Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was injured in 2003 while working for Appellee. In 2010, Appellant applied for permanent total disability compensation. Kiva Shtull, M.D. examined Appellant on behalf of the employer and concluded that Appellant was capable of full-time employment. Craig Johnson, Ph.D., performed a vocational assessment and concluded that Appellant was capable of sedentary physical activity. A staff hearing officer denied Appellant’s application, determining that Appellant was vocationally capable of returning to work or going into a rehabilitation program. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the staff hearing officer abused his discretion by relying on the reports of Shtull and Johnson. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was evidence in the record to support the Commission’s denial of permanent-total-disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Lacroix v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Vlada Abraitis, the mother of Sarunas Abraitis, died in 2008. Vlada’s will named Sarunas as the executor of the estate. Sarunas applied to admit his mother’s will, executed in 1978, to probate, and the matter was assigned to Judge Laura Gallagher. Sarunas’s brother, Vytautas, died in 2013 while the estate was being administered. Vytautus’s former wife, Vivian, was named as the personal representative of his estate. In 2014, Vivian filed the underlying complaint to contest a will that Vlada executed in 1993. Vlada also sought a declaratory judgment that a certain survivorship deed was invalid and that the property transferred by the deed belonged in Vlada’s estate. This action was also assigned to Judge Gallagher. Sarunas filed the complaint in this case seeking a writ of prohibition, asserting that Vivian lacked standing to bring the action. Sarunas also sought a writ to prohibit Judge Gallagher from proceeding in the action. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Vivian had a potential interest in Vlada’s estate and was therefore a “person interested” who may bring the combined will-contest and declaratory-judgment action; and (2) therefore, Judge Gallagher had jurisdiction to proceed in the underlying action. View "State ex rel. Abraitis v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation conducted an adult of WFAL Construction and determined that WFAL owned back premiums as an “employer” subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act because those working for WFAL in 2009 were employees, not independent contractors as WFAL claimed. WFAL protested the audit findings. An adjudicating committee of the Bureau denied the protest, and the administrator’s designee affirmed. WFAL then filed this action for mandamus relief. The court of appeals concluded that the Bureau appropriately found that WFAL met the statutory criteria to support its decision that WFAL’s workers were employees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that WFAL failed to demonstrate that the Bureau’s decision was an abuse of discretion. View "State ex rel. WFAL Constr. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted and sentenced in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant, who was incarcerated, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the court in his criminal case lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the indictment failed to establish that the crimes of which he was convicted occurred in Cuyahoga County. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant’s petition based on its numerous procedural and other deficiencies. View "Arroyo v. Sloan" on Justia Law

While on parole, Appellant was convicted of three new offenses and sentenced to a new nine-year aggregate term. Appellant was incarcerated for the new offenses and became a member of the class of parolees entitled to a parole-revocation mitigation hearing under the consent decree upheld in Kellogg v. Shoemaker. Appellant, however, signed a Kellogg waiver. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that his Kellogg waiver was invalid. The court of appeals dismissed the case because of procedural deficiencies in Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s complaint was deficient and that the court of appeals was correct in dismissing his case. View "Al'Shahid v. Cook" on Justia Law

David Bundy served prison time before his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender was reversed. Bundy sought a declaratory judgment pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48 that he had been wrongfully imprisoned for his failure to comply with the requirements of Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act (AWA) and that he was eligible to proceed for monetary relief against the State. The trial court found Bundy’s argument to be meritorious on the authority of three recent decisions from the Eighth District Court of Appeals, determining that the invalidation of certain provisions of the AWA on constitutional grounds required the conclusion that no violation had been committed and that Bundy, therefore, had the right to seek compensation under section 2743.48. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a claimant seeking a declaration that he is a wrongfully imprisoned individual does not satisfy the actual-innocence standard of section 2743.48(A)(5) by showing that his conviction was reversed solely because the statute describing the offense could not be enforced on constitutional grounds; and (2) therefore, Bundy was not entitled to seek compensation from the state. View "Bundy v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of kidnapping and rape, both first-degree felonies. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of incarceration and ordered that Appellant have no contact with the victim. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant’s sentences, holding that “a trial court may impose a no contact order as part of its sentence.” The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and vacated the no-contact order, holding that a court cannot impose a prison term and a community-control sanction for the same offense, and no exception allows otherwise. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder, sexual battery, and other offenses and was sentenced to fifteen years to life. Appellant filed an action in habeas corpus seeking an order to compel Judge Joseph Russo to order his release from prison and asserting that a sex-offender-classification hearing was pending before Judge Russo and that the hearing was in violation of his plea agreement. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the petition was correctly dismissed based on its numerous procedural defaults and because Appellant had an adequate alternate remedy at law. View "Pointer v. Russo" on Justia Law

In 1992, Appellant was found guilty of felonious sexual penetration. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed several postconviction motions that were denied. In 2014, Appellant filed an original action in procedendo in the court of appeals contending that that trial judge had failed to rule on a motion Appellant filed in 2013 to vacate a void judgment. Appellant also requested a writ of mandamus asking that the trial court correct a number of alleged errors in the trial proceedings. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for writs of mandamus and procedendo. The Supreme court affirmed, holding (1) the arguments raised by Appellant in support of his petition for a writ of mandamus related to issues that he could have raised on appeal, thus precluding a writ of mandamus; and (2) because the trial judge had ruled on Appellant’s motion to vacate a void judgment, the procedendo claim was properly dismissed. View "Shoop v. State" on Justia Law

Grace Cathedral filed an exemption application for the tax year 2010 pertaining to additional buildings added to an exempt church parcel. Regarding the building at issue in this appeal, Grace Cathedral stated that the building would be “made available to visitors in need to temporary housing, free of charge, while they visit the church to participate in worship services.” The tax commissioner denied Grace Cathedral’s claimed exemptions. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) upheld that determination. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that, under the circumstances of this case, the building’s use in facilitating attendance at religious services qualified for exemption under Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach. View "Grace Cathedral, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law