Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, importuning, gross sexual imposition, and public indecency. Each count related to an incident with B.P., a fourteen-year-old female. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and vacated all of Defendant’s convictions, sua sponte, determining that there was insufficient evidence to prove Defendant’s identity as the man who had committed the offenses against B.P. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the evidence of Defendant’s identity was overwhelming, and because neither party argued otherwise, the appellate court improperly decided the case on the basis of the new, unbriefed issue. View "State v. Tate" on Justia Law

Gerald Renfrow worked for Northern Southern Railway Company as a brakeman for approximately twenty-five years. Gerald, who smoked a pack and a half of cigarettes every day for fifty years, died in 2011 after a battle with lung cancer. Gerald’s widow, Cleo Renfrow, sued Norfolk Southern, alleging that Gerald’s asbestos exposure at Norfolk Southern caused him to develop lung cancer. Norfolk Southern filed a motion to administratively dismiss the complaint, arguing that Cleo failed to proffer the necessary prima facie evidence in support of the claims. The trial court denied the motion for administrative dismissal. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Cleo had provided sufficient evidence to prevent an administrative dismissal of the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cleo failed to make the prima facie showing required to withstand administrative dismissal of her tort action alleging an asbestos claim based on lung cancer. View "Renfrow v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the Public Utilities Commission’s first annual review of the fuel-adjustment clause (FAC) mechanism that was part of the first electric security plan (ESP) for two American Electric Power operating companies, Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power Company. The FAC allowed the companies to recover fuel costs for providing generation service as those costs were incurred without being required to file a new rate case. An auditor found that the companies had underrecovered fuel costs through the FAC in 2009. After review, the Commission concluded (1) all of the proceeds that AEP had received from a 2008 contract settlement agreement with a coal supplier should be offset against Ohio Power’s FAC underrecovery; and (2) only the share of the settlement proceeds allocable to Ohio retail customers must be credited. Ohio Power appealed, and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s orders, holding that Ohio Power and IEU did not carry their burden of showing reversible error in the Commission’s orders. View "In re Fuel Adjustment Clauses for Columbus S. Power Co. & Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

Donald Burkhart (Burkhart) died after developing mesothelioma. Mary Lou Burkhart (Claimant) filed a claim against H.J. Heinz Company (Employer), Burkhart’s former employer, seeking workers compensation benefits. In making her case that Employer had injuriously exposed Burkhart to asbestos, Claimant sought to admit deposition testimony Burkhart had given in a products-liability action he had filed against various asbestos manufacturers. On appeal from the Industrial Commission’s adverse ruling against Claimant, the trial court struck Burkhart’s testimony from the record and granted summary judgment for Employer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was admissible because the manufacturers in the asbestos litigation were predecessors-in-interest to Employer for purposes of Ohio R. Evid. 804(B)(1) in that they shared a similar motive to develop Burkhart’s testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was not admissible pursuant to Rule 804(B)(1) because the asbestos manufacturers that cross-examined Burkhart were neither predecessors-in-interest to Employer nor had a similar motive to develop the deposition testimony through cross-examination. View "Burkhart v. H.J. Heinz Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the State must prove a culpable mental state with respect to the element of the offense of robbery contained in Ohio Rev. Code 2911.02(A)(3) that the offender did “[u]se or threaten the immediate use of force against another.” After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of robbery. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the State had to prove that he had recklessly used force while committing or attempting to commit theft. The court of appeals agreed with Defendant and reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 2901.21(B), the statute for determining whether an offense imposes strict liability or requires proof of recklessness, applies only when a mental state is not specified in a section defining an offense; (2) because section 2911.02 defines every robbery to include the culpable mental states of the predicate theft offense, section 2901.21(B) does not apply; and (3) therefore, the State need not prove a culpable mental state with respect to the force element in section 2911.02(A)(3). View "State v. Tolliver" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals seeking an order compelling the Director of Rehabilitation and Correction to hold an immediate hearing and grant Appellant release from incarceration. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint on the basis that Appellant failed to file with his complaint several of the documents required by Ohio 2969.25. The Supreme Court affirmed because failure to comply with the requirements of section 2969.25 requires dismissal of an inmate’s complaint, and Appellant’s belated attempt to cure the defects in his complaint was to no avail, as the documents required the statute must be filed with the complaint. View "State ex rel. Hall v. Mohr" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated murder and other felony offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) even if the trial court overstepped its bounds in conducting an Adkins hearing, no prejudice occurred; (2) Defendant’s waiver of a jury trial was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; (3) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct; (4) Defendant’s counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance; (5) the three-judge panel did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights by choosing to give certain mitigating evidence no weight and limited weight; and (6) Defendant’s remaining claims similarly failed. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In the wrongful-death action underlying this case, the trial court found a certain term in a commercial general liability policy, which was not defined in a policy, to be ambiguous and construed this language against the insurer. The court then found that the policy provided coverage in the wrongful-death action. The insurer appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in determining whether a policy provision is ambiguous, courts must consider the context in which the specific language of the provision is used; and (2) based on this rule, the policy provision in this case was not ambiguous and did not provide coverage. View "Sauer v. Crews" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Ohio Rev. Code 5721.25 permits a mortgage holder to redeem the mortgaged property when it is the subject of a tax foreclosure proceeding. Here, Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. (Vanderbilt) was the holder of both a promissory note and mortgage on certain property. Due to the mortgagors’ failure to pay taxes on the property, the county treasurer initiated a tax foreclosure proceeding for delinquent taxes. The question before the trial court was whether Vanderbilt had the right to redeem. The trial court concluded that Vanderbilt was a “person entitled to redeem” under section 5721.25, granted Vanderbilt’s motion to stay the confirmation of sale and to vacate and set aside the sheriff’s sale. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Vanderbilt was not entitled to redeem the property. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) “any person entitled to redeem the land” under section 5721.25 includes “any owner or lienholder of, or other person with an interest in” the property as set forth in section 5721.181; and (2) therefore, Vanderbilt, as a lienholder, was entitled to redeem the land. Remanded. View "In re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Land Taxes v. Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens" on Justia Law

On April 15, 2014, the Columbus Coalition for Responsive Government filed a precirculation copy of a proposed initiative ordinance with the Columbus city clerk. On July 15, 2014, the Coalition submitted 497 part-petitions to the clerk. Andrea Blevins, the Columbus city clerk, refused to submit the proposed initiative to city council on the grounds that the part-petitions were defective because the Coalition had failed to file a certified precirculation copy of the proposed initiative ordinance with the city auditor in compliance with Ohio Rev. Code 731.32. The Coalition sought a writ of mandamus to verify the petition signatures and submit the petition to city council. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that section 731.32 requires strict compliance. View "State ex rel. Columbus Coal. for Responsive Gov’t v. Blevins" on Justia Law