Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to aggravated murder and related charges. A three-judge panel sentenced Defendant to death on the capital charge and to various prison terms for the noncapital offenses. The Supreme Court twice vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing. After the three-judge panel issued a new sentencing entry, Defendant appealed, raising five propositions of law. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s sentence, holding (1) discovery was not improperly denied following the second; (2) the panel did not impose consecutive terms of postrelease control; and (3) the remainder of Defendant’s arguments were barred by res judicata. View "State v. Ketterer" on Justia Law

In this divorce action, the trial court concluded that Husband’s unvested military benefits could not be divided because the military retirement benefits were a “mere expectancy.” The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that there was no need to decide whether unvested pension benefits were a marital asset because there was insufficient evidence regarding Husband’s retirement benefits to require division of the asset. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the unvested military retirement benefits earned during the marriage fell within the definition of marital property in Ohio Rev. Code 3105.171(A)(3)(a) and must be considered for division under section 3105.171(C); and (2) the trial court had enough information in this case to make an equitable division of the benefits. Remanded.View "Daniel v. Daniel" on Justia Law

In 2008, Appellant was sentenced after pleading guilty to sixteen counts of breaking and entering and one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. The 2008 sentencing order was superseded by two subsequent orders, including a resentencing order. In 2013, Appellant filed an original action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the common pleas court judge to resentence him, arguing that his first sentencing order was void based on five defects. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to establish any defect in his current sentence and therefore failed to show he had a legal right to a new sentencing hearing. View "State ex rel. Kirkpatrick v. Rice" on Justia Law

Appellants owned the mineral rights and the State owned the surface rights to a certain tract of land. When the property was transferred to the State, the seller reserved all mineral rights and “reasonable surface right privileges.” Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a determination that they were entitled to surface-mine a reasonable portion of the property. The court of common pleas granted summary judgment for the State, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract entitled Appellants to surface-mine the property, subject to the reasonableness standard of the contract. Remanded. View "Snyder v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res." on Justia Law

Thomas Brown ran unsuccessfully to become the Democratic nominee for a seat on the Ashtabula County common pleas court in the Democratic Party primary election. Brown subsequently filed nominating petitions to be a judicial candidate on the Ashtabula County Western Area Court in the general election. The Ashtabula County Board of Elections (Board) rejected Brown’s petitions based on the ballot-access restrictions set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 3513.04. Relators, including Brown, subsequently sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Board and its director (collectively, Respondents) to certify Brown’s candidacy for the Western Area Court, asserting that section 3513.04 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relators failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality and failed to demonstrate that section 3513.04 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

William Glick filed a class action suit against Raymond Wohl, in his official capacity of the clerk of the municipal court, among other defendants, seeking declaratory and equitable relief related to Glick's municipal court sentences he alleged to be void for imposing unlawfully excessive court costs. The common pleas court determined that Glick’s class action against Wohl was viable, declared that multiple costs assessed against Glick as part of his sentence were unlawful, and held that Glick and other class members who had been assessed unlawful costs were owed a refund. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the class action was not viable, and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Wohl. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the relief requested by Glick in his class action was in substance a request to vacate a portion of a judgment of the municipal court; and (2) because a court of common pleas has no power to vacate an order rendered by a municipal court, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Wohl. Remanded. View "Lingo v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of a number of offenses, including two counts of aggravated murder with capital specifications. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed several post-trial motions, including motions for resentencing and a new trial, to no avail. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of procedendo to order the judge of the county court of common pleas to resentence him and to issue a final, appealable sentencing order in his criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the motion on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of procedendo because he raised these same issues before and had an adequate remedy by way of appeal in previous cases.View "State ex rel. Williams v. Hunter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the aggravated murder of Nichole McCorkle and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and the sentence of death, holding, among other things, that (1) the trial court did not err in admitting the autopsy report on McCorkle and by allowing a medical examiner, who did not conduct the autopsy, to testify about the autopsy results because an autopsy report that is neither prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual nor prepared for the primary purpose of providing evidence in a criminal trial is nontestimonial and its admission into evidence at trial as a business record does not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights; (2) trial counsel did not provide constitutionally ineffective assistance; and (3) the trial court did not err by failing to appoint a neurologist to develop mitigation.View "State v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Panther II Transportation, Inc. (Appellee) requested refunds for tax years 2005 and 2006, claiming that state law exempted it from the imposition of a local income tax on its net profit. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) concluded that state law preempted local tax on net profits as applied to “motor transportation companies” that are subject to state taxes, fees, and regulatory requirements, as was Appellee. The court of appeals affirmed. The Central Collection Agency and its tax administrator and the Seville Board of Income Tax Review appealed, arguing that the state law at issue did not preclude the imposition of generally applicable local income taxes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA and court of appeals correctly determined that the local tax on corporate net profits was preempted by state law.View "Panther II Transp., Inc. v. Seville Bd. of Income Tax Review" on Justia Law

In February 2013, the police chief of the Akron Police Department appointed Charles Brown as “acting chief of police,” a temporary assignment by the chief of police to administer the division of police during his absence. Relators, six of the nine police department captains who claimed that they were qualified to hold the positions of deputy police chief and acting police chief, sought a writ of quo warranto seeking to oust Brown from the positions of de facto deputy chief and acting chief of police. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Brown could not be ousted from the office of acting chief of police because there was no such office within the police command, and quo warranto does not lie to remove someone from a temporary assignment; and (2) because Brown did not hold the office of deputy chief or claim to be a deputy chief, he was not a de facto deputy chief for purposes of a quo warranto action, and therefore, he could not be ousted from that office.View "Calvaruso v. Brown" on Justia Law