Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee, the former chief of the Westlake Fire Department, was suspended for thirty days without pay and demoted from the position of fire chief for violating Ohio Rev. Code 124.34(A). The trial court modified the penalty imposed by the Westlake Civil Service Commission by reversing Appellee’s demotion to the position of firefighter and ordering that Appellee be reinstated to the rank of captain. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a trial court, as part of its de novo review of a civil service commission’s decision pursuant to section 124.34(C), has the authority to modify the disciplinary measures imposed by the commission; and (2) the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion by reducing the punishment imposed by the commission. View "Westlake Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Pietrick" on Justia Law

Lance Mason, a sitting Cuyahoga county Court of Common Pleas judge, was indicted on three counts of felonious assault, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of endangering children, and one count of domestic violence. Mason filed a pretrial motion to disqualify the prosecutor’s office and appoint a special prosecutor. The trial judge denied the motion, finding that Mason had not shown the requisite “actual prejudice” that would justify the disqualification of the entire prosecutor’s office and that there was no conflict of interest shown. Mason appealed. The Eighth District Court of Appeals issued a stay of the trial court proceedings to consider whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Timothy McGinty, the prosecutor, filed this original action in prohibition, arguing that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and to issue the stay. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the Court of Appeals patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to disqualify the prosecutor in a criminal case. View "State ex rel. McGinty v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured when he fell from a ladder-jack scaffold while working as a carpenter on a construction project for his Employers. Appellee sued his Employers, alleging claims of employer intentional tort. The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“CIC”), which insured the Employers under a commercial general liability policy, intervened and filed a complaint seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to indemnify the Employers should Appellee prevail on his employer-intentional-tort claims. The policy contained a provision that excluded coverage for acts committed with the deliberate intent to injure an employee. The trial court granted summary judgment for CIC. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that liability may be imposed without a finding of deliberate intent under the policy. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that an insurance provision that excludes from coverage liability for an insured’s act committed with the deliberate intent to injure an employee precludes coverage for employer intentional torts. View "Hoyle v. DTJ Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1987, the village of Lodi passed an ordinance enacting Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a), which addresses discontinuation or abandonment of nonconforming uses. The final sentence of the ordinance states that the absence or removal of a mobile home from its lot constitutes discontinuance from the time of removal. As a result of the ordinance, Appellees were eventually not able to rent some of their mobile-home park lots and essentially lost a property right as to that portion of their property. Appellees filed a complaint against Lodi requesting a declaration that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and constituted a taking of their properties. The trial court granted summary judgment for Lodi. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the last sentence of the ordinance was an unconstitutional deprivation of a property right and may not be applied. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Sunset Estate Props., LLC, v. Village of Lodi" on Justia Law

Employee filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission contending that her employment by Employer had been terminated because she became pregnant. The Commission found that Employer had participated in a discriminatory practice in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112. Employer filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4112.06. The common pleas court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition for review was not timely served on the parties because Employer failed to properly initiate service by the clerk within thirty days of the date the Commission’s order was filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Employer had one year to obtain service of a petition to review an order of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings initiated pursuant to section 4112.06; and (2) therefore, a petition to review an order of the Commission must be served by a clerk of courts on all parties who appeared before the Commission and on the Commission itself within one year of the date the petition was filed as required by Ohio R. Civ. P. 3(A). View "Hambuechen v. 221 Market North, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Delaware and Berkshire Township contracted for a proposed joint economic development district, and the Berkshire Township Board of Trustees adopted a resolution approving the contract. Colleen Mann circulated part-petitions, including part-petition Nos. 2 and 5, calling for a referendum on the resolution. The Delaware County Board of Elections (“Board”) rejected part-petitions No. 2 and 5 in their entirety, concluding that the part-petitions lacked the required number of valid signatures. Relators, Mann and two other individuals, commenced this action in mandamus against the Board and its members seeking to compel the Board to certify the referendum petition for the May 5, 2015 special-election ballot. The Supreme Court granted the writ and ordered the Board to recalculate the number of valid signatures, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence from which the Board could infer that Mann knew that two specific signatures were false; and (2) therefore, the Board abused its discretion when it rejected the two part-petitions in their entirety. View "State ex rel. Mann v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was indicted in Ashland County on charges of theft and breaking and entering. At the time, Defendant was being held in a county jail in Maryland. In 2012, the State re-indicted Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the new indictment, arguing that his speedy-trial rights were violated because the applicable time limits under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) - codified in Ohio Rev. Code 2963.30 - were exceeded without resolution of the charges. The trial court overruled Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the time limits under the IAD did not apply because Black was incarcerated in an out-of-state county jail and not in a state penal or correctional institution. Defendant was ultimately convicted of two misdemeanor counts of theft and one felony count of breaking and entering. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the IAD applied to Defendant even though he was incarcerated in an out-of-state county facility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term “penal or correctional institution of a party state,” as it is used in section 2963.30, includes a county jail as well as a state prison or correctional facility. View "State v. Black" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former police officer, was indicted on one count of felonious assault with a firearm specification arising from his shooting of Michael McCloskey Jr. during a traffic stop. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felonious assault and the accompanying firearm specification. The court of appeals reversed the felonious assault conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding (1) the firearm specification was unconstitutional as applied to Defendant; and (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the use of deadly force and in not giving a mistaken-belief instruction, and by excluding testimony about the crimes Defendant believed McCloskey had committed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the firearm specification did not apply in this case; (2) the trial court gave potentially misleading instructions to the jury regarding the use of deadly force and justification; and (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding the offenses that Defendant believed McCloskey had committed. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

These three consolidated cases arose out of the same set of facts and raised identical issues. Pursuant to a search warrant issued by a probate judge, which gave law enforcement permission to search a business for evidence of illegal gambling, more than thirty video slot machines were confiscated, giving rise to charges filed against Defendants, who were operating the business. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence, asserting that the search warrant was void because probate judges do not have the statutory authority to issue a criminal search warrant. The trial court agreed with Defendants and granted the motions to suppress the evidence gathered to the tainted warrant. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the probate judge did indeed lack authority to issue a search warrant; but (2) the police officers acted in good-faith reliance on the warrant under United States v. Leon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a probate judge does not have the authority to issue search warrants in criminal matters; and (2) the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in Leon applies in these cases. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Ohio Rev. Code 1509 gives state government “sole and exclusive authority” to regulate the permitting, location, and spacing of oil and gas wells and production operations within Ohio. Beck Energy Corporation obtained a permit from the Ohio Department of Natural Resources in order to drill an oil and gas well on property within the corporate limits of the City of Munroe Falls. When Beck Energy began drilling, the City filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief and alleging that Beck Energy was violating several provisions of the Munroe Falls Codified Ordinances. The trial court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Beck Energy from drilling until it complied with all local ordinances. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 1509.02 prohibited the City from enforcing the five ordinances. In so holding, the court rejected the City’s argument that the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution allowed the City to impose its own permit requirements on oil and gas drilling operations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Home Rule Amendment does not grant the City the power to discriminate against, unfairly impede, or obstruct oil and gas activities and production operations that the State has permitted under chapter 1509. View "State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp." on Justia Law