Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose from the death of Seth Cromer at the pediatric intensive-care unit of Children’s Hospital Medical Center. Seth’s mother and father, individually and as administrator, brought this medical-negligence action against the hospital, alleging that Seth’s death was caused by the negligence of multiple hospital employees. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the hospital. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by including an instruction on foreseeability when it instructed the jury on the hospital’s standard of care. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) foreseeability of harm is generally relevant to the determination of the scope of a physician’s duty in a medical-malpractice action, and therefore, giving a foreseeability instruction in such an action is not manifestly incorrect; (2) where the parties in this case did not dispute that the physician understood that the chosen course of treatment carried some risk of harm, the instruction regarding foreseeability was not necessary; and (3) the unneeded jury instruction on foreseeability did not prejudice Plaintiffs’ substantial rights, and therefore, reversal was not justified. View "Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his conviction for two felonies. The court of appeals ordered Appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. Appellant subsequently returned to the trial court and moved for a revised termination entry. Judge Wiseman of that court entered a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the original judgment of conviction. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant's conviction, concluding that the error was cured by the nunc pro tunc entry, proceeded with the appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed this action for writ of mandamus, contending that Judge Wiseman did not have the authority to sign the nunc pro tunc entry. The court of appeals dismissed the action, finding that the original judgment entry was a final, appealable order, as corrected by the nunc pro tunc order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant had an adequate remedy at law, he was not entitled to the writ. View "State ex rel. Priest v. Dankof" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and having weapons under disability. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a suggestion of incompetence to stand trial and a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. A psychologist conducted a court-ordered evaluation on the issues of Defendant’s competency and sanity. Defendant later withdrew the defenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when it allowed the psychologist to testify during trial. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 2945.371(J) prohibits the use of statements made by a defendant in a psychiatric evaluation against the defendant on the issue of guilt in a criminal action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a defendant asserts a mental-capacity defense, resulting in the court ordering a psychiatric evaluation, but then the defendant wholly abandons the defense, a psychologist’s testimony regarding the defendant’s feigning of mental illness during the court-ordered evaluation is inadmissible in the state’s case-in-chief pursuant to section 2945.371(J); and (2) the trial court’s admission of the psychologist’s testimony in this case was not harmless error. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

Appellant injured his back while working as a mechanic for Employer. Six days after the injury, Appellant returned to work with a note from his doctor restricting him to modified duty. Appellant quit his job that same day. Thereafter, Appellant applied for temporary-total-disability compensation. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation denied Appellant’s request on the ground that he had voluntarily quit his job and had not reentered the workforce. The Industrial Commission refused Appellant’s appeal. Appellant filed a complaint in the court of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluded that Appellant was not fired but had voluntarily quit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant voluntarily abandoned his position for reasons unrelated to his industrial injury and in denying Appellant’s request for temporary-total-disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Hildebrand v. Wingate Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Martha Simpson, a doctor of osteopathic medicine, was employed in two state positions. In one position, Simpson and her employer contributed to the State Teachers Retirement System (STRS). In the other, Simpson and her employer contributed to the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). Members of STRS who are also members in another state retirement system may combine their total contributions and service credits in determining eligibility for benefits. Under STRS statutes, a pension benefit is calculated by determining a final average salary, which is capped under certain conditions. Simpson filed an application for retirement benefits with STRS. STRS applied the cap to Simpson’s combined PERS and STRS salaries when calculating Simpson’s final average salary. As a result, Simpson’s pension benefit was decreased. After unsuccessfully pursuing an administrative appeal, Simpson filed this action in mandamus, requesting a writ ordering the State Teachers Retirement Board to recalculate her retirement benefit by not capping the PERS portion of her salary. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that because STRS administered the pension benefits for Simpson, STRS’s statutes must be applied to the entirety of Simpsons’s retirement contributions. View "State ex rel. Simpson v. State Teachers Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

A property owner appealed a valuation of its real property. After the Board of Tax Appeals issued its decision on August 29, 2013, the property owner appealed. The notice of appeal was filed on September 30, 2013, but the property owner failed to initiate service of the notice of appeal on the tax commissioner. On October 24, 2013, the property owner served the tax commissioner with the appeal. On November 4, 2013, the appeal was returned from mediation to the regular docket. That order specified that Appellant’s brief was due forty days from the date of the order. On November 12, 2013, the school board filed a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the property owner failed to initiate service of the notice of appeal on the tax commissioner, a necessary party, within the thirty-day appeal period. View "Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Industrial Commission allowed the claim of Donna Evert, the surviving spouse of Charles Evert (the Decedent), for death benefits. Evert then filed a motion requesting an award for the Decent’s use of his arms and legs prior to his death. A staff hearing officer denied the motion. More than one year later, Evert filed a motion asking the Commission to exercise continuing jurisdiction to rehear the issue. A staff hearing officer denied the motion. Evert asked the Commission to reconsider its decision. After a hearing with two of the three commissioners attending, the Commission denied reconsideration by a vote of two-to-one. In 2011, Evert filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that she had been denied due process of law when the absent commissioner voted on the motion for reconsideration despite not attending the hearing. The Tenth District Court of Appeals issued a limited writ of mandamus vacating the Commission’s order and ordering a new hearing, concluding that the Tenth Circuit’s then-recent decision in State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp. was depositive. Because the Supreme Court subsequently reversed State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp., the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the court of appeals for additional consideration. View "State ex rel. Evert v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2002, Ruth McCormick slipped and fell while working at a McDonald’s restaurant. McCormick received temporary total disability (TTD) compensation until 2010, when the Industrial Commission terminated McCormick’s benefits based on a doctor’s opinion that McCormick had reached maximum medical improvement. McCormick filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the Commission's decision to terminate benefits was not supported by the evidence, was contrary to law, and was an abuse of discretion because the doctor’s opinion that she had reached maximum medical improvement was factually inaccurate. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctor’s report that McCormick had reached maximum level improvement was valid evidence supporting the Commission’s decision to terminate TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. McCormick v. McDonald’s" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging statutory retaliatory-discharge and common-law wrongful-discharge against Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc. for firing her for reporting suspected abuse or neglect and against Brookdale Senior Living, Inc. for inducing Hospice to fire her. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, concluding, as relevant to this appeal, Plaintiff's retaliatory-discharge claim under Ohio Rev. Code 3721.24 failed because Plaintiff did not report the suspected abuse or neglect to the Ohio director of health. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment to the extent it dismissed Plaintiff’s statutory retaliatory-discharge claim, holding that section 3721.24 does not require an employee or other person to report suspected abuse or neglect to the Ohio director of health in order to be protected from retaliation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an employee who reports suspected abuse or neglect of a long-term-care-facility or residential-care-facility resident is not required to report to the Ohio director of health in order to state a claim for retaliatory discharge under section 3721.24; and (2) in this case, Plaintiff’s reporting the suspected abuse or neglect to Brookdale and to the resident’s children triggered the protection of section 3721.24. View "Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1983, the four fingers of Dennis Varney’s left hand were amputated in a work-related accident. Three fingers were completely reattached and the fourth finger was partially reattached, but the fingers did not regain their full function. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded Varney compensation for the partial loss of use of his four fingers. In 1985 and 1990 two claims were allowed for one-third loss of use of Varney's index finger and for two-thirds loss of use of his other damaged fingers. In 2010, Varney filed a motion for a total loss of use of his index, ring, and little fingers. The Industrial Commission denied the motion. The Court of Appeals granted Varney’s request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the Commission had applied the wrong legal standard for determining the loss of use of a finger. The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding that the Commission used the proper standard when examining the medical evidence as it related to the amount of function remaining in Varney’s three fingers and did not abuse its discretion in denying compensation for the total loss of use of those fingers. View "State ex rel. Varney v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law