Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert Corlew was an employee of Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc. when he was injured while working. Honda’s long-term-disability insurance carrier eventually determined that Corlew was not eligible for ongoing disability benefits because he was capable of gainful employment outside of Honda. Corlew subsequently retired because there was no position available at Honda. One year later, Corlew underwent surgery on his wrist. The Industrial Commission awarded temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation to be paid during Corlew’s postsurgical recovery, concluding that Corlew had not voluntarily retired or abandoned the workforce. The court of appeals denied Honda’s request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that Corlew’s retirement was due to his industrial injury, and thus was involuntary, and that there was no evidence that Corlew had abandoned the entire workforce. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Corlew was eligible for TTD compensation even though he suffered no economic loss that could be directly attributed to his industrial injury.View "State ex rel. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with aggravated murder, and his case was assigned to the docket of Common Plea Court Judge Thomas Nurre. A visiting judge, Judge Donald Schott, was assigned to preside over the trial. The jury found Appellant guilty, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after twenty years. The judgment entry was signed by Judge Nurre on behalf of Judge Schott. Appellant filed an original action in the court of appeals requesting writs of mandamus and prohibition and seeking to declare the entry of conviction void because it was not signed by the judge who presided over the trial. The court of appeals dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that Appellant’s sentencing entry did not violate Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) because Judge Nurre’s signing the entry was proper, and the entry satisfied the requirements of Rule 32(C). View "State ex rel. Harris v. Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

While on parole from a prior conviction of murder, Appellant committed murder. After a trial in 1984, a three-judge panel found Appellant guilty of aggravated murder with a prior-conviction specification and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the death sentence, determining that the panel had improperly weighed a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors. On remand, the same three-judge panel that had originally sentenced Defendant conducted the resentencing hearing and again sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2007, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted habeas relief and required that Defendant be resentenced on the ground that the panel on resentencing should have allowed Defendant to introduce mitigating evidence in addition to the mitigating evidence presented at his 1984 trial. By the time of the subsequent resentencing, none of the original panel members were on the bench. Accordingly, the trial court convened a three-panel consisting of three new members. The new panel again sentenced Defendant to death. Defendant appealed, raising five propositions of law challenging his death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, holding that all five propositions of law lacked merit. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Appellant submitted a declaration of candidacy to run in the May 6, 2014 primary for an elected position on the Democratic Party State Central Committee and, along with the declaration, submitted a nominating petition containing nine total signatures. The Franklin County Board of Elections rejected Appellant’s declaration because, according to the Board’s judgment, Appellant did not submit five valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. After Appellant unsuccessfully appealed, Appellant filed a complaint for writ of mandamus with the court of appeals. The court denied the writ. The Supreme Court granted the writ and ordered the Board to add Appellant’s name to the May 6, 2014 primary ballot, holding that the Board abused its discretion in determining that the nominating petition did not contain five valid signatures.View "State ex rel. Scott v. Franklin County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of four felonies, with forfeiture specifications, for running a marijuana-distribution operation out of a building he and his brothers owned on Scranton Road. Common Pleas Court Judge Nancy McDonnell issued a sentencing entry listing the property at Scranton Road as property to be forfeited. On October 11, 2011, Appellant appealed the sentencing order. On January 13, 2012, Judge McDonnell issued a journal entry reiterating Appellant’s sentence and ordering transfer of the property. On October 23, 2012, Appellant sought a writ of prohibition to vacate Judge McDonnell’s January 13, 2012 order, arguing that Judge McDonnell lacked jurisdiction to enter the order. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition, concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 2981.04 vested Judge McDonnell with jurisdiction to conduct forfeiture proceedings even after the notice of appeal was filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge McDonnell did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction and that any errors in the proceedings should be addressed on appeal. View "State ex rel. West v. McDonnell" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with, inter alia, operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OVI). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the motion lacked sufficient particularity on the issue of alleged improper administration of field sobriety tests. At the pretrial conference, Defendant pled no contest. The trial court subsequently found Defendant guilty of OVI. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, finding the motion deficient because more factual detail was needed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a highly detailed pleading of the facts and law is not required to satisfy the notice requirements of State v. Shindler and to trigger the right to a hearing on a motion to suppress.View "State v. Codeluppi" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured when he fell from a ladder as he was working on a billboard in the course and scope of his employment with Employer. Appellant sought an award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), alleging that Employer had violated several safety rules, resulting in his injury. The Industrial Commission denied the award. Appellant subsequently filed an action in mandamus in the court of appeals, requesting that the Commission be ordered to grant him the VSSR award. The magistrate of the court of appeals and a three-judge panel determined that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission (1) properly considered evidence of the industry standards in determining whether Appellant’s ladder and harness equipment complied with the law; (2) correctly concluded that a hook ladder, when properly secured, can be part of a billboard structure; and (3) properly considered Appellant’s negligence in deciding to deny a VSSR award.View "State ex rel. Richmond v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Greg Bell and his attorney, Philip Cramer, were party and counsel in court proceedings originating from an appropriation action filed by the Madison County Board of Commissioners against Bell and his wife to acquire a sewer easement on Bell’s property. The court of common pleas held that the Board was entitled to an easement. Thereafter, Bell, through Cramer, filed a complaint asserting various causes of action related to the appropriation case. The case was dismissed the case based on res judicata. Thereafter, Bell, represented by Cramer, filed an action for a writ of mandamus requesting that the court of appeals order the Board to provide him with due process in the taking of his real property rights and to comply with a consent agreement. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, the Board filed a motion for sanctions against Bell and Cramer. The court of appeals granted the motion for sanctions in the amount of $21,137, concluding that Bell and Cramer had engaged in frivolous conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the mandamus action was clearly frivolous and adversely affected the Board, and the fees awarded were reasonable. View "State ex rel. Bell v. Madison County Bd. of Comm’rs" on Justia Law

In 2005, real property owned by Roger and Sharon Barkoff was sold for $1.4 million. In 2008, after performing the reappraisal that the law required every six years, the Summit County Fiscal Officer determined the value of the property to be $902,320. The Akron City School District Board of Education challenged the assessment, asserting that the 2005 sale price should be adopted as the value of the property. The Summit County Board of Revision retained the fiscal officer’s value. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed, concluding that the Barkoffs had not rebutted the presumption that the sale was within a reasonable time before the tax-lien date, therefore adopting the $1.4 million sale price from 2005 as the value of the property for tax year 2008. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s application of the recency presumption, holding that when a property has been the subject of the reappraisal that occurs every six years, a sale that occurred more than twenty-four months before the lien date should not be presumed recent if a different value has been determined for that lien date as part of the reappraisal, and thus no presumption arises that the sale price reflects the property’s value.View "Akron City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Summit County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of rape he committed in 1983. In 2009, while out of prison on parole, Appellant committed two theft offenses at a gas station. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to two misdemeanor offenses of petty theft, and the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (“OAPA”) found Appellant had violated the conditions of his parole. In 2011, Appellant filed an administrative grievance with the OAPA, contending that the 2009 report recommending revocation of his parole falsely stated that Appellant used a knife and committed rape during the offenses. The OAPA rejected the complaint. Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asking the court of appeals to compel with OAPA to expunge the false statement from the violation report and conduct a new parole hearing. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the statement at issue in the violation report was referring to the 1983 rape, not the 2009 incident, the statement in the report was factually accurate and Appellant’s rights were not violated.View "Scarberry v. Turner" on Justia Law