Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Buckeye Energy Brokers, a certified provider of competitive retail electric service a competitive retail natural-gas service, filed an amended complaint with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio against Palmer Energy Company, an energy-management and consulting firm. Buckeye claimed that Palmer, one of its alleged competitors, violated Ohio Rev. Code 4928.08 and 4929.20 by acting without a certificate as a broker in arranging for the supply of competitive retail electric and natural-gas services in Ohio. The Commission held that Buckeye failed to prove its allegations, concluding that Palmer had provided services to clients as a consultant, not as a broker. The Supreme Court dismissed Buckeye’s appeal without reaching the merits, holding that Buckeye failed to show that it suffered prejudice or harm from the Commission’s orders. View "In re Complaint of Buckeye Energy Brokers v. Palmer Energy Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant injured her lower back while working for Employer, who was self-insured. Later that year, Employer discharged Appellant for violating the company’s absenteeism policy and failing to accept the light-duty work offered. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, concluding that Appellant had abandoned her employment and that the abandonment barred payment of TTD compensation. Three and a half years after the denial of benefits, Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The appellate court denied the writ, concluding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s request for TTD benefits, as her conduct had amounted to a voluntary abandonment of employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s request for compensation, as the Commission’s order was supported by the evidence. View "State ex rel. Jacobs v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Relators circulated petitions in support of a proposed amendment to the city charter that would nullify an ordinance establishing a development plan for property in downtown Powell, Ohio. The city counsel considered the proposed ballot measure and voted unanimously not to submit the amendment to the voters, concluding that the charter amendment constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority into private hands. Realtors sought a writ of mandamus to compel the city council and city clerk to place their proposed charter amendment on the November 4, 2014 ballot. The Supreme Court held that the city council properly refused to place the matter on the ballot because the terms of the proposed charter initiative were unconstitutional. Relators then filed a motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration and granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the council acted unlawfully when if failed to place the amendment before the voters, as the proper time for an aggrieved party to challenge the constitutionality of the charter amendment is after the voters approve the measure. View "State ex rel. Ebersole v. Powell" on Justia Law

On December 30, 2013, Steven Linnabary filed a declaration of candidacy and nominating petition to run in the Libertarian primary for the office of attorney general. Secretary of State Jon Husted certified Linnabary’s candidacy for the May 6, 2014 ballot. Carl Akers subsequently filed a protest against Linnabary’s candidacy. After a hearing officer issued his report rejecting certain part petitions circulated on behalf of Linnabary due to noncompliance, Husted issued a decision letter adopting the hearing officer’s conclusions, which resulted in a finding that Linnabary no longer had sufficient signatures to qualify for the primary ballot. On March 10, 2014, Linnabary sought a writ of mandamus to compel Husted to restore his name to the ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that Husted reasonably concluded that the part petitions should be invalidated for noncompliance.View "State ex rel. Linnabary v. Husted" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two felony counts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OVI), each with a specification that he had been convicted of or pled guilty to five or more OVI violations or equivalent offenses within the previous twenty years. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Appellant filed a complaint for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals naming the judge who had presided over his criminal trial as respondent, claiming that his conviction and sentence under the specification were void because the jury never found that he had been convicted of five felony OVI offenses. The court of appeals dismissed the motion, concluding that Appellant had adequate remedies at law to challenge his sentencing entry. The Supreme court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal, and even if the Court were to reach the merits, Appellant’s arguments were unavailing. View "State ex rel. Beechler v. Rastatter" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted on one count of rape. After a jury trial, Appellant was found not guilty of rape and not guilty of sexual battery but guilty of the lesser included offense of gross sexual imposition. The court of appeals remanded the case, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of gross sexual imposition over Appellant’s objection; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for gross sexual imposition but that there was sufficient evidence to prove the lesser included offense of sexual imposition. Upon remand, the trial court found that Appellant was guilty of sexual imposition. Appellant appealed, arguing that, as a matter of trial strategy, a defendant has a right to present an “all or nothing defense” and refuse any lesser-included offenses instructions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a defendant does not have such a trial, and the trial court, after reviewing the evidence, must give an instruction on a lesser included offense if its is possible for the trier of fact to find the defendant not guilty of the greater offense and guilty of the lesser offense. View "State v. Wine" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Supreme Court ousted George Maier as sheriff of Stark County based on Maier’s failure to meet the employment qualifications. Maier subsequently went back to work full-time for Harrison County as a deputy sheriff. The Stark County Democratic Central Committee believed this employment cured the defect in Maier’s qualifications and again appointed him Stark County Sheriff. Thereafter, Maier submitted an application to be a candidate for sheriff in the May 6, 2014 Democratic primary election. Relator filed a protest with the Stark County Board of Elections (“BOE”), claiming that Maier remained unqualified to be a candidate for sheriff. The BOE’s hearing on the protest resulted in a tie vote. Secretary of State Jon Husted broke the tie in favor of denying the protest. Relator filed this action in prohibition to order the BOE and Husted to remove a BOE member for purposes of this protest for alleged bias and to order Husted to remove Maier from the primary ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that neither Husted nor the BOE had the clear authority to remove a board of elections member for bias and because Husted did not abuse his discretion in allowing Maier to remain on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Balas-Bratton v. Husted" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to multiple criminal offenses, both state and federal. Appellant sought release from prison, arguing that the sentencing entry was ambiguous regarding whether his state sentences were to be served concurrently or consecutively to his federal sentence, and as a result, the sentences must be concurrent. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) habeas corpus was inappropriate in this case because sentencing errors are not cognizable in habeas corpus; (2) the availability of other adequate remedies at law also precludes relief in habeas corpus; and (3) even if Appellant could overcome the problems with habeas in this case, his arguments were without merit because the sentencing entry was not ambiguous. View "State ex rel. O’'Neal v. Bunting" on Justia Law

While she was a 2012 judicial candidate for the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, Respondent, who had previously served on the Eleventh District Court of Appeals but was no longer an incumbent judge, wore a name badge identifying herself as a judge of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals. A five-member judicial commission found that, during the campaign, Respondent violated Jud. Cond. R. 4.3(A). The Supreme Court affirmed the commission’s order in part, holding (1) the portion of Rule 4.3(A) that prohibits a judicial candidate from conveying information about the judicial candidate or candidate’s opponent that the candidate knows to be false is not an overbroad restriction on speech and is not unconstitutionally vague; and (2) the portion of Rule 4.3(A) that prohibits a judicial candidate from knowingly or recklessly conveying information about the candidate or the candidate’s opponent that, if true, would deceive or mislead a reasonable person is unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court severed the unconstitutional portion of the rule, found that Respondent committed one rather than two violations, and agreed with the commission that a remand is appropriate. View "In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against O’’Toole" on Justia Law

In 1995, Todd Plassman pled guilty to several counts of rape. Plassman was sentenced to indefinite terms of nine to twenty-five years, to be served concurrently but consecutively to his sentence imposed in another case. Over the years, Plassman filed, unsuccessfully, a variety of actions attempting to enforce the alleged limit on his sentence. In this instant case, Plassman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the prosecutor and judge in his 1995 case agreed off the record that he would serve no more than a ten-year term of imprisonment if he pled guilty. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the issues Plassman raised were not only res judicata but were barred from consideration in habeas corpus due to the availability of other remedies. View "Plassman v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth." on Justia Law