Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Defendant was indicted in Ashland County on charges of theft and breaking and entering. At the time, Defendant was being held in a county jail in Maryland. In 2012, the State re-indicted Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the new indictment, arguing that his speedy-trial rights were violated because the applicable time limits under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) - codified in Ohio Rev. Code 2963.30 - were exceeded without resolution of the charges. The trial court overruled Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the time limits under the IAD did not apply because Black was incarcerated in an out-of-state county jail and not in a state penal or correctional institution. Defendant was ultimately convicted of two misdemeanor counts of theft and one felony count of breaking and entering. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the IAD applied to Defendant even though he was incarcerated in an out-of-state county facility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term “penal or correctional institution of a party state,” as it is used in section 2963.30, includes a county jail as well as a state prison or correctional facility. View "State v. Black" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former police officer, was indicted on one count of felonious assault with a firearm specification arising from his shooting of Michael McCloskey Jr. during a traffic stop. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felonious assault and the accompanying firearm specification. The court of appeals reversed the felonious assault conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding (1) the firearm specification was unconstitutional as applied to Defendant; and (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the use of deadly force and in not giving a mistaken-belief instruction, and by excluding testimony about the crimes Defendant believed McCloskey had committed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the firearm specification did not apply in this case; (2) the trial court gave potentially misleading instructions to the jury regarding the use of deadly force and justification; and (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding the offenses that Defendant believed McCloskey had committed. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

These three consolidated cases arose out of the same set of facts and raised identical issues. Pursuant to a search warrant issued by a probate judge, which gave law enforcement permission to search a business for evidence of illegal gambling, more than thirty video slot machines were confiscated, giving rise to charges filed against Defendants, who were operating the business. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence, asserting that the search warrant was void because probate judges do not have the statutory authority to issue a criminal search warrant. The trial court agreed with Defendants and granted the motions to suppress the evidence gathered to the tainted warrant. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the probate judge did indeed lack authority to issue a search warrant; but (2) the police officers acted in good-faith reliance on the warrant under United States v. Leon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a probate judge does not have the authority to issue search warrants in criminal matters; and (2) the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in Leon applies in these cases. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Ohio Rev. Code 1509 gives state government “sole and exclusive authority” to regulate the permitting, location, and spacing of oil and gas wells and production operations within Ohio. Beck Energy Corporation obtained a permit from the Ohio Department of Natural Resources in order to drill an oil and gas well on property within the corporate limits of the City of Munroe Falls. When Beck Energy began drilling, the City filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief and alleging that Beck Energy was violating several provisions of the Munroe Falls Codified Ordinances. The trial court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Beck Energy from drilling until it complied with all local ordinances. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 1509.02 prohibited the City from enforcing the five ordinances. In so holding, the court rejected the City’s argument that the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution allowed the City to impose its own permit requirements on oil and gas drilling operations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Home Rule Amendment does not grant the City the power to discriminate against, unfairly impede, or obstruct oil and gas activities and production operations that the State has permitted under chapter 1509. View "State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(C)(2)(a), which defines “gross sexual imposition” and subjects an offender to a mandatory term of imprisonment when evidence other than the victim’s testimony is admitted corroborating the violation. Appellant in this case pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition. The State introduced testimony regarding Appellant’s alleged confession to the offenses and argued that the confession constituted corroborating evidence, and thus a mandatory prison sentence was required. The trial court concluded that application of section 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violated Appellant’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 2907.05(C)(2)(a)’s requirement of a mandatory prison term when corroborating evidence is introduced is unconstitutional because corroboration bears no rational relationship to the crime’s activity; and (2) in cases in which a defendant has pled guilty, imposing a mandatory prison term pursuant to section 2907.05(C)(2)(a) when corroborating evidence of the charge of gross sexual imposition is produced violates a defendant’s right to a jury trial. View "State v. Bevly" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer sought a warrant to search a house based on facts within the supporting affidavit. Among those facts were the results of a “trash pull” that detectives had conducted outside the house. Based on these facts, the officers obtained the search warrant and, upon executing the warrant, found evidence of an active methamphetamine lab. Defendant was indicted on eight felony counts related to the manufacturing, possession, and trafficking of drugs. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered through execution of the search warrant. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that “one trash pull is not necessarily sufficient” to establish probable cause. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence seized from the single trash pull that corroborated tips and background information involving drug activity was sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant. Remanded. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this appropriation action, Appellant was awarded $366,384 in a judgment dated October 4, 2012. Appellant timely moved for attorney fees. On November 27, 2012, the trial court entered its judgment denying attorney fees. However, because there was no instruction to the clerk of courts to serve the entry, the clerk neither served the entry nor noted service on the appearance docket. Appellant received the trial court’s opinion but asked the court to make the judgment final and appealable. On January 30, 2013, the trial court expressly ordered the clerk of courts to serve the November 27, 2012 judgment entry. The clerk of courts complied with the order on that date. On February 4, 2013, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the November 27, 2012 judgment. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that it was untimely because it had not been filed within thirty days of the judgment. The Supreme Court reversed with instructions to reinstate the appeal, holding that there is no exception to the requirement that when a trial court issues a judgment, the trial court shall issue a directive to the clerk of courts to serve all interested parties and attorneys with that judgment. View "Clermont County Transp. Improvement Dist. v. Gator Milford, LLC" on Justia Law

The Governor granted a pardon to Appellant that extended to five convictions that occurred in several counties, including a felony conviction in Franklin County. Appellant subsequently applied to the Franklin County Common Pleas Court for an order sealing his conviction in that forum. The trial court granted Appellant’s application to seal. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that no statute authorized the sealing of Appellant’s record based on a gubernatorial pardon. Subsequently, the Tenth District certified its decision as in conflict with the First District’s decision in State v. Cope, which provides that a trial court may seal the record of a conviction that has been erased by a pardon. The Supreme Court recognized the conflict, accepted Appellant’s discretionary appeal, and consolidated the causes. The Court then resolved the conflict by rejecting Cope and affirming the decision of the Tenth District, holding that a court lacks the authority to seal a criminal record of a pardoned offender who does not meet applicable statutory requirements for sealing the record. View "State v. Radcliff" on Justia Law

Appellant was acquitted on four drug-trafficking charges and successfully moved to seal the records in that case. Three days after the trial court entered judgment sealing Appellant’s record, the state charged Appellant with retaliating against the state’s informant in the drug-trafficking case. The state then moved to unseal the record of Appellant’s drug-trafficking case so it could be used as evidence in the retaliation case. The trial court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that a court has discretion to unseal records of criminal proceedings for purposes other than those provided in Ohio Rev. Code 2953.53(D). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a court does not have the authority to unseal official records for a purpose different from those explicitly authorized under section 2953.53. View "State v. Vanzandt" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant was convicted of several felonies, including receiving stolen property, burglary, and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. The convictions arose out of the practice of Defendant and another individual of stealing or receiving stolen vehicles and using those vehicles to commit several burglaries. The court of appeals reversed the conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, concluding that there was not evidence that Defendant was “involved in any type of ongoing organization, functioning as a continuing unit, with a structure separate and apart from the pattern of corrupt activity.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the existence of an enterprise, sufficient to sustain a conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, can be established without proving that the enterprise is a structure separate and distinct from a pattern of corrupt activity; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in this case. View "State v. Beverly" on Justia Law