Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the aggravated murder of Nichole McCorkle and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and the sentence of death, holding, among other things, that (1) the trial court did not err in admitting the autopsy report on McCorkle and by allowing a medical examiner, who did not conduct the autopsy, to testify about the autopsy results because an autopsy report that is neither prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual nor prepared for the primary purpose of providing evidence in a criminal trial is nontestimonial and its admission into evidence at trial as a business record does not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights; (2) trial counsel did not provide constitutionally ineffective assistance; and (3) the trial court did not err by failing to appoint a neurologist to develop mitigation.View "State v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Panther II Transportation, Inc. (Appellee) requested refunds for tax years 2005 and 2006, claiming that state law exempted it from the imposition of a local income tax on its net profit. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) concluded that state law preempted local tax on net profits as applied to “motor transportation companies” that are subject to state taxes, fees, and regulatory requirements, as was Appellee. The court of appeals affirmed. The Central Collection Agency and its tax administrator and the Seville Board of Income Tax Review appealed, arguing that the state law at issue did not preclude the imposition of generally applicable local income taxes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA and court of appeals correctly determined that the local tax on corporate net profits was preempted by state law.View "Panther II Transp., Inc. v. Seville Bd. of Income Tax Review" on Justia Law

In February 2013, the police chief of the Akron Police Department appointed Charles Brown as “acting chief of police,” a temporary assignment by the chief of police to administer the division of police during his absence. Relators, six of the nine police department captains who claimed that they were qualified to hold the positions of deputy police chief and acting police chief, sought a writ of quo warranto seeking to oust Brown from the positions of de facto deputy chief and acting chief of police. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Brown could not be ousted from the office of acting chief of police because there was no such office within the police command, and quo warranto does not lie to remove someone from a temporary assignment; and (2) because Brown did not hold the office of deputy chief or claim to be a deputy chief, he was not a de facto deputy chief for purposes of a quo warranto action, and therefore, he could not be ousted from that office.View "Calvaruso v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, importuning, gross sexual imposition, and public indecency. Each count related to an incident with B.P., a fourteen-year-old female. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and vacated all of Defendant’s convictions, sua sponte, determining that there was insufficient evidence to prove Defendant’s identity as the man who had committed the offenses against B.P. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the evidence of Defendant’s identity was overwhelming, and because neither party argued otherwise, the appellate court improperly decided the case on the basis of the new, unbriefed issue. View "State v. Tate" on Justia Law

Gerald Renfrow worked for Northern Southern Railway Company as a brakeman for approximately twenty-five years. Gerald, who smoked a pack and a half of cigarettes every day for fifty years, died in 2011 after a battle with lung cancer. Gerald’s widow, Cleo Renfrow, sued Norfolk Southern, alleging that Gerald’s asbestos exposure at Norfolk Southern caused him to develop lung cancer. Norfolk Southern filed a motion to administratively dismiss the complaint, arguing that Cleo failed to proffer the necessary prima facie evidence in support of the claims. The trial court denied the motion for administrative dismissal. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Cleo had provided sufficient evidence to prevent an administrative dismissal of the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cleo failed to make the prima facie showing required to withstand administrative dismissal of her tort action alleging an asbestos claim based on lung cancer. View "Renfrow v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the Public Utilities Commission’s first annual review of the fuel-adjustment clause (FAC) mechanism that was part of the first electric security plan (ESP) for two American Electric Power operating companies, Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power Company. The FAC allowed the companies to recover fuel costs for providing generation service as those costs were incurred without being required to file a new rate case. An auditor found that the companies had underrecovered fuel costs through the FAC in 2009. After review, the Commission concluded (1) all of the proceeds that AEP had received from a 2008 contract settlement agreement with a coal supplier should be offset against Ohio Power’s FAC underrecovery; and (2) only the share of the settlement proceeds allocable to Ohio retail customers must be credited. Ohio Power appealed, and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s orders, holding that Ohio Power and IEU did not carry their burden of showing reversible error in the Commission’s orders. View "In re Fuel Adjustment Clauses for Columbus S. Power Co. & Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

Donald Burkhart (Burkhart) died after developing mesothelioma. Mary Lou Burkhart (Claimant) filed a claim against H.J. Heinz Company (Employer), Burkhart’s former employer, seeking workers compensation benefits. In making her case that Employer had injuriously exposed Burkhart to asbestos, Claimant sought to admit deposition testimony Burkhart had given in a products-liability action he had filed against various asbestos manufacturers. On appeal from the Industrial Commission’s adverse ruling against Claimant, the trial court struck Burkhart’s testimony from the record and granted summary judgment for Employer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was admissible because the manufacturers in the asbestos litigation were predecessors-in-interest to Employer for purposes of Ohio R. Evid. 804(B)(1) in that they shared a similar motive to develop Burkhart’s testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was not admissible pursuant to Rule 804(B)(1) because the asbestos manufacturers that cross-examined Burkhart were neither predecessors-in-interest to Employer nor had a similar motive to develop the deposition testimony through cross-examination. View "Burkhart v. H.J. Heinz Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the State must prove a culpable mental state with respect to the element of the offense of robbery contained in Ohio Rev. Code 2911.02(A)(3) that the offender did “[u]se or threaten the immediate use of force against another.” After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of robbery. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the State had to prove that he had recklessly used force while committing or attempting to commit theft. The court of appeals agreed with Defendant and reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 2901.21(B), the statute for determining whether an offense imposes strict liability or requires proof of recklessness, applies only when a mental state is not specified in a section defining an offense; (2) because section 2911.02 defines every robbery to include the culpable mental states of the predicate theft offense, section 2901.21(B) does not apply; and (3) therefore, the State need not prove a culpable mental state with respect to the force element in section 2911.02(A)(3). View "State v. Tolliver" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals seeking an order compelling the Director of Rehabilitation and Correction to hold an immediate hearing and grant Appellant release from incarceration. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint on the basis that Appellant failed to file with his complaint several of the documents required by Ohio 2969.25. The Supreme Court affirmed because failure to comply with the requirements of section 2969.25 requires dismissal of an inmate’s complaint, and Appellant’s belated attempt to cure the defects in his complaint was to no avail, as the documents required the statute must be filed with the complaint. View "State ex rel. Hall v. Mohr" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated murder and other felony offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) even if the trial court overstepped its bounds in conducting an Adkins hearing, no prejudice occurred; (2) Defendant’s waiver of a jury trial was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; (3) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct; (4) Defendant’s counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance; (5) the three-judge panel did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights by choosing to give certain mitigating evidence no weight and limited weight; and (6) Defendant’s remaining claims similarly failed. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law