Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While she was a 2012 judicial candidate for the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, Respondent, who had previously served on the Eleventh District Court of Appeals but was no longer an incumbent judge, wore a name badge identifying herself as a judge of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals. A five-member judicial commission found that, during the campaign, Respondent violated Jud. Cond. R. 4.3(A). The Supreme Court affirmed the commission’s order in part, holding (1) the portion of Rule 4.3(A) that prohibits a judicial candidate from conveying information about the judicial candidate or candidate’s opponent that the candidate knows to be false is not an overbroad restriction on speech and is not unconstitutionally vague; and (2) the portion of Rule 4.3(A) that prohibits a judicial candidate from knowingly or recklessly conveying information about the candidate or the candidate’s opponent that, if true, would deceive or mislead a reasonable person is unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court severed the unconstitutional portion of the rule, found that Respondent committed one rather than two violations, and agreed with the commission that a remand is appropriate. View "In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against O’’Toole" on Justia Law

In 1995, Todd Plassman pled guilty to several counts of rape. Plassman was sentenced to indefinite terms of nine to twenty-five years, to be served concurrently but consecutively to his sentence imposed in another case. Over the years, Plassman filed, unsuccessfully, a variety of actions attempting to enforce the alleged limit on his sentence. In this instant case, Plassman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the prosecutor and judge in his 1995 case agreed off the record that he would serve no more than a ten-year term of imprisonment if he pled guilty. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the issues Plassman raised were not only res judicata but were barred from consideration in habeas corpus due to the availability of other remedies. View "Plassman v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth." on Justia Law

For the tax year 2008, Appellant, a property owner and taxpayer, filed four valuation complaints challenging the Summit County Fiscal Officer’s valuation of seven parcels. The Summit County Board of Revision (BOR) rejected Appellant’s requests for decreased valuations for lack of probative evidence. On appeal, Appellant urged the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) to adopt to certain properties the contractual allocation of the purchase price of a large industrial-warehouse business Appellant sold in 2010. The BTA found that the values determined by the fiscal officer and the BOR should be retained, concluding that the 2010 sale included some but not all of the parcels at issue as well as parcels that were not at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in concluding that the allocation evidence did not suffice to establish the value of the properties; and (2) Appellant failed to discharge its burden to show the propriety of an allocated sale price. View "RNG Props., Ltd. v. Summit County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile when he committed acts constituting aggravated robbery. After a mandatory bindover hearing, the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction and transferred the matter to the common pleas court. Defendant did not object to the mandatory bindover. Defendant then pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification. Defendant was sentenced to four years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing, for the first time, that the statutory mandatory bindover procedures violated his constitutional rights and that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise these claims in the lower courts. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that, by pleading guilty, Defendant had waived his right to challenge either the mandatory bindover or his attorney’s failure to object to it and that Defendant had not demonstrated that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant forfeited his challenge to the constitutionality of the mandatory bindover statutes by failing to present it to the lower courts. View "State v. Quarterman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felonious assault and carrying a concealed weapon. The appellate court remanded the matter for resentencing, determining that the trial court did not properly impose postrelease control. At the resentencing hearing, Defendant told the trial court that he wanted to represent himself. Thereafter, the court announced that Defendant would be subject to mandatory postrelease control upon release from prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right to counsel was violated during the resentencing proceedings and that a resentencing hearing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding to which the right to counsel attaches. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court had not violated Defendant’s right to counsel by allowing him to represent himself at the resentencing hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a resentencing hearing is a critical stage of the proceedings to which the right to counsel attaches; and (2) Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at the resentencing hearing. View "State v. Schleiger" on Justia Law

After a group of Richmond Heights, Ohio electors submitted a “recall petition” to recall Mayor Miesha Wilson Headen, the Richmond Heights City Council voted to certify the mayoral recall issue for inclusion on the ballot. A special election was scheduled for September 23, 2014, and early voting in the special election began on August 27, 2014. On September 4, 2014, James G. Dawson attempted to file a written protest against the special election. The Cuyahoga County Board of Elections refused to accept the protest because the voting had already begun. Dawson subsequently filed suit seeking a writ of prohibition against the Board of Elections to prevent it from submitting the recall initiative to the voters at the September 23, 2014 special election. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Dawson failed to present any reason why a writ of prohibition should issue to prevent the recall election. View "State ex rel. Dawson v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

On June 17, 2014, the city council of Powell approved a development plan prosing new construction in the Powell downtown business district by adopting Ordinance No. 2014-10. Relators filed petitions with the city clerk in support of three ballot measures: a referendum to block Ordinance No. 2014-10 from taking effect, an initiative to approve an ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 2014-10, and an amendment to the city charter that would nullify Ordinance No. 2014-10. The city clerk transmitted the three petitions to the Delaware County Board of Elections. As a result of the combined actions of the city council and the board of elections, none of the three ballot measures was certified for the November 4, 2014 ballot. Relators filed this mandamus action to compel with city council and city clerk to place the proposed charter amendment on the ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the proposed charter amendment unlawfully delegated legislative power, and therefore, the city council did not have a clear legal duty to put the measure on the November 4, 2014 ballot. View "State ex rel. Ebersole v. Powell" on Justia Law

On August 5, 2014, Relators submitted a petition to the clerk of council to amend the charter of the City of Maple Heights by limiting the use of photo-monitoring devices to enforce traffic laws. On August 18, 2014, the director of the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections certified that the part-petitions contained sufficient valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. The city council, however, took no action on the petition. On August 25, 2014, Relators this expedited election action in the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the City and its city council to pass an ordinance placing the charter-amendment initiative on the November 4, 2014 ballot. On September 3, 2014, council referred the matter to the Committee as a whole but failed to schedule a vote on the matter. The Supreme Court granted the writ, as the city council failed to submit the charter-amendment initiative “forthwith” as required by the Ohio Constitution. View "State ex rel. Comm. for Charter Amendment Petition v. City of Maple Heights" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant, his employer, signed a written employment agreement detailing the terms of Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendant. Plaintiff later ceased working for Defendant, believing he had been fired. Defendant, however, believed that Plaintiff had resigned. Plaintiff’s termination became the subject of binding arbitration. The arbitration panel concluded that Plaintiff had been terminated for reasons other than cause and ordered Defendant to reinstate Plaintiff “to the position he held prior to his wrongful termination.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) specific performance is not an available remedy for breach of an employment contract unless it is explicitly provided for in the contract or by an applicable statute; and (2) the arbitration panel in this case exceeded its authority by holding otherwise, as the contract clearly did not entitle Plaintiff to reinstatement. Remanded. View "Cedar Fair, L.P. v. Falfas" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent Appellees, a judge and magistrate on the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, from exercising jurisdiction over a foreclosure action filed against a client that Appellant represented. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, concluding that Appellant lacked standing and that Appellant could not prevail on the merits even if he did have standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant lacked standing to bring this case, as lawyers do not have standing to bring claims in their own names based on violations of their clients’ rights. View "State ex rel. Wood v. McClelland" on Justia Law