Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the rape of three women, along with three associated aggravated burglaries. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred by failing to merge the three aggravated burglary counts into the corresponding rape counts. The district court affirmed the trial court on the nonsentencing issues but vacated the sentences for the aggravated burglary and rape counts, concluding that because the conduct relied upon to establish the rapes was the same conduct used to establish the physical-harm element of the aggravated burglaries, the offenses were allied and subject to merger. At issue on appeal was whether the offenses in question were allied offenses of similar or dissimilar import within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) offenses with resulting harm that is separate and identifiable are offenses of dissimilar import; and (2) because the court of appeals in this case did not consider whether the import of the aggravated burglary and the import of the rape were similar or dissimilar in each of the three separate events, the cause must be remanded for consideration of these factors. View "State v. Ruff" on Justia Law

The Tussing Road Water Reclamation Facility in Fairfield County is required to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act from the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (Ohio EPA). The Fairfield County Board of Commissioners challenged the validity of new phosphorus limitations added on to the Tussing Road plant’s renewed NPDES permit, alleging that Ohio EPA ignored the administrative rulemaking procedures required by the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act (the Act) and imposed the new limits solely on a federally approved total maximum daily load (TMDL) report previously issued for the watershed in question. Specifically, the County contended that it should have had a full and fair opportunity to be heard and the right to review and challenge the TMDL before it was submitted to United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). The Court of Appeals vacated the NPDES phosphorus limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a TMDL established by Ohio EPA is a rule that is subject to the requirements of the Act, and therefore, Ohio EPA must follow the rulemaking procedure in the Act before submitting a TMDL to U.S. EPA for its approval and before the TMDL may be implemented in an NPDES permit. View "Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Nally" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to five years in prison and three years of postrelease control (“Sentencing Order 1”). The court of appeals vacated Sentencing Order 1 and remanded the cause for resentencing because, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court had failed to advise Defendant about the particulars of post release control. Upon resentencing, the trial court amended its sentencing entry (Sentencing Order 2), but the court of appeals remanded the case with instructions to clarify Sentencing Order 2. In response to the remand order, the trial court issued Sentencing Order 3. The court of appeals dismissed Defendant’s appeal for failure to file a transcript of the resentencing hearing. Defendant sought discretionary review in the Supreme Court, but his appeal was not accepted. Defendant later filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking a writ compelling the trial judge to repentance him de novo, which he claimed was required by the appellate court’s decision in his appeal from Sentencing Order 1. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of the trial judge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly declined to issue a writ of mandamus on the grounds that Defendant had an adequate remedy at law. View "State ex rel. Turner v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

To establish entitlement to an award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), a claimant must show that there was a specific safety rule (SSR) applicable to the employer, that the employer violated that SSR, and that the violation proximately caused the claimant’s injury. Cathy Penwell was injured when her left had was crushed in a hydraulic press. Her workers’ compensation was allowed for various serious injuries. Penwell also applied for a VSSR award, alleging that her injuries were caused by her employer’s failure to provide adequate safety restraints under the applicable safety rule. The Industrial Commission, through its staff hearing officer (SHO), concluded that there was no evidence of a VSSR. Penwell subsequently filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court of appeals agreed with the SHO’s determinations and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying a VSSR award, and the court of appeals did not reweigh the evidence or otherwise improperly review the case. View "State ex rel. Penwell v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

A reporter from The Cincinnati Enquirer submitted a public records request to the Butler County Sheriff’s Office for an outgoing phone call placed by a Butler County 9-1-1 dispatcher. The County denied the request, claiming that the return call was both a trial preparation record and a confidential law enforcement investigatory record and, thus, was exempt from the public records laws. The Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus ordering the County to release the recording. The County subsequently released the recording. Judge Sage and the County then filed a motion to dismiss the Enquirer’s mandamus complaint as moot. The court of appeals overruled the motion, granted the writ of mandamus, and awarded statutory damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the outgoing 9-1-1 call was a public record and was not exempt from release, and therefore, the Enquirer was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering release of the record; and (2) the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in awarding statutory damages but did abuse its discretion in not awarding attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage" on Justia Law

Appellee injured both thumbs in an industrial accident. Following a period of temporary total disability, Appellee returned to light-duty work and, later, to his former position of employment with no medical restrictions. Later that year, Appellee was terminated for violating work rules. Appellee’s physician subsequently placed Appellee on restricted duty, and Appellee applied for an additional period of temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission awarded Appellee TTD compensation, concluding that Appellee had not voluntarily abandoned his employment and that he remained temporarily and totally disabled. Appellee’s former employer filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion in ordering payment of TTD compensation. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was evidence in the record that supported the Commission’s finding that Appellee was entitled to TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Viking Forge Corp. v. Perry" on Justia Law

Appellee, the former chief of the Westlake Fire Department, was suspended for thirty days without pay and demoted from the position of fire chief for violating Ohio Rev. Code 124.34(A). The trial court modified the penalty imposed by the Westlake Civil Service Commission by reversing Appellee’s demotion to the position of firefighter and ordering that Appellee be reinstated to the rank of captain. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a trial court, as part of its de novo review of a civil service commission’s decision pursuant to section 124.34(C), has the authority to modify the disciplinary measures imposed by the commission; and (2) the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion by reducing the punishment imposed by the commission. View "Westlake Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Pietrick" on Justia Law

Lance Mason, a sitting Cuyahoga county Court of Common Pleas judge, was indicted on three counts of felonious assault, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of endangering children, and one count of domestic violence. Mason filed a pretrial motion to disqualify the prosecutor’s office and appoint a special prosecutor. The trial judge denied the motion, finding that Mason had not shown the requisite “actual prejudice” that would justify the disqualification of the entire prosecutor’s office and that there was no conflict of interest shown. Mason appealed. The Eighth District Court of Appeals issued a stay of the trial court proceedings to consider whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Timothy McGinty, the prosecutor, filed this original action in prohibition, arguing that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and to issue the stay. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the Court of Appeals patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to disqualify the prosecutor in a criminal case. View "State ex rel. McGinty v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured when he fell from a ladder-jack scaffold while working as a carpenter on a construction project for his Employers. Appellee sued his Employers, alleging claims of employer intentional tort. The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“CIC”), which insured the Employers under a commercial general liability policy, intervened and filed a complaint seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to indemnify the Employers should Appellee prevail on his employer-intentional-tort claims. The policy contained a provision that excluded coverage for acts committed with the deliberate intent to injure an employee. The trial court granted summary judgment for CIC. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that liability may be imposed without a finding of deliberate intent under the policy. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that an insurance provision that excludes from coverage liability for an insured’s act committed with the deliberate intent to injure an employee precludes coverage for employer intentional torts. View "Hoyle v. DTJ Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1987, the village of Lodi passed an ordinance enacting Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a), which addresses discontinuation or abandonment of nonconforming uses. The final sentence of the ordinance states that the absence or removal of a mobile home from its lot constitutes discontinuance from the time of removal. As a result of the ordinance, Appellees were eventually not able to rent some of their mobile-home park lots and essentially lost a property right as to that portion of their property. Appellees filed a complaint against Lodi requesting a declaration that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and constituted a taking of their properties. The trial court granted summary judgment for Lodi. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the last sentence of the ordinance was an unconstitutional deprivation of a property right and may not be applied. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Sunset Estate Props., LLC, v. Village of Lodi" on Justia Law