Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee pleaded guilty to one count of theft and was sentenced to five years of community control and ordered to pay restitution to certain third parties. Appellee later applied to have the record of her theft conviction sealed. Although the trial court recognized that Appellee had not yet satisfied her obligation to make restitution to the third parties, it granted Appellee’s application to seal her record because Appellee had paid a substantial portion of the restitution owed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a trial court may not seal an offender’s record before the offender has completed all sentencing requirements, including any order to make restitution to third parties; and (2) because Appellee still owed restitution in this case, she had not received a final discharge of her conviction and could not have her records sealed. Remanded tot he trial court with instructions to vacate its prior judgment. View "State v. Aguirre" on Justia Law

Appellee, a home health nurse who provided in-home health-care services to clients of Visiting Nurse Association of Mid-Ohio (VNA), was injured in a vehicle collision while she was traveling to the home of a patient. Appellee had decided to transport her children and two friends to a mall on her way to the patient’s home. The Industrial Commission allowed Appellee’s claim for a neck sprain. VNA appealed. The trial court granted summary judgment for VNA, concluding that Appellee was on a personal errand at the time she was injured. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the accident and injury arose out of and occurred in the course of Appellee’s employment. Specifically, the court determined that although Appellee had intended to drop her passengers off at the mall, she had the dual intent to travel to her patient’s home, and when she was injured, she had not yet diverted from that path. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine of dual intent or dual purpose is not recognized in Ohio for purposes of determining eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits. Remanded. View "Friebel v. Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Mid-Ohio" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on several charges. Defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby he agreed to testify in a murder prosecution against his father in exchange for amended or dismissed charges. One year after Defendant was sentenced, the State asked the trial court to vacate Defendant’s plea because he failed to cooperate in the State’s prosecution of his father. The trial court granted the request, withdrew the former plea agreement, and vacated the sentence. Defendant subsequently entered into a second plea agreement and was resentenced. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the trial court did not have the authority to reconsider its own final judgment after Defendant had been sentenced. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there is no authority for a court to revisit a sentence that has already been imposed based on a defendant’s failure to fulfill his obligations under a plea agreement. View "State v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

Appellant brought an original action for a writ of mandamus against his former employers, the Summit County prosecutor and the County (collectively, the County), alleging that the County did not compensate him in accordance with established pay scales for his position and seeking payment of “an amount to cover back pay losses.” The court of appeals denied the writ and also denied Appellant’s motion for sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s right to back pay was not so clear as to justify issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus, and therefore, the court of appeals correctly determined that Appellant failed to carry his burden of proof; and (2) the appellate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for sanctions. View "State ex rel. Manley v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Christopher Wright was convicted of felonious assault. The court of appeals affirmed. Asserting that he filed such a motion, Wright filed a petition for writ of procedendo to compel the trial judge to rule on his pro se motion for a new trial. The judge to whom the motion was directed moved to dismiss the motion, asserting that Defendant never filed a motion for a new trial. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals was correct in dismissing the petition, as there was no evidence that Wright’s motion was ever filed in the trial court. View "State ex rel. Wright v. Niehaus" on Justia Law

Appellant was found to have knowingly and voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to her child and to have agreed that it was in her child’s best interest that permanent custody be granted to the state. Four days after the child’s adoption by his foster family was finalized, Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. The court of appeals concluded that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and dismissed the appeal, also determining that there was no authority for filing a notice of appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights after the expiration of the deadline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that due process does not entitle a parent whose parental rights have been terminated the right to a delayed appeal from the judgment of termination. View "In re B.C." on Justia Law

In 1976, Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and modified Appellant’s death sentence to life in prison based on Lockett v. Ohio and Bell v. Ohio. In 1998 and 2007, Appellant filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus, which the court of appeals dismissed. In 2013, Appellant filed the instant complaint for a writ of mandamus and/or procedendo asserting that he should have been returned to the common pleas court for resentencing after his death sentence was modified. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case was res judicata, as Appellant unsuccessfully made all these arguments in previous actions. View "State ex rel. Johnson v. McClelland" on Justia Law

Since March 2013, all meetings of the Norton City Council have been broadcast over the Internet by live video stream. In April 2013, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the City breached its legal duty under its charter to “televise” council meetings via broadcast tower. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the charter did not specify the means by which televising the meetings must be accomplished and that the City had complied with the charter because Internet streaming is a manner of televising the meetings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City did not abuse its discretion by interpreting the charter to permit public airing of city council meetings by way of live Internet streaming. View "State ex rel. Paluch v. Zita" on Justia Law

In an underlying partition action, Appellant objected to a magistrate’s decision. Judge Nancy Russo of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court affirmed the magistrate’s decision. Judge Russo subsequently issued a final judgment ordering a sheriff’s sale and setting the terms of distribution of the proceeds. Rather than appealing the final order, Appellant sought a writ of mandamus directing Judge Russo to issue a final, appealable order on her adoption of the magistrate’s decision. The court of appeals denied a writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appeal, and therefore, Appellant could not satisfy the elements required for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Luoma v. Russo" on Justia Law

Miles Cobrun was killed after he was struck by a vehicle driven by Robert Shill. Peggy Spaeth, Cobrun’s wife, filed a wrongful-death action against Robert and his insurer. Robert sought additional coverage under the liability policy of his parents issued by Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC). CIC denied coverage. Robert then filed this declaratory-judgment action seeking a declaration that CIC owed him a duty of indemnification in the wrongful-death case. The trial court consolidated the declaratory-judgment and underlying wrongful-death actions. The trial court granted summary judgment for CIC. The appellate court reversed. At issue before the Supreme Court was the meaning of the term “domicile,” the crucial policy term at issue in regard to coverage for Robert under his parents’ CIC umbrella policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in accordance with this Court’s previous jurisprudence, the definition of domicile is where a person resides, where he intends to remain, and where he intends to return when away temporarily; and (2) under this definition, Robert was not an insured “resident relative” under the umbrella policy at issue. View "Schill v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law