Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was found to have knowingly and voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to her child and to have agreed that it was in her child’s best interest that permanent custody be granted to the state. Four days after the child’s adoption by his foster family was finalized, Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. The court of appeals concluded that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and dismissed the appeal, also determining that there was no authority for filing a notice of appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights after the expiration of the deadline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that due process does not entitle a parent whose parental rights have been terminated the right to a delayed appeal from the judgment of termination. View "In re B.C." on Justia Law

In 1976, Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and modified Appellant’s death sentence to life in prison based on Lockett v. Ohio and Bell v. Ohio. In 1998 and 2007, Appellant filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus, which the court of appeals dismissed. In 2013, Appellant filed the instant complaint for a writ of mandamus and/or procedendo asserting that he should have been returned to the common pleas court for resentencing after his death sentence was modified. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case was res judicata, as Appellant unsuccessfully made all these arguments in previous actions. View "State ex rel. Johnson v. McClelland" on Justia Law

Since March 2013, all meetings of the Norton City Council have been broadcast over the Internet by live video stream. In April 2013, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the City breached its legal duty under its charter to “televise” council meetings via broadcast tower. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the charter did not specify the means by which televising the meetings must be accomplished and that the City had complied with the charter because Internet streaming is a manner of televising the meetings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City did not abuse its discretion by interpreting the charter to permit public airing of city council meetings by way of live Internet streaming. View "State ex rel. Paluch v. Zita" on Justia Law

In an underlying partition action, Appellant objected to a magistrate’s decision. Judge Nancy Russo of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court affirmed the magistrate’s decision. Judge Russo subsequently issued a final judgment ordering a sheriff’s sale and setting the terms of distribution of the proceeds. Rather than appealing the final order, Appellant sought a writ of mandamus directing Judge Russo to issue a final, appealable order on her adoption of the magistrate’s decision. The court of appeals denied a writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appeal, and therefore, Appellant could not satisfy the elements required for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Luoma v. Russo" on Justia Law

Miles Cobrun was killed after he was struck by a vehicle driven by Robert Shill. Peggy Spaeth, Cobrun’s wife, filed a wrongful-death action against Robert and his insurer. Robert sought additional coverage under the liability policy of his parents issued by Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC). CIC denied coverage. Robert then filed this declaratory-judgment action seeking a declaration that CIC owed him a duty of indemnification in the wrongful-death case. The trial court consolidated the declaratory-judgment and underlying wrongful-death actions. The trial court granted summary judgment for CIC. The appellate court reversed. At issue before the Supreme Court was the meaning of the term “domicile,” the crucial policy term at issue in regard to coverage for Robert under his parents’ CIC umbrella policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in accordance with this Court’s previous jurisprudence, the definition of domicile is where a person resides, where he intends to remain, and where he intends to return when away temporarily; and (2) under this definition, Robert was not an insured “resident relative” under the umbrella policy at issue. View "Schill v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A property owner (Taxpayer) filed a complaint for tax year 2010, asking for a reduction from the auditor’s value of its property. The Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (BOR) dismissed Taxpayer’s complaint. Taxpayer then filed a complaint challenging the valuation for tax year 2011. Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(A)(2) generally prohibits the filing of a second complaint within the same interim period, with certain exceptions, and the 2010 and 2011 tax years were part of the same interim period between the 2009 update and the 2012 reappraisal in Cuyahoga County. Taxpayer argued that two exceptions to the general rule applied in this case. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) disagreed and held that neither applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the filing of Taxpayer’s tax-year-2011 complaint came within the exception in Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(A)(2)(a), and the filing therefore invoked the jurisdiction of the BOR. Remanded. View "Soyko Kulchystsky, LLC v. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of several counts of aggravated robbery and abduction, with firearm specifications. Several years later, Appellant filed a motion asserting that his sentence should be corrected because he was not properly advised of postrelease control. The trial court responded by correcting the original sentencing entry by a nunc pro tunc entry. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for writs of mandamus and procedendo against Judge Jeffrey L. Reed, requesting that the court of appeal compel the judge to issue a final, appealable sentencing order in his criminal case. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the sentencing judgment, as corrected by the nunc pro tunc entry was a final, appealable order. The Sureme Court affirmed on the grounds that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appeal. View "State ex rel. Ward v. Reed" on Justia Law

After Employee was terminated from his position as a construction-equipment operator with the City of Cleveland, the collective-bargaining unit for construction-equipment operators employed by the City sought a writ of mandamus to compel the City Civil Service Commission to conduct a termination hearing before a neutral referee. The appellate court denied the writ, concluding that Employee had no clear legal right to a termination hearing, that the Commission had no clear legal duty to provide Employee with a hearing before a neutral referee, and that Employee had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Employee had a clear legal right to a hearing to challenge his termination; (2) the City was under a clear legal duty to appoint a referee to conduct a hearing; and (3) a writ of mandamus was the proper remedy because Employee had no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. View "State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Kohl’s Illinois, Inc. filed a valuation complaint challenging the tax year 2010 valuation of a Kohl’s store in Marion County. The Board of Revision (BOR) dismissed the case, finding that the complaint was void because the property was subject to a tax-increment-financing (TIF) agreement that contained a covenant prohibiting the filing of a complaint against the value. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the decision of the BOR. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the BTA, holding (1) any bar to the complaint that arises from the TIF agreement is not a jurisdictional restriction, and therefore, the complaint was not void; (2) the beneficiaries of the covenant had the burden to assert the covenant as a defense against Kohl’s complaint; and (3) because the beneficiaries did not shoulder the burden to prove their entitlement to a dismissal of Kohl’s complaint, the decision of the BTA must be vacated. Remanded. View "Kohl’s Ill., Inc. v. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Bank of America, N.A. filed a complaint in foreclosure against George and Bridget Kuchta, claiming to be the holder of a promissory note and assignee of the mortgage. The trial court granted summary judgment to the bank and entered a decree of foreclosure in its favor. The Kuchtas moved to vacate the summary judgment and decree of foreclosure, arguing that the bank lacked standing to commence the action because it did not prove ownership of the note and because the mortgage assignment was fatally flawed. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that standing is a jurisdictional matter and that Bank of America’s alleged lack of standing would warrant relief from judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a lack of standing cannot support a motion for relief from judgment, and lack of standing does not render a judgment void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta" on Justia Law