeding. Here, Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. (Vanderbilt) was the holder of both a promissory note and mortgage on certain property. Due to the mortgagors’ failure to pay taxes on the property, the county treasurer initiated a tax foreclosure proceeding for delinquent taxes. The question before the trial court was whether Vanderbilt had the right to redeem. The trial court concluded that Vanderbilt was a “person entitled to redeem” under section 5721.25, granted Vanderbilt’s motion to stay the confirmation of sale and to vacate and set aside the sheriff’s sale. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Vanderbilt was not entitled to redeem the property. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) “any person entitled to redeem the land” under section 5721.25 includes “any owner or lienholder of, or other person with an interest in” the property as set forth in section 5721.181; and (2) therefore, Vanderbilt, as a lienholder, was entitled to redeem the land. Remanded. View "In re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Land Taxes v. Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens" on Justia Law

On April 15, 2014, the Columbus Coalition for Responsive Government filed a precirculation copy of a proposed initiative ordinance with the Columbus city clerk. On July 15, 2014, the Coalition submitted 497 part-petitions to the clerk. Andrea Blevins, the Columbus city clerk, refused to submit the proposed initiative to city council on the grounds that the part-petitions were defective because the Coalition had failed to file a certified precirculation copy of the proposed initiative ordinance with the city auditor in compliance with Ohio Rev. Code 731.32. The Coalition sought a writ of mandamus to verify the petition signatures and submit the petition to city council. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that section 731.32 requires strict compliance. View "State ex rel. Columbus Coal. for Responsive Gov’t v. Blevins" on Justia Law

Appellee, an employee of the City of Warren, was appointed deputy bailiff/legal secretary to Judge Gysegem in 2007. In 2010, Appellee discussed with Judge Gysegem her wish to retire and receive Ohio Public Employees Retirement Systems (OPERS) benefits but to continue working for the judge. Consequently, the judge did not issue an entry terminating Appellee’s employment. Appellant, the auditor of the City, claimed he could not certify to OPERS Appellee’s final date and salary, which was required for Appellee to receive OPERS benefits. Appellee filed this mandamus case to compel Appellant to certify her final-earnable-salary date to OPERS. The court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant had no direct evidence of Appellee’s retirement, he had no clear legal duty to certify Appellee’s final-earnable-salary date. View "State ex rel. O’’Grady v. Griffing" on Justia Law

One of the exceptions to public employee membership in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS) is set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 145.03, which provides that a student employee is exempt from OPERS membership if the student requests exemption by submitting a form to OPERS, OPERS approves the exemption, and the student is “continuously employed” by the school. OPERS concluded that Appellants, five current and former student employees of Youngstown State University (YSU), had all requested exemptions and were all continuously employed by the university. Appellants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the exemption forms were invalid and that they were not “continuously employed” within the meaning of section 145.03. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) OPERS correctly interpreted the law to mean that the student employees were continuously employed even though YSU had a policy of terminating student employees at the end of the school year; and (2) OPERS was therefore correct in finding that Appellants needed to sign only one application for exemption from membership in OPERS at or near the time of their initial employment to be exempt from membership. View "State ex rel. Domhoff v. Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. Bd." on Justia Law

The question presented to the Supreme Court here was what evidence a juvenile is entitled to in discovery prior to a bindover hearing. In this case, the State filed a motion asking the juvenile court to relinquish jurisdiction and to have the Juvenile bound over to the general division of the court of common pleas for prosecution as an adult. Because the State failed to obey a court order during discovery to turn over police reports relating to the juvenile’s case, the juvenile court dismissed the case without prejudice. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Juv. R. 24 applies in bindover hearings, which imposes a duty on the prosecuting attorney to disclose to a juvenile respondent all evidence in the State’s possession that is favorable to the juvenile and material either to guilt, innocence, or punishment; and (2) it is an abuse of discretion for a juvenile court to dismiss a case for a prosecuting attorney’s failure to comply with a discovery order without first performing an in camera inspection of the withheld evidence to determine whether the evidence is discoverable under Juv. R. 24. Remanded. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law

Appellee filed an employment-discrimination action against the Dayton Police Department (DPD) and Major Mitchell Davis, her supervisor, alleging, inter alia, age- and sex-based discrimination in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. DPD and Davis filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Davis was entitled to immunity on the basis that a supervisor employed by a political subdivision cannot be held individually liable in a discrimination action. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment as it related to Appellee’s claim of sex discrimination under Chapter 4112 and denied the motion as it related to Davis’s claim of immunity. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis that Ohio Rev. Code 2744.03(A)(6)(c), which states that political-subdivision employees, such as Davis, are not entitled to immunity if civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 4112.01(A)(2) and 4112.02(A) do not expressly impose civil liability on political-subdivision employees so as to trigger the immunity exception in section 2744.03(A)(6)(c). View "Hauser v. Dayton Police Dep’t" on Justia Law

Torri Auer filed suit against real-estate broker Keller Williams Home Town Realty (Home Town) and its former real-estate agent, Jamie Paliath, alleging that Paliath had fraudulently induced her to purchase certain properties. Auer pursued her case against Home Town solely on the basis of respondeat superior liability. The jury returned verdicts against Paliath and Home Town, finding that Paliath had committed fraud and that Home Town was vicariously liable for Paliath’s fraud. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s error to instruct the jury on scope of agency as it related to Home Town’s vicarious liability was harmless because scope of agency was a matter of law and therefore outside the province of the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the instructions given in this case were erroneous and constituted reversible error because, in order to impose vicarious liability, a jury first must make a factual determination that the agent was acting within the scope of her agency when she committed the torts at issue. View "Auer v. Paliath" on Justia Law

Plunderbund Media, LLC sought the disclosure of records documenting threats against the governor that were kept by the Director of Public Safety. Legal counsel for the Department of Public Safety refused to produce any records based on Ohio Rev. Code 149.433, which exempts “security records” from disclosure under the Public Records Act. Plunderbund filed an action for a writ of mandamus to require the Department to produce the requested records. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding any records of threats made to the governor are “security records” and are therefore exempt from disclosure as public records under section 149.433. View "State ex rel. Plunderbund Media v. Born" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a commercial building consisting of a warehouse and office space. The tax year at issue was 2005. The property owner disagreed with the auditor’s valuation of the subject property and filed a complaint seeking a reduction. Before the Board of Revision (BOR) the owner presented a value using the income approach as an “owner’s opinion of value.” The BOR found the valuation evidence “competent, credible, and probative” and adopted the value suggested by that approach. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reinstated the auditor’s determination of value, determining that the income-approach valuation did not qualify as an admissible owner’s opinion and was not probative evidence of value in any event. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) certain expert testimony coupled with the income-approach valuation was competent evidence of value; and (2) the BTA may not revert to the auditor’s value when the BOR relied on competent evidence. View "Worthington City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law