Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Karen Baker, represented by an attorney with Schiavoni, Bush & Muldowney Co, L.P.A. (“the law firm”), filed an application for an increase in her permanent-partial-disability compensation. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded a total amount of $24,649.50. The law firm subsequently filed a motion with the Bureau seeking payment of its attorney fees out of Baker’s permanent-partial-disability-compensation award. The matter was referred to the full Industrial Commission, which denied the law firm’s motion, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve a fee dispute between a claimant’s counsel and the Bureau and lacked jurisdiction to order the Bureau to pay the requested attorney fees. Baker then filed a complaint in mandamus against the Commission. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Baker and the law firm failed to demonstrate that they had a clear legal right to the relief requested or that the Bureau had a clear duty to pay the fees. View "State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court considered a trial court’s authority to “conditionally” dismiss a civil case and thereby retain jurisdiction to thereafter enforce a settlement between the parties. These two cases involved claims that arose as a result of a fire in an apartment complex. During a pretrial settlement conference, the parties orally agreed to settle their claims. The trial court sua sponte filed a dismissal entry. The court subsequently clarified that its dismissal was conditional and that it retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement between the parties. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court’s dismissal entry divested the trial court of jurisdiction and precluded further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a trial court may, when it dismisses a civil action upon notification that the parties have settled, expressly retain jurisdiction for the specific purpose of enforcing the settlement agreement; and (2) because the trial court’s dismissal entry in this case did not incorporate the terms of the settlement agreement or expressly state that the court was retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, the dismissal entry divested the court of jurisdiction and precluded further proceedings. View "Infinite Sec. Solutions, LLC v. Karam Props. II, Ltd." on Justia Law

Charles Watkins, an inmate at North Central Correctional Complex, filed an original action in mandamus against the chief of the Adult Parole Authority and chair of the Parole Board (together, Appellees), arguing that Appellees failed to affirm him review of his parole. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint sua sponte because Watkins’s affidavit did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A)(1). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err by dismissing Watkins’s complaint sua sponte because it did not comply with the statute. View "State ex rel. Watkins v. Andrews" on Justia Law

David Quolke, the president of the Cleveland Teacher’s Union, requested from the Strongsville City School District Board of Education the names and identification numbers of all teachers and replacement teachers employed by the Board during a teachers’ strike. The Board claimed that many of the records were not subject to disclosure, asserting that the names of the replacement teachers were not considered public record because of the threat of harm to those teachers. Quolke sued in mandamus in the court of appeals for the records. The court of appeals found for Quolke and ordered the Board to produce the names. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, while there may have been a genuine threat to the replacement teachers’ well-being during the strike, the Board presented little evidence that there was any remaining threat to the teachers now that the strike was over. View "State ex rel. Quolke v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the rape of three women, along with three associated aggravated burglaries. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred by failing to merge the three aggravated burglary counts into the corresponding rape counts. The district court affirmed the trial court on the nonsentencing issues but vacated the sentences for the aggravated burglary and rape counts, concluding that because the conduct relied upon to establish the rapes was the same conduct used to establish the physical-harm element of the aggravated burglaries, the offenses were allied and subject to merger. At issue on appeal was whether the offenses in question were allied offenses of similar or dissimilar import within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) offenses with resulting harm that is separate and identifiable are offenses of dissimilar import; and (2) because the court of appeals in this case did not consider whether the import of the aggravated burglary and the import of the rape were similar or dissimilar in each of the three separate events, the cause must be remanded for consideration of these factors. View "State v. Ruff" on Justia Law

The Tussing Road Water Reclamation Facility in Fairfield County is required to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act from the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (Ohio EPA). The Fairfield County Board of Commissioners challenged the validity of new phosphorus limitations added on to the Tussing Road plant’s renewed NPDES permit, alleging that Ohio EPA ignored the administrative rulemaking procedures required by the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act (the Act) and imposed the new limits solely on a federally approved total maximum daily load (TMDL) report previously issued for the watershed in question. Specifically, the County contended that it should have had a full and fair opportunity to be heard and the right to review and challenge the TMDL before it was submitted to United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). The Court of Appeals vacated the NPDES phosphorus limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a TMDL established by Ohio EPA is a rule that is subject to the requirements of the Act, and therefore, Ohio EPA must follow the rulemaking procedure in the Act before submitting a TMDL to U.S. EPA for its approval and before the TMDL may be implemented in an NPDES permit. View "Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Nally" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to five years in prison and three years of postrelease control (“Sentencing Order 1”). The court of appeals vacated Sentencing Order 1 and remanded the cause for resentencing because, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court had failed to advise Defendant about the particulars of post release control. Upon resentencing, the trial court amended its sentencing entry (Sentencing Order 2), but the court of appeals remanded the case with instructions to clarify Sentencing Order 2. In response to the remand order, the trial court issued Sentencing Order 3. The court of appeals dismissed Defendant’s appeal for failure to file a transcript of the resentencing hearing. Defendant sought discretionary review in the Supreme Court, but his appeal was not accepted. Defendant later filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking a writ compelling the trial judge to repentance him de novo, which he claimed was required by the appellate court’s decision in his appeal from Sentencing Order 1. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of the trial judge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly declined to issue a writ of mandamus on the grounds that Defendant had an adequate remedy at law. View "State ex rel. Turner v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

To establish entitlement to an award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), a claimant must show that there was a specific safety rule (SSR) applicable to the employer, that the employer violated that SSR, and that the violation proximately caused the claimant’s injury. Cathy Penwell was injured when her left had was crushed in a hydraulic press. Her workers’ compensation was allowed for various serious injuries. Penwell also applied for a VSSR award, alleging that her injuries were caused by her employer’s failure to provide adequate safety restraints under the applicable safety rule. The Industrial Commission, through its staff hearing officer (SHO), concluded that there was no evidence of a VSSR. Penwell subsequently filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court of appeals agreed with the SHO’s determinations and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying a VSSR award, and the court of appeals did not reweigh the evidence or otherwise improperly review the case. View "State ex rel. Penwell v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

A reporter from The Cincinnati Enquirer submitted a public records request to the Butler County Sheriff’s Office for an outgoing phone call placed by a Butler County 9-1-1 dispatcher. The County denied the request, claiming that the return call was both a trial preparation record and a confidential law enforcement investigatory record and, thus, was exempt from the public records laws. The Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus ordering the County to release the recording. The County subsequently released the recording. Judge Sage and the County then filed a motion to dismiss the Enquirer’s mandamus complaint as moot. The court of appeals overruled the motion, granted the writ of mandamus, and awarded statutory damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the outgoing 9-1-1 call was a public record and was not exempt from release, and therefore, the Enquirer was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering release of the record; and (2) the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in awarding statutory damages but did abuse its discretion in not awarding attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage" on Justia Law

Appellee injured both thumbs in an industrial accident. Following a period of temporary total disability, Appellee returned to light-duty work and, later, to his former position of employment with no medical restrictions. Later that year, Appellee was terminated for violating work rules. Appellee’s physician subsequently placed Appellee on restricted duty, and Appellee applied for an additional period of temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission awarded Appellee TTD compensation, concluding that Appellee had not voluntarily abandoned his employment and that he remained temporarily and totally disabled. Appellee’s former employer filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion in ordering payment of TTD compensation. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was evidence in the record that supported the Commission’s finding that Appellee was entitled to TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Viking Forge Corp. v. Perry" on Justia Law