Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) approved a mechanism called a phase-in recovery rider (PIRR) for Ohio Power Company to recover fuel costs that were incurred under Ohio Power’s first electric-security plan (ESP) but were deferred for future collection. In approving Ohio Power’s PIRR application, PUCO modified part of the portion of its order approving Ohio Power’s first ESP that established the carrying-charge rate. The end result was the reduction of Ohio Power’s recovery of carrying charges by more than $130 million. The Supreme Court reversed PUCO’s order insofar as it reduced the carrying-charge rate, holding that the order violated Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(C)(2)(a) by depriving Ohio Power of its right to withdraw the modified ESP. Remanded. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

Appellant was a state prisoner serving several sentences for multiple felony convictions. Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals. Appellant attached his judgment of conviction and sentencing entry for one case to his complaint but failed to attach any documents from a second case, which was pertinent to his entitlement to a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas petition on the grounds that it was procedurally defective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s failure to include all commitment papers with his complaint, where his maximum sentence had not been served, was fatal to his complaint. View "Pence v. Bunting" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of aggravated murder, rape, and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced Appellant to death. Appellant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant later filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered DNA evidence. The trial court reduced Appellant’s conviction for rape to attempted rape and granted Appellant’s new trial motion as to the penalty phase. The trial court held that it had the authority to hold a resentencing hearing under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.06(B), which allows for the reimposition of the death penalty. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition against the trial judge to prohibit the trial court from holding a resentencing hearing under section 2929.06(B). The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to hold a capital resentencing hearing under section 2929.06(B). View "State ex rel. Steffen v. Myers" on Justia Law

The grandfather of J.B., filed a complaint for custody of J.B. V.K.B., J.B.’s mother, had legal custody over J.B. Sandusky County Juvenile Court Judge Bradley Smith allowed the complaint to proceed. Judge Smith subsequently recused himself from the case and retired judge David Allan Basinski was appointed in his place. Judge Basinski dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction but ordered V.K.B. to provide J.B.’s grandfather with an address he might use to contact J.B. V.K.B. filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition against Judge Smith and the the juvenile court after Judge Smith recused himself but before Judge Basinski dismissed the case. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition and (1) ordered the juvenile court to rescind the order that V.K.B. provide J.B.’s grandfather with an address, as the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to grant that form of relief; and (2) instructed the juvenile court to rescind Judge Basinski’s order to the child-support-enforcement agency, as the absence of jurisdiction was patent and unambiguous in this case. The Court did not grant the writ against Smith because he recused himself from the case before this action was filed. View "V.K.B. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint against the Ohio Department of Natural Resources. A magistrate with the Ohio Court of Claims recommended judgment in favor of the Department. Appellant filed objections to the factual findings in the magistrate’s report and recommendation, but his objections did not include a transcript or affidavit as required by Ohio R. Civ. P. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). The Court of Appeals entered judgment in favor of the Department. Appellant filed a notice of appeal and also filed a proposed Ohio R. App. P. 9(C) statement of facts in the court of claims. The court of claims rejected the proposed App.R. 9(C) statement and accepted the magistrate’s factual findings as the statement of the evidence. Appellant failed to file his brief in the appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed Appellant’s appeal. Appellant then commenced this mandamus action to compel the court of claims to settle and approve his Rule 9(C) statement and transmit it to the Court of Appeals as a supplemental record. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant waived his appeal as to the magistrate’s findings by failing to follow the procedures set forth in Rule 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). View "State ex rel. Pallone v. Ohio Court of Claims" on Justia Law

Appellant, an editor for a campus publication, requested criminal reports of persons whose cases had been referred, presumably by the Otterbein University police department (“the department”), to the Westerville Mayor’s Court. The department denied the request, stating that it was not subject to the Public Records Act because Otterbein is a private university. Appellant subsequently filed this action in mandamus seeking an order directing Respondent, the chief of the department, to produce the requested records. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the department is a public office because its officers are sworn, state-certified police officers who exercise plenary police power; and (2) therefore, the department can be compelled to produce public records. View "State ex rel. Schiffbauer v. Banaszak" on Justia Law

Appellant alleged that between 2000 and 2001 two employees of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) sexually abused her while she was in custody of a juvenile correctional facility. In 2012, Appellant filed a complaint against DYS. DYS moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, asserting that Appellant’s complaint was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for civil actions against the state set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2743.16(A). The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, concluding that Appellant’s claims were barred because she filed her complaint more than two years after reaching the age of majority. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the twelve-year statute of limitations set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2305.111(C), which pertains to actions brought by victims of childhood sexual abuse, rather than the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2743.16(A), which pertains to civil actions filed against the state, applied to Appellant’s claims. Remanded. View "Watkins v. Dep’t of Youth Servs." on Justia Law

The City of Cincinnati owned several golf courses that were operated under a management contract by a private, for-profit contractor. Paul Macke, a private golf-course operator who owned taxable real property, challenged the ongoing exemption of the golf courses as public property used exclusively for a public purpose in complaints filed in 2009 and 2010. In each case, the tax commissioner granted the complaint and denied exemption. The City appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) consolidated the cases and reversed the tax commissioner’s denial of exemptions. The tax commissioner appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully by determining that the City did not forfeit its exemption under Ohio Rev. code 5709.08(A) when it hired a private management company to manage its golf courses. View "City of Cincinnati v. Testa" on Justia Law

Appellant, a retired professional football player, was employed by the Indiana Colts of the National Football League (NFL) during the taxable year of 2008. During the 2008 season, Appellant neither played in nor attended the one game the Colts played in Cleveland. The Colts nevertheless withheld an amount of Cleveland municipal income tax from Appellant’s 2008 compensation and paid it to the city. Appellant sought from Cleveland’s tax administration authority a refund of income tax withheld and remitted to Cleveland for tax year 2008, arguing that the city had no authority to impose its tax on the income of a nonresident who did not work within Cleveland’s city limits during the taxable year. Appellant’s claim for a full refund was denied. The City of Cleveland Board of Review and the Board of Tax Appeals upheld the denial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cleveland lacked authority under its city ordinance and its regulations to impose a tax on Appellant’s income, given that none of the services for which he was compensated were performed in Cleveland during 2008. Remanded with instructions that Appellant be granted a full refund of Cleveland municipal income tax paid for 2008. View "Saturday v. Cleveland Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Appellant, a former linebacker for the Chicago Bears, filed applications for refunds of income taxes paid to Cleveland for tax years 2004 through 2006. A nonresident of Cleveland, Appellant asserted that Cleveland had adopted an unlawful method of computing the amount of his compensation that was subject to its city income tax. Appellant’s applications were denied. The City of Cleveland Board of Review and the Board of Tax Appeals upheld the denials. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although Cleveland has the right to tax the compensation earned by a nonresident professional athlete for his work performed in Cleveland, the city’s method of allocating income violates the due-process rights of National Football League players such as Appellant. View "Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland Bd. of Review" on Justia Law