Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Upon its implementation of an automated-meter-reading (“AMR”) program, the East Ohio Gas Company, d/b/a Dominion East Ohio (“Dominion”), sought to recover costs associated with its AMR program. The Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”) reduced Dominion’s proposed customer charge from $0.54 per customer per month to $0.42 per customer per month because Dominion had allegedly failed to timely implement the AMR program. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the Commission’s order was substantively unreasonable because its reduction of Dominion’s AMR charge was not rationally tied to Dominion’s alleged failure to meet certain deadlines. Remanded.View "In re Application of E. Ohio Gas Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the effect of H.B. 86 on a defendant who was convicted of possession of crack cocaine prior to its effective date but who was not sentenced until after its effective date. In practice, the enactment of H.B. 86 decreased the penalties for possession of crack cocaine. After a sentencing hearing conducted two weeks after H.B. 86’s effective date Defendant in this case was sentenced in accordance with the sentencing law in existence at the time she entered a plea of no contest to possessing crack cocaine. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant was entitled to the benefit of a decreased sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that defendants who were convicted of possession of crack cocaine prior to the effective date H.B. 86 but were not sentenced until after that date must be sentenced under the provisions of H.B. 86.View "State v. Limoli" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder, each of which carried three death specifications. Defendant waived a jury and was tried by a three-judge panel. The panel found Defendant guilty of felony murder and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s jury waiver and voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; (2) the procedure whereby the judges were appointed to the panel was not plain error; (3) Defendant’s confession was voluntary; (4) Defendant’s claim that the State violated his Sixth Amendment rights by seizing “attorney work product” during a search of his jail cell was waived at trial; (5) prosecutorial misconduct did not deny Defendant a fair trial; (6) the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors in this case beyond a reasonable doubt; and (7) the death sentence in this case was appropriate and proportionate.View "State v. Osie" on Justia Law

Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties.” Under Crim.R. 46(A)(2), however, a court may require a defendant to post ten percent of the bail amount in cash. Relators in these consolidated cases were bail bond agents and companies seeking writs of mandamus to compel the clerk and judges of county courts to accept surety bonds in all cases where bail is set by the court. Relator Woody Fox Bail Bonds also requested damages. The Supreme Court granted the requested writs of mandamus but denied damages, holding (1) Crim.R. 46(A)(2) is unconstitutional insofar as it permits a court to require a bond secured by a ten percent cash deposit as the only option, to the exclusion of a surety bond, because it denies the constitutional rights of defendants to be “bailable by sufficient sureties”; and (2) the clerk of courts and judges have political-subdivision immunity.View "State ex rel. Sylvester v. Neal" on Justia Law

Stanley and Kathryn Wasserman are the successors in interest to an easement created in 1915 for the purpose of draining what is now their farmland over land now owned by the City of Freemont. After the City unilaterally replaced plastic drainage tiles across the easement with a single drainage pipe and rerouted the drainage pathway, the Wassermans sued in mandamus, alleging an unconstitutional taking. The court of appeals concluded that the City violated the easement and that the Wassermans were entitled to a determination of whether a taking had actually occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the express easement language gave the owner of the original servient estate the right to determine the lines by which the drainage system should run through the land, and as the current owner of the servient estate, the City retained the right to change the route of the drainage tile as long as it continued to drain the Wassermans’ land; and (2) under the facts of this case, the City did not violate the easement.View "State ex rel. Wasserman v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law

Gregory Murphy suffered two work-related injuries in 2001 and 2006 while working for Packaging Corporation of America (PCA). Murphy received temporary-total-disability for the 2001 claim, and after his second injury occurred in 2006, Murphy received temporary-total-disability compensation for the 2006 claim. In 2010, the day after compensation ended for the 2006 claim, Murphy filed a second request for temporary-total-disability compensation. The Industrial Commission granted temporary-total-disability benefits. PCA filed a complaint for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the Commission’s order was based on some evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it awarded temporary-total-disability compensation.View "State ex rel. Packaging Corp. of Am. v. Indus. Comm’n " on Justia Law

In 2009, the Harrison County Board of Revision (BOR) issued two orders purporting to determine the value of two parcels owned by L.J. Smith, Inc. However, the BOR did not certify a transcript showing the filing of the complaint. Smith prosecuted an appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) challenging the valuation. The BTA remanded the case to the BOR with instructions to vacate its decision, concluding that “nothing in the record demonstrated that Smith did, in fact, file a complaint” with the BOR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the presumption of regularity was rebutted by the BOR’s failure to certify a transcript under these circumstances, and therefore, the BTA should not have relied on that presumption; but (2) the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in deeming the evidence of filing to be insufficient and in vacating the BOR order. View "L.J. Smith, Inc. v. Harrison County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

After Mother and Father divorced, the parties disputed the custody of their child, A.G. During a court proceeding concerning custody, the juvenile court excluded A.G., who was thirteen years old at the time, from attending the hearing. A.G. had filed a motion to attend the hearing, but the judge denied the motion, concluding that the dispute was between the parents, and therefore, A.G. had not constitutional right to be present. A.G. appealed, claiming that the trial court violated her due process rights by denying her motion to attend the proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had discretion to exclude A.G., a nonparty, from a hearing in custody litigation ancillary to her parents’ divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in child-custody litigation arising from a divorce, a court has discretion to exclude a child from any proceeding if it determines that exclusion is in the best interest of the child; and (2) the juvenile court in this case considered relevant and appropriate factors in making its decision.View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

Dick Flanagan filed an action in quo warranto challenging the qualifications of David Lucas, the Belmont County sheriff, who was elected to the office and sworn in on January 7, 2013. Specifically, Flanagan claimed that Lucas did not meet the statutory qualifications for a candidate for county sheriff and that Flanagan, the only person appearing on the ballot in the November 6, 2012 election who satisfied the statutory qualifications, was entitled to the office. The Supreme Court dismissed the action for lack of standing, holding that Flanagan, as the losing candidate, had no reasonable grounds to claim entitlement to the office of sheriff and therefore lacked standing to bring this quo warranto action.View "State ex rel. Flanagan v. Lucas" on Justia Law

In tax year 2007, a county fiscal officer valued an improved 6.415-acre parcel in the county at $8,740,000, consistent with the property's 2004 sale price. The property owner filed an amended complaint seeking a reduction to $3,100,000. The board of revision issued a decision retaining the fiscal officer’s valuation of the property. The owner and the school board of education both appealed. Before the board of tax appeals (BTA), the parties presented competing appraisals. The BTA accepted the owner’s appraisal and assigned a value of $3,100,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the school board did not show that the BTA’s acceptance of the valuation presented by the owner was unlawful or unreasonable; and (2) the record supported the BTA’s decision.View "Health Care REIT, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law