Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee, an employee of the City of Warren, was appointed deputy bailiff/legal secretary to Judge Gysegem in 2007. In 2010, Appellee discussed with Judge Gysegem her wish to retire and receive Ohio Public Employees Retirement Systems (OPERS) benefits but to continue working for the judge. Consequently, the judge did not issue an entry terminating Appellee’s employment. Appellant, the auditor of the City, claimed he could not certify to OPERS Appellee’s final date and salary, which was required for Appellee to receive OPERS benefits. Appellee filed this mandamus case to compel Appellant to certify her final-earnable-salary date to OPERS. The court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant had no direct evidence of Appellee’s retirement, he had no clear legal duty to certify Appellee’s final-earnable-salary date. View "State ex rel. O’’Grady v. Griffing" on Justia Law

One of the exceptions to public employee membership in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS) is set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 145.03, which provides that a student employee is exempt from OPERS membership if the student requests exemption by submitting a form to OPERS, OPERS approves the exemption, and the student is “continuously employed” by the school. OPERS concluded that Appellants, five current and former student employees of Youngstown State University (YSU), had all requested exemptions and were all continuously employed by the university. Appellants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the exemption forms were invalid and that they were not “continuously employed” within the meaning of section 145.03. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) OPERS correctly interpreted the law to mean that the student employees were continuously employed even though YSU had a policy of terminating student employees at the end of the school year; and (2) OPERS was therefore correct in finding that Appellants needed to sign only one application for exemption from membership in OPERS at or near the time of their initial employment to be exempt from membership. View "State ex rel. Domhoff v. Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. Bd." on Justia Law

The question presented to the Supreme Court here was what evidence a juvenile is entitled to in discovery prior to a bindover hearing. In this case, the State filed a motion asking the juvenile court to relinquish jurisdiction and to have the Juvenile bound over to the general division of the court of common pleas for prosecution as an adult. Because the State failed to obey a court order during discovery to turn over police reports relating to the juvenile’s case, the juvenile court dismissed the case without prejudice. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Juv. R. 24 applies in bindover hearings, which imposes a duty on the prosecuting attorney to disclose to a juvenile respondent all evidence in the State’s possession that is favorable to the juvenile and material either to guilt, innocence, or punishment; and (2) it is an abuse of discretion for a juvenile court to dismiss a case for a prosecuting attorney’s failure to comply with a discovery order without first performing an in camera inspection of the withheld evidence to determine whether the evidence is discoverable under Juv. R. 24. Remanded. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law

Appellee filed an employment-discrimination action against the Dayton Police Department (DPD) and Major Mitchell Davis, her supervisor, alleging, inter alia, age- and sex-based discrimination in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. DPD and Davis filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Davis was entitled to immunity on the basis that a supervisor employed by a political subdivision cannot be held individually liable in a discrimination action. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment as it related to Appellee’s claim of sex discrimination under Chapter 4112 and denied the motion as it related to Davis’s claim of immunity. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis that Ohio Rev. Code 2744.03(A)(6)(c), which states that political-subdivision employees, such as Davis, are not entitled to immunity if civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 4112.01(A)(2) and 4112.02(A) do not expressly impose civil liability on political-subdivision employees so as to trigger the immunity exception in section 2744.03(A)(6)(c). View "Hauser v. Dayton Police Dep’t" on Justia Law

Torri Auer filed suit against real-estate broker Keller Williams Home Town Realty (Home Town) and its former real-estate agent, Jamie Paliath, alleging that Paliath had fraudulently induced her to purchase certain properties. Auer pursued her case against Home Town solely on the basis of respondeat superior liability. The jury returned verdicts against Paliath and Home Town, finding that Paliath had committed fraud and that Home Town was vicariously liable for Paliath’s fraud. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s error to instruct the jury on scope of agency as it related to Home Town’s vicarious liability was harmless because scope of agency was a matter of law and therefore outside the province of the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the instructions given in this case were erroneous and constituted reversible error because, in order to impose vicarious liability, a jury first must make a factual determination that the agent was acting within the scope of her agency when she committed the torts at issue. View "Auer v. Paliath" on Justia Law

Plunderbund Media, LLC sought the disclosure of records documenting threats against the governor that were kept by the Director of Public Safety. Legal counsel for the Department of Public Safety refused to produce any records based on Ohio Rev. Code 149.433, which exempts “security records” from disclosure under the Public Records Act. Plunderbund filed an action for a writ of mandamus to require the Department to produce the requested records. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding any records of threats made to the governor are “security records” and are therefore exempt from disclosure as public records under section 149.433. View "State ex rel. Plunderbund Media v. Born" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a commercial building consisting of a warehouse and office space. The tax year at issue was 2005. The property owner disagreed with the auditor’s valuation of the subject property and filed a complaint seeking a reduction. Before the Board of Revision (BOR) the owner presented a value using the income approach as an “owner’s opinion of value.” The BOR found the valuation evidence “competent, credible, and probative” and adopted the value suggested by that approach. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reinstated the auditor’s determination of value, determining that the income-approach valuation did not qualify as an admissible owner’s opinion and was not probative evidence of value in any event. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) certain expert testimony coupled with the income-approach valuation was competent evidence of value; and (2) the BTA may not revert to the auditor’s value when the BOR relied on competent evidence. View "Worthington City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2010, almost ten years after he had left his employment with his employer, Formica Corporation, Appellant applied for temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s application, concluding that Appellant’s failure to search for work since leaving Formica was evidence that he had abandoned the job market and retired, making him ineligible to receive further compensation. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the evidence supported the Commission’s decision that Appellant intended to voluntarily abandon the workforce when his employment with Formica ended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err when it determined that the Commission’s order was supported by sufficient evidence that Appellant had already abandoned the entire workforce when he applied for TTD compensation in 2010. View "State ex rel. Floyd v. Formica Corp." on Justia Law

The new owner of an arena football team applied for workers’ compensation coverage. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation concluded that the new owner was a successor employer for workers’ compensation purposes and that it would base the new owners’ premium rate on the experience of the former owner. The new owner filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Bureau abused its discretion by finding that the new owner was a successor to the former owner for workers’ compensation purposes and by failing to adequately explain its decision. A magistrate concluded that the Bureau abused its discretion in transferring the entire experience of the former owner, concluding that if only a portion of the former owner’s business was transferred to the new owner, then the experience rating is transferred in proportion to the business that was transferred. The court of appeals agreed with the magistrate’s decision and granted the new owner’s request for a writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bureau abused its discretion by transferring the entire experience rating of the former owner. View "State ex rel. Cleveland Prof’l Football, LLC v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the calculation of his jail-time credit and contending that aggregation of his sentences constituted double jeopardy. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) habeas corpus does not lie to challenge the calculation of jail-time credit when a petitioner has an adequate remedy by appeal to raise the issue; (2) double jeopardy claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus; and (3) because Petitioner was not entitled to immediate release he failed to state a claim in habeas. View "Johnson v. Crutchfield" on Justia Law