Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(C)(2)(a), which defines “gross sexual imposition” and subjects an offender to a mandatory term of imprisonment when evidence other than the victim’s testimony is admitted corroborating the violation. Appellant in this case pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition. The State introduced testimony regarding Appellant’s alleged confession to the offenses and argued that the confession constituted corroborating evidence, and thus a mandatory prison sentence was required. The trial court concluded that application of section 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violated Appellant’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 2907.05(C)(2)(a)’s requirement of a mandatory prison term when corroborating evidence is introduced is unconstitutional because corroboration bears no rational relationship to the crime’s activity; and (2) in cases in which a defendant has pled guilty, imposing a mandatory prison term pursuant to section 2907.05(C)(2)(a) when corroborating evidence of the charge of gross sexual imposition is produced violates a defendant’s right to a jury trial. View "State v. Bevly" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer sought a warrant to search a house based on facts within the supporting affidavit. Among those facts were the results of a “trash pull” that detectives had conducted outside the house. Based on these facts, the officers obtained the search warrant and, upon executing the warrant, found evidence of an active methamphetamine lab. Defendant was indicted on eight felony counts related to the manufacturing, possession, and trafficking of drugs. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered through execution of the search warrant. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that “one trash pull is not necessarily sufficient” to establish probable cause. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence seized from the single trash pull that corroborated tips and background information involving drug activity was sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant. Remanded. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this appropriation action, Appellant was awarded $366,384 in a judgment dated October 4, 2012. Appellant timely moved for attorney fees. On November 27, 2012, the trial court entered its judgment denying attorney fees. However, because there was no instruction to the clerk of courts to serve the entry, the clerk neither served the entry nor noted service on the appearance docket. Appellant received the trial court’s opinion but asked the court to make the judgment final and appealable. On January 30, 2013, the trial court expressly ordered the clerk of courts to serve the November 27, 2012 judgment entry. The clerk of courts complied with the order on that date. On February 4, 2013, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the November 27, 2012 judgment. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that it was untimely because it had not been filed within thirty days of the judgment. The Supreme Court reversed with instructions to reinstate the appeal, holding that there is no exception to the requirement that when a trial court issues a judgment, the trial court shall issue a directive to the clerk of courts to serve all interested parties and attorneys with that judgment. View "Clermont County Transp. Improvement Dist. v. Gator Milford, LLC" on Justia Law

The Governor granted a pardon to Appellant that extended to five convictions that occurred in several counties, including a felony conviction in Franklin County. Appellant subsequently applied to the Franklin County Common Pleas Court for an order sealing his conviction in that forum. The trial court granted Appellant’s application to seal. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that no statute authorized the sealing of Appellant’s record based on a gubernatorial pardon. Subsequently, the Tenth District certified its decision as in conflict with the First District’s decision in State v. Cope, which provides that a trial court may seal the record of a conviction that has been erased by a pardon. The Supreme Court recognized the conflict, accepted Appellant’s discretionary appeal, and consolidated the causes. The Court then resolved the conflict by rejecting Cope and affirming the decision of the Tenth District, holding that a court lacks the authority to seal a criminal record of a pardoned offender who does not meet applicable statutory requirements for sealing the record. View "State v. Radcliff" on Justia Law

Appellant was acquitted on four drug-trafficking charges and successfully moved to seal the records in that case. Three days after the trial court entered judgment sealing Appellant’s record, the state charged Appellant with retaliating against the state’s informant in the drug-trafficking case. The state then moved to unseal the record of Appellant’s drug-trafficking case so it could be used as evidence in the retaliation case. The trial court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that a court has discretion to unseal records of criminal proceedings for purposes other than those provided in Ohio Rev. Code 2953.53(D). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a court does not have the authority to unseal official records for a purpose different from those explicitly authorized under section 2953.53. View "State v. Vanzandt" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant was convicted of several felonies, including receiving stolen property, burglary, and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. The convictions arose out of the practice of Defendant and another individual of stealing or receiving stolen vehicles and using those vehicles to commit several burglaries. The court of appeals reversed the conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, concluding that there was not evidence that Defendant was “involved in any type of ongoing organization, functioning as a continuing unit, with a structure separate and apart from the pattern of corrupt activity.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the existence of an enterprise, sufficient to sustain a conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, can be established without proving that the enterprise is a structure separate and distinct from a pattern of corrupt activity; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in this case. View "State v. Beverly" on Justia Law

This case arose from the death of Seth Cromer at the pediatric intensive-care unit of Children’s Hospital Medical Center. Seth’s mother and father, individually and as administrator, brought this medical-negligence action against the hospital, alleging that Seth’s death was caused by the negligence of multiple hospital employees. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the hospital. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by including an instruction on foreseeability when it instructed the jury on the hospital’s standard of care. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) foreseeability of harm is generally relevant to the determination of the scope of a physician’s duty in a medical-malpractice action, and therefore, giving a foreseeability instruction in such an action is not manifestly incorrect; (2) where the parties in this case did not dispute that the physician understood that the chosen course of treatment carried some risk of harm, the instruction regarding foreseeability was not necessary; and (3) the unneeded jury instruction on foreseeability did not prejudice Plaintiffs’ substantial rights, and therefore, reversal was not justified. View "Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his conviction for two felonies. The court of appeals ordered Appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. Appellant subsequently returned to the trial court and moved for a revised termination entry. Judge Wiseman of that court entered a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the original judgment of conviction. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant's conviction, concluding that the error was cured by the nunc pro tunc entry, proceeded with the appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed this action for writ of mandamus, contending that Judge Wiseman did not have the authority to sign the nunc pro tunc entry. The court of appeals dismissed the action, finding that the original judgment entry was a final, appealable order, as corrected by the nunc pro tunc order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant had an adequate remedy at law, he was not entitled to the writ. View "State ex rel. Priest v. Dankof" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and having weapons under disability. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a suggestion of incompetence to stand trial and a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. A psychologist conducted a court-ordered evaluation on the issues of Defendant’s competency and sanity. Defendant later withdrew the defenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when it allowed the psychologist to testify during trial. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 2945.371(J) prohibits the use of statements made by a defendant in a psychiatric evaluation against the defendant on the issue of guilt in a criminal action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a defendant asserts a mental-capacity defense, resulting in the court ordering a psychiatric evaluation, but then the defendant wholly abandons the defense, a psychologist’s testimony regarding the defendant’s feigning of mental illness during the court-ordered evaluation is inadmissible in the state’s case-in-chief pursuant to section 2945.371(J); and (2) the trial court’s admission of the psychologist’s testimony in this case was not harmless error. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

Appellant injured his back while working as a mechanic for Employer. Six days after the injury, Appellant returned to work with a note from his doctor restricting him to modified duty. Appellant quit his job that same day. Thereafter, Appellant applied for temporary-total-disability compensation. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation denied Appellant’s request on the ground that he had voluntarily quit his job and had not reentered the workforce. The Industrial Commission refused Appellant’s appeal. Appellant filed a complaint in the court of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluded that Appellant was not fired but had voluntarily quit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant voluntarily abandoned his position for reasons unrelated to his industrial injury and in denying Appellant’s request for temporary-total-disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Hildebrand v. Wingate Transport, Inc." on Justia Law