Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Mother and Father divorced, the parties disputed the custody of their child, A.G. During a court proceeding concerning custody, the juvenile court excluded A.G., who was thirteen years old at the time, from attending the hearing. A.G. had filed a motion to attend the hearing, but the judge denied the motion, concluding that the dispute was between the parents, and therefore, A.G. had not constitutional right to be present. A.G. appealed, claiming that the trial court violated her due process rights by denying her motion to attend the proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had discretion to exclude A.G., a nonparty, from a hearing in custody litigation ancillary to her parents’ divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in child-custody litigation arising from a divorce, a court has discretion to exclude a child from any proceeding if it determines that exclusion is in the best interest of the child; and (2) the juvenile court in this case considered relevant and appropriate factors in making its decision.View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

Dick Flanagan filed an action in quo warranto challenging the qualifications of David Lucas, the Belmont County sheriff, who was elected to the office and sworn in on January 7, 2013. Specifically, Flanagan claimed that Lucas did not meet the statutory qualifications for a candidate for county sheriff and that Flanagan, the only person appearing on the ballot in the November 6, 2012 election who satisfied the statutory qualifications, was entitled to the office. The Supreme Court dismissed the action for lack of standing, holding that Flanagan, as the losing candidate, had no reasonable grounds to claim entitlement to the office of sheriff and therefore lacked standing to bring this quo warranto action.View "State ex rel. Flanagan v. Lucas" on Justia Law

In tax year 2007, a county fiscal officer valued an improved 6.415-acre parcel in the county at $8,740,000, consistent with the property's 2004 sale price. The property owner filed an amended complaint seeking a reduction to $3,100,000. The board of revision issued a decision retaining the fiscal officer’s valuation of the property. The owner and the school board of education both appealed. Before the board of tax appeals (BTA), the parties presented competing appraisals. The BTA accepted the owner’s appraisal and assigned a value of $3,100,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the school board did not show that the BTA’s acceptance of the valuation presented by the owner was unlawful or unreasonable; and (2) the record supported the BTA’s decision.View "Health Care REIT, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The county auditor assigned an aggregate value for four properties of $468,470 for the tax year 2008, which represented a significant increase over the aggregate valuation of the parcels’ two ancestor parcels. After a hearing before the county board of revision (BOR), the aggregate valuation of the four parcels changed to $383,180. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed, holding that the sale price of $135,000 from a 2006 transaction was the best evidence of value of the four parcels on the tax-lien date for tax year 2008. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 2006 purchase of the two ancestor parcels was not recent to the 2008 tax lien date because Appellant changed the character of the property when it split the two parcels into four total parcels in 2007.View "Richman Props., LLC v. Medina County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant, a registered lender under the Mortgage Loan Act (MLA), and Appellee executed a customer agreement for a single-installment, $500 loan governed by the MLA. Appellee later defaulted on his loan. Appellant filed this action to recover on its loan to Appellee, seeking the unpaid principal balance on the loan along with interest and fees permitted by the MLA. A magistrate judge determined that Appellee’s loan was impermissible under the MLA and that the loan should be governed by the Short-Term Lender Act (STLA). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the MLA does not authorize single-installment, interest-bearing loans and that the STLA prohibits MLA registrants from making single-installment loans of short duration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an “interest-bearing loan,” as defined by the MLA, may include a loan requiring repayment in a single installment; (2) Lenders registered under the MLA may make single-installment, interest-bearing loans, and the STLA does not limit the authority of lenders registered under the MLA to make any loans authorized by the MLA; and (3) Appellant’s loan to Appellee was an interest-bearing loan as defined under the MLA.View "Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were thirteen unbuilt lots in a residential subdivision. For the tax year 2008, the county auditor set the value of each lot at $105,000. Taxpayer filed a complaint challenging the valuation and proposing a reduced value of $65,000 for each of the lots. After a hearing, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) rejected the comparable-sales appraisal submitted by Taxpayer and reverted to the county’s valuation of the parcels, concluding that Taxpayer failed to meet its burden of showing a different value. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Taxpayer presented evidence that negated the auditor’s valuation of the unbuilt lots and triggered the BTA’s duty to perform an independent valuation of the property for tax year 2008. View "Apple Group Ltd. v. Medina County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were ProgressOhio.org, Inc., a member of the Ohio Senate, and a former member of the Ohio House of Representatives. Appellants brought a constitutional challenge to the JobsOhio Act, which created JobsOhio, a nonprofit corporation, and gave JobsOhio the right to purchase the state’s liquor distribution and merchandising operations. The trial court dismissed the case, concluding that Appellants lacked standing to sue. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellants had no personal stake in the outcome of this litigation, they lacked common-law standing to challenge the JobsOhio Act.View "ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a tort action against the City of Cleveland and some of its employees (collectively, Relators). Relators filed a motion to dismiss based on political-subdivision immunity. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding the trial court erred in not granting the motion. On remand, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice. Relators filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that it had not mandated a dismissal with prejudice and that Relators possessed adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part because the court of appeals found the City and its employees in their official capacities were immune, and therefore, the court of appeals should have issued a writ ordering the trial court to dismiss those counts with prejudice; and (2) affirmed as to the claims that were originally dismissed on grounds of failing to state a claim with regard to immunity of the employees in their individual capacities.View "State ex rel. Cleveland v. Astrab" on Justia Law

Sonya Jackson, an inmate, was represented by Assistant State Public Defender Dennis Pusateri when she filed a complaint for writ of mandamus alleging that she was entitled to parole. Pusateri allowed the magistrate to dismiss the action and then refiled the complaint. Because Pusateri erroneously believed that the court had dismissed the second complaint, he filed a new mandamus petition raising the same issues. Pusateri then voluntarily dismissed the second complaint in order to proceed with the third action. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for Defendants under the “double dismissal” rule. Pusateri filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from the judgment of dismissal, arguing that the voluntary dismissal was the product of “excusable neglect.” The court of appeal denied the motion. Jackson appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Jackson failed to establish excusable neglect.View "State ex rel. Jackson v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth." on Justia Law

The Cincinnati Enquirer filed two original actions in the Supreme Court seeking extraordinary writs. In the first case, the Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus to compel the county court judge to vacate his order sealing records relating to the prosecution of a defendant for a disorderly-conduct misdemeanor charge. In the second case, the Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to produce criminal records for the past five years that had been incorrectly sealed and a writ of prohibition to prevent him from enforcing his orders to seal those records. The Supreme Court (1) granted the writ in the first case because the judge did not follow the proper statutory procedure in sealing the case; and (2) denied the writs in the second case because the Enquirer failed to establish a clear legal right to the records it requested.View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons" on Justia Law