Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Erin McCardle and Leatrice Tolls, protesters involved in the Occupy Cleveland movement in the Public Square area of Cleveland, were arrested and charged with a curfew violation under Cleveland Codified Ordinances 559.541. The ordinance prevents any person from remaining in the Public Square area between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. without a permit. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges, asserting that the ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Cleveland Municipal Court denied the motions to dismiss. The defendants subsequently pled no contest to the curfew violation. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cases, holding that the ordinance violated the First Amendment because Cleveland’s interests were insufficient to justify its limit on speech, and the ordinance was not narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was constitutional under the United States Constitution, as it was content-neutral, narrowly tailored to advance a significant government interest, and allowed alternative channels of speech.View "City of Cleveland v. McCardle" on Justia Law

East Bank Condominiums II, LLC filed valuation complaints challenging the county auditor’s assessment of twenty-one units in a condominium complex owned by East Bank. The county auditor valued each unit as a separate parcel. The Dublin City Schools Board of Education filed countercomplaints seeking to retain the auditor’s valuations. The Board of Revision (BOR) disagreed with the assessment and accepted the bulk-appraisal valuation that East Bank submitted. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reinstated the county auditor’s valuations. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA, holding that the BTA erred in reverting back to the auditor’s determination of value. The school board moved for reconsideration. The Supreme Court granted in part the school board’s motion, holding (1) the BTA was correct in rejecting East Bank’s bulk-appraisal valuation for the units; but (2) the BTA was incorrect in adopting the auditor’s valuations. Remanded to the BTA for an independent determination of value.View "Dublin City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant-mortgagee filed a complaint seeking to foreclose on property owned by Appellees-mortgagors. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant. The court of appeals dismissed Appellees’ appeal, finding that the district court’s order was not final and appealable because it did not set forth the dollar amount of the balance due on the mortgage. On remand, the trial court stated a dollar amount of the balance due on the mortgage and included in its judgment decree unspecified amounts advanced by Appellant for inspections, appraisals, property protection, and maintenance. The court of appeal dismissed Appellees’ appeal, concluding that the trial court again failed to issue a final, appealable order because it did not include in its judgment specific itemization of the amounts expended by Appellant for inspections, appraisals, and the like. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a judgment decree in foreclosure that allows as part of recoverable damages unspecified amounts advanced by the mortgagee for inspections, appraisals, and the like is a final, appealable order; and (2) a mortgagor may challenge those amounts as part of the proceedings to confirm the foreclosure sale and appeal the order of confirmation. Remanded.View "CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Roznowski" on Justia Law

In 1990, construction was completed on a condominium development. In 2003, the Oaktree Condominium Association (“Oaktree”) discovered that there was a defect in the construction. In 2007, Oaktree filed an action against the builder of the condominiums. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Oaktree. The trial court, however, ruled that Oaktree’s claims were time-barred under a ten-year statute of repose enacted by the General Assembly in 2007. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that although the statute of repose was not in effect at the time that Oaktree’s action accrued, the action was nonetheless time-barred because Oaktree did not file its action within two years of accrual. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict in favor of Oaktree, holding (1) Ohio’s construction statute of repose is unconstitutional as applied to Oaktree because the retroactive application of the statute would bar Okatree’s accrued action; (2) a cause of action that has accrued but on which no suit has been filed by the effective date of repose is governed by the relevant statute of limitations; and (3) the complaint was filed within four years of its accrual and was therefore timely under the relevant statute of limitations.View "Oaktree Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hallmark Bldg. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the aggravated murders of his former mother-in-law, his five-year-old daughter, and his three-year-old son. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each of the three aggravated murders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a change of venue did not violate Defendant's rights to due process and to a fair trial by an impartial jury; (2) the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in seating two jurors that Defendant claimed were unfairly biased in favor of the death penalty; (3) there was no abuse of discretion in the admission of autopsy photos; (4) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct; (5) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; (6) Defendant’s challenges to the death penalty failed; and (7) there was no error in the sentences imposed.View "State v. Mammone" on Justia Law

James Navratil Development Company (JNDC) filed a valuation complaint. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) remanded the cause and ordered the Medina County Board of Revision to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because JNDC did not properly identify itself as the owner of the property on the face of the complaint. JNDC appealed. While the parties were filing briefs in the appeal, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Groveport Madison Local Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision, in which the Court held that it is not a jurisdictional requirement to correctly name the owner of the subject property in a valuation complaint. On the authority of Groveport Madison, the Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s decision, holding that the defect in the complaint was not jurisdictional, and the BTA erred in holding that it was. Remanded.View "James Navratil Dev. Co. v. Medina County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to the murders of two women and to two counts of abuse of a corpse. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder with death specifications for the deaths of two girls. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, primarily, that (1) the State’s closing remarks in the penalty phase were “improper and substantially prejudicial,” but the Court’s independent evaluation and approval of the capital sentence cured the errors in the penalty-phase proceedings; (2) the trial court did not violate Ohio R. Evid. 404(B) by allowing a witness to testify that when she was thirteen years old Defendant exposed himself to her and offered her five dollars to engage in oral sex; (3) trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance; (4) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of attempted rape or robbery in connection the murder of one of the girls; and (5) the sentence was appropriate.View "State v. Kirkland" on Justia Law

Appellants were convicted of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under Ohio’s version of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for their involvement in the sale of drugs. The total amount of money involved in the sales attributed to each appellant was $460 and $250 respectively. Appellants appealed, arguing that the State failed to offer evidence demonstrating that either of them was involved in drug sales that totaled $500 or more, although the enterprise they were involved in profited significantly, and therefore, the $500 threshold set forth in Ohio’s RICO statutes had not been satisfied as to either of them individually. The Supreme Court overturned Appellants’ first-degree felony convictions under Ohio’s RICO statutes, holding that in order for a defendant to obtain a conviction for engaging in a patter of corrupt activity, Ohio’s RICO statutes must be construed so that the stated threshold amount applies to each individual and not to the enterprise as a whole. Remanded.View "State v. Stevens" on Justia Law

A colorectal surgeon and a surgical resident at a hospital (collectively, Defendants), performed abdominal surgery on Plaintiff in 2007. In 2009, Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim against Defendants, alleging that Defendants’ negligence caused her femoral-nerve damage. The jury entered verdicts for Defendants. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that the verdicts could not be reconciled with the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court properly overruled Plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts; but (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on remote cause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously found prejudicial error in the remote-cause jury instruction. Remanded.View "Hayward v. Summa Health Sys./Akron City Hosp." on Justia Law

Between 1996 and 2003, Appellant filed several workers’ compensation claims, which were allowed for certain conditions. Appellant subsequently filed two applications for permanent-total-disability compensation. The Industrial Commission denied the applications, relying in part on the report of Dr. Lee Howard, a psychologist, who determined that Appellant could perform work without significant limitations. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the Commission abused its discretion when it relied on Dr. Howard’s report because the report was stale. The court of appeals denied the writ, determining that Dr. Howard’s report was relevant evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it relied on Dr. Howard’s report in denying permanent-total-disability compensation.View "State ex rel. Bailey v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law