Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio filed with the Supreme Court a certified copy of a judgment entry of a felony conviction against Rosenfield, a Cleveland attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Ohio. The court suspended Rosenfield from the practice of law for an interim period, pending disciplinary counsel’s investigation and the commencement of disciplinary proceedings. View "In re Rosenfield" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a trial court must engage in judicial fact-finding prior to imposing consecutive sentences on an offender. In this case, Appellant was sentenced to consecutive sentences aggregating eight years and five months for convictions arising out of four instances in which Appellant took $117 in change from vending machines. On appeal, Appellant argued that the imposition of consecutive sentences was contrary to law because the trial court did not expressly make the findings mandated by Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(C)(4) and did not provide reasons in support of those findings when imposing consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding (1) a trial court is required to make the findings required by section 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but the court has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings; and (2) the trial court in this case did not make all of the findings required by section 2929.14(C)(4) at the time it imposed consecutive sentences, and neither did it incorporate all of the necessary findings into its judgment entry. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Bonnell" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases, the trial court sentenced a felony offender to one or more community-control sanctions without first ordering and reviewing a presentence investigation report. In both cases, the sanction ordered was a sentence of pre-trial jail time served following a plea. The Supreme Court entered judgment in favor of the defendants in both cases, holding that, although requiring a presentence investigation for every felony conviction when the offender is not sent to prison is excessive and unwarranted, a trial court acts contrary to law when it imposes a sentence of one or more community-control sanctions on a felony offender without first ordering and reviewing a presentence investigation report. View "State v. Amos" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant was convicted and sentenced to prison. In 2013, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of procedendo against Judge James D. Jensen, asserting that Judge Jensen failed to rule on a motion to dismiss the indictment in his criminal matter. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the petition for the writ because there was no indication that the motion to dismiss had been filed. The Supreme Court affirmed but for a different reason, holding that Appellant’s petition was fatally defective because Appellant named the wrong party as the respondent, where Judge Michael Goulding was currently assigned to Appellant’s case in the court of common pleas. View "State ex rel. Johnson v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Appellant was ordered to pay restitution to several victims as part of his sentence for a criminal conviction. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking public records, claiming that despite several requests, Appellee failed to provide him with certified copies of the victim-loss statement for each victim. The court of appeals issued an alternative writ ordering Appellee to respond to the complaint, to which Appellee responded that she was not and had ever been in possession of the documents Appellant was seeking. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition because Appellant failed to file the documentation required by Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25 with his petition and because he failed to show that the victim-loss statements that he requested existed. View "State ex rel. Gooden v. Kagel" on Justia Law

In 2010, the juvenile court found H.V. to be delinquent and committed him to a minimum six-month term commitment to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS). H.V. was subsequently placed on supervised release. Thereafter, H.V. was charged with second-degree felonious assault and with violating the terms of his supervised release. The juvenile court judge revoked H.V.’s supervised release and committed him to a minimum ninety-day commitment to the ODYS. Five days later, the judge found H.V. to be delinquent and committed him to the ODYS for a minimum one year commitment. The court ordered that the ninety-day term imposed for the violation of supervised release would run consecutively to the one-year term imposed for the felonious assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a juvenile court has the authority to commit a delinquent juvenile to the ODYS for a minimum period in excess of thirty days for violating his supervised release; and (2) in committing a juvenile to the ODYS for a supervised-release violation, a juvenile court can order that the commitment period be served consecutively to the commitment period imposed for that crime that resulted in the violation of supervised release. View "In re H.V." on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with several offenses stemming from two separate shootings. Appellant was age seventeen when the offenses were committed. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Appellant contended that his sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s sentence was proper under Miller v. Alabama because the sentence imposed in this case was not mandatory but, rather, an exercise of the trial court’s discretion; and (2) the trial court did not violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to consider Appellant’s youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to consider youth as a mitigating factor when sentencing a child to life without parole for homicide, and the record must reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile offender’s youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing when a prison term of life without parole is imposed; and (2) because Appellant might not have been given the benefit of the consideration of youth as a mitigating factor, his sentence did not comport with the procedural strictures of Miller. View "State v. Long" on Justia Law

In 2006, U-Store-It, L.P. acquired several self-storage facilities in Franklin County in a bulk purchase. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopted the 2006 sale prices as the value of those properties for the 2006 tax year. U-Store-It appealed, arguing (1) the sale involved related parties and thus could not qualify as an arm’s-length transaction for purposes of valuing the properties; and (2) the sale prices could not be used because they included consideration paid for personal property as well as real property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in adopting the 2006 sale prices as the value of the properties at issue. View "Hilliard City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellee was charged with criminal child enticement. The complaint alleged that Appellee had asked a child to carry some boxes to his apartment in exchange for money, which conduct allegedly constituted a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2905.05(A). Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the criminal child enticement statute was unconstitutional because it was overbroad. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that section 2905.05(A) was unconstitutionally overbroad. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the criminal child enticement statute could not survive constitutional scrutiny due to its overbreadth. View "State v. Romage" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to a third-degree felony violation of former Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(A), which resulted in his fourth DUI conviction and second felony DUI conviction. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a lifetime drivers license suspension. Nine years later, Defendant moved for limited driving privileges. The trial court granted those privileges for daylight hours only. The State appealed, arguing that granting limited driving privileges violated former Ohio Rev. Code 4510.54(A), which prohibited the modification of lifetime suspension for the first fifteen years. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 4510.13(A)(5)(g)(i) gives a trial court discretion to grant limited driving privileges during a lifetime suspension. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that when a trial court grants limited driving privileges and issues an entry in compliance with Ohio Rev. Code 4510.021(A), which directs that driving privileges shall be for certain enumerated limited purposes, that grant is not a modification of a lifetime suspension within the meaning for former section 4510.54(A). Remanded for the trial court to issue a new entry in conformity with section 4510.021(A). View "State v. Manocchio" on Justia Law