Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging statutory retaliatory-discharge and common-law wrongful-discharge against Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc. for firing her for reporting suspected abuse or neglect and against Brookdale Senior Living, Inc. for inducing Hospice to fire her. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, concluding, as relevant to this appeal, Plaintiff's retaliatory-discharge claim under Ohio Rev. Code 3721.24 failed because Plaintiff did not report the suspected abuse or neglect to the Ohio director of health. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment to the extent it dismissed Plaintiff’s statutory retaliatory-discharge claim, holding that section 3721.24 does not require an employee or other person to report suspected abuse or neglect to the Ohio director of health in order to be protected from retaliation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an employee who reports suspected abuse or neglect of a long-term-care-facility or residential-care-facility resident is not required to report to the Ohio director of health in order to state a claim for retaliatory discharge under section 3721.24; and (2) in this case, Plaintiff’s reporting the suspected abuse or neglect to Brookdale and to the resident’s children triggered the protection of section 3721.24. View "Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1983, the four fingers of Dennis Varney’s left hand were amputated in a work-related accident. Three fingers were completely reattached and the fourth finger was partially reattached, but the fingers did not regain their full function. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded Varney compensation for the partial loss of use of his four fingers. In 1985 and 1990 two claims were allowed for one-third loss of use of Varney's index finger and for two-thirds loss of use of his other damaged fingers. In 2010, Varney filed a motion for a total loss of use of his index, ring, and little fingers. The Industrial Commission denied the motion. The Court of Appeals granted Varney’s request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the Commission had applied the wrong legal standard for determining the loss of use of a finger. The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding that the Commission used the proper standard when examining the medical evidence as it related to the amount of function remaining in Varney’s three fingers and did not abuse its discretion in denying compensation for the total loss of use of those fingers. View "State ex rel. Varney v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Phillip Pixley brought an employer intentional tort claim arising from injuries he sustained when he was struck by a transfer car in the course of his employment at Pro-Pak Industries, Inc. Pixley alleged that Pro-Pak had not adequately trained its transfer car operator and had deliberately bypassed the transfer car’s safety bumper, causing the safety mechanism that stopped the car to fail. The trial court granted summary judgment for Pro-Pak, concluding that Pixley failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that Pro-Pak had the specific intent to injure him. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Pixley failed to prove that Pro-Pak deliberately removed or disabled the safety bumper on the transfer car that injured him, and therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Pro-Pak. View "Pixley v. Pro-Pak Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, the City of Toledo enacted an ordinance authorizing an automated traffic-law-enforcement system that assesses civil penalties against a vehicle’s owner for speeding and red-light violations. The ordinance further provides that appeals are heard through an administrative process established by the Toledo police department. Appellee received a notice of liability for a traffic violation under the ordinance and paid the civil penalty without pursuing an administrative appeal. Appellee then filed a class-action complaint against the City for unjust enrichment, asserting that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it usurped the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Ohio Constitution and statutory law do not endow municipal courts with exclusive authority over traffic-ordinance violations; and (2) Ohio municipalities have home rule-authority to impose civil liability on traffic violators through an administrative enforcement system and to establish administrative proceedings that must be exhausted before offenders can pursue judicial remedies. View "Walker v. Toledo" on Justia Law

Appellee was employed by the village of Cardington from 2000 to 2009. When he discovered that someone was discharging a hazardous chemical that was passing through the village’s wastewater treatment plant (WWTP), Appellee voiced his concerns about the WWTP to the village council. Ultimately, Appellee was instrumental in exposing an automotive-parts manufacturer’s criminal discharge of hazardous chemicals into the public water supply. However, a few months after Appellee reported the problems with the WWTP, the village terminated Appellee for reasons disputed by the parties. Appellee sued the village, claiming that he was fired in violation of Ohio’s whistleblower statute. The trial court granted summary judgment for the village. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Appellee engaged in whistleblowing under the whistleblower statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellee did not satisfy the procedural requirements of the whistleblower statute, and therefore, Appellee did not qualify for whistleblower protection. View "Lee v. Cardington" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the aggravated murders of his girlfriend and two children. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) the prosecutor did not violate Batson v. Kentucky during voir dire; (2) while the prosecutor made improper comments, the improper comments were not prejudicial and did not deny Defendant a fair trial; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting surveillance videos into evidence; (4) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions; (5) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance during either phase of trial; and (6) the death penalty was appropriate and proportionate when compared to death sentences approved in similar cases. View "State v. Pickens" on Justia Law

In December 2012, a reporter for the Cincinnati Enquirer requested the court docket showing the cases Hamilton County Juvenile Court Judge Tracie Hunter had presided over during December. The juvenile court administrator sent to the Enquirer the requested documents, but the documents were redacted to provide only the initials of the juveniles. The Enquirer filed this action in mandamus seeking a writ ordering Judge Hunter to reveal the names of the juveniles. The First District Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Enquirer and ordered Judge Hunter to produce unredacted copies of her docket. In January 2014, the Supreme Court disqualified Judge Hunter from acting as a judge. The Court then dismissed this appeal, as a live controversy no longer existed here because Judge Hunter no longer had power to provide access to the requested records. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of complicity to commit aggravated murder, two counts of attempted aggravated murder, and related crimes. After a mitigation hearing, the jury recommended death for the three aggravated murders. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation prior to his mitigation hearing. The trial court denied Defendant’s petition for postconviction relief. The court of appeals vacated Defendant’s death sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing, concluding that trial counsel’s decision to present only positive mitigation evidence was unreasonable, and undiscovered mitigating evidence might have influenced the jury’s appraisal of Defendant’s culpability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel were deficient by failing to conduct a thorough and adequate investigation into Defendant’s background before his mitigation hearing; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in determining that counsel’s deficiency was prejudicial under Strickland. View "State v. Herring" on Justia Law

Mallon Roberts was found guilty of murder. On appeal, Roberts asserted that certain evidence should not have been allowed in the trial. After the conviction was affirmed, Roberts filed a motion for a new trial on the same basis. The trial court judge, Judge Melba Marsh, overruled the motion. Roberts then filed this action in the court of appeals asking that the court issue a writ of procedendo ordering Judge Marsh to rule on his motion. Specifically, Roberts contended that Judge Marsh’s ruling on his motion was not a proper ruling because it did not include required findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court of appeals dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Roberts had an adequate alternative remedy in the ordinary course of law, and because Judge Marsh had in fact ruled on the motion, Roberts was not entitled to a writ of procedendo. View "State ex rel. Roberts v. Marsh" on Justia Law

The two property owners of two different parcels of real property, one of which was situated in the Dublin City School District and the other in the Columbus City School District, filed claims for tax exemption on the basis that Columbus State Community College was a tenant in each of the buildings and provided educational services to students at each location. The tax commissioner denied the applications. The Board of Tax Appeals partially granted exemptions, concluding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Cleveland State Univ. v. Perk permitted exemptions under Ohio Rev. Code 5709.07(A)(4) when the public college leased the property from a landlord. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA erred by construing section 5709.07(A)(4) to allow exemption, as Perk’s holding did not apply to the facts in this case. View "Equity Dublin Assocs. v. Testa" on Justia Law