Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1986, Appellant was convicted of several sex-related crimes. Appellant was classified as a sexually oriented offender when Megan’s Law was enacted. In 2007, after Appellant was released on parole, he was convicted of failure to verify. In 2008, after Ohio enacted the Adam Walsh Act, Appellant was reclassified as a Tier III offender and convicted of failure to notify under the Act. In 2012, Appellant filed motions for de novo resentencing in the 2007 and 2008 cases, arguing that portions of the Adam Walsh Act were held unconstitutional in State v. Bodyke and thus that he had improperly been reclassified. Judge Frances McGee denied both motions. In 2013, Appellant filed this action seeking writs of mandamus and procedendo, asserting that the Judge McGee must vacate his conviction in the 2008 case, reclassify him, and reinstate the community-control sanctions imposed in the 2007 case. The court of appeals dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s petition for writs of procedendo and mandamus because Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. View "State ex rel. Smith v. McGee" on Justia Law

In 2009, Kent Cunningham filed an “Affidavit of Non-Ohio Domicile” for tax year 2008 declaring that he was “not domiciled in Ohio” at any during during the tax year. The tax commissioner issued Kent and his wife an assessment based upon the nonfiling and nonpayment of Ohio income tax for 2008. The Cunninghams filed a petition for reassessment. Noting a 2008 filing of an Ohio homestead-exemption application declaring that the Cunninghams’ Cincinnati, Ohio house was their principal place of residence, the commissioner concluded that the Cunninghams’ Affidavit of Non-Ohio Domicile contained a false statement and that the Cunninghams failed to rebut the presumption of Ohio domicile. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed the commissioner’s determination with regard to Kent, concluding that Kent complied with the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 5747.24(B)(1) and was, therefore, “irrefutably presumed to be not domiciled in Ohio for Ohio individual income tax purposes.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Kent’s explicit claim under section 5747.24(B)(1) to be domiciled outside Ohio did not bind the commissioner without regard to other statements and actions by Kent that indicated a domicile inside Ohio; and (2) the BTA erred by reversing the tax commissioner’s denial of the irrebuttable presumption created under section 5747.24(B)(1). View "Cunningham v. Testa" on Justia Law

Landowners filed a complaint with the Auglaize County Board of Revision (BOR) challenging the auditor’s valuation of their property. The BOR notified Landowners that a hearing would be held. Neither Landowners nor anyone on their behalf appeared at the hearing. The BOR dismissed the valuation complaint for failure to prosecute based on Landowners’ failure to attend the scheduled hearing. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed, concluding that the BOR had exceeded its discretionary authority in dismissing the complaint because the evidence presented raised the presumption that the sale furnished the criterion of value. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding (1) BORs do not have the discretionary authority to dismiss a complaint based on the complainant’s failure to attend the scheduled meeting of the board; and (2) a BOR must make a determination of value whenever a complaint properly invokes its jurisdiction. Remanded. View "Ginter v. Auglaize County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured in the course and scope of his employment with the City of Columbus, Division of Fire. The Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund granted Appellant’s application for a partial-disability retirement. Appellant subsequently accepted a position as a deer herd manager with Crosswoods Whitetails, LLC. Appellant applied to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation for wage-loss compensation to partially compensate him for the difference between his average weekly wage as a firefighter and his lower earnings from Crosswoods. A hearing officer with the Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s application. Appellant filed this action in the court of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence demonstrated that Appellant failed to make “consistent, sincere, and best attempts to obtain suitable employment” that would eliminate the wage loss, and therefore, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for wage-loss compensation. View "State ex rel. Oldaker v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellee was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court reversed. After a retrial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence. After a “long and complex history,” a federal district court ultimately granted a writ of habeas corpus, finding that Appellee was denied the right to due process as interpreted in Brady v. Maryland. New proceedings subsequently commenced in the trial court. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss, concluding that because of the prejudice suffered by Appellee in light of the State’s “egregious prosecutorial misconduct” and the Brady violations in his two prior trials, Appellee could not receive the fair trial he was entitled to. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court acted unreasonably, unconscionably, and arbitrarily when it found that it was impossible for Appellee to receive a fair trial without first giving the parties an opportunity to develop the record. Remanded to the trial court with instructions to proceed to trial. View "State v. Keenan" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, Defendant pleaded guilty to several counts of receiving stolen property. Defendant appealed, arguing for the first time that some of his convictions should have been merged for sentencing. The appellate court concluded that the trial court had committed plain error by failing to inquire into or address the question of whether the trial court erred in imposing sentences for allied offenses of similar import. Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that a trial court has a duty to inquire about allied offenses if the defense fails to raise it at sentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a defendant’s failure to raise the issue of allied offenses of similar import in the trial court forfeits all but plain error; (2) unless a defendant shows a reasonable probability that the convictions are for allied offenses of similar import committed with the same conduct and without a separate animus, he cannot demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to inquire whether the convictions merge for purposes of sentencing was plain error; and (3) because Defendant failed to object to his sentences in the trial court, he forfeited appellate review of the argument that he had been sentenced for allied offenses of similar import, and Defendant’s claim that the trial court committed plain error failed. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellee was injured while working for Appellant. In 2011, Appellee applied for permanent-total-disability compensation and submitted a report from his treating physician, Dr. Oscar DePaz. A hearing officer relied in part on the report of Dr. DePaz as support for the decision to award Appellee permanent-total-disability compensation. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Industrial Commission had abused its discretion when it ordered compensation to begin on the date of Dr. DePaz’s report and claiming that Dr. DePaz’s report did not find that Appellee’s disability was solely the result of his medical impairment. The court of appeals denied Appellant’s request for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by (1) relying on the date of the DePaz report as the date on which to begin paying the award; and (2) determining that, based on the entire report, the DePaz opinion was evidence of permanent total disability based on the medical factors alone, thereby eliminating the need for further consideration of the nonmedical disability factors. View "State ex rel. Tradesmen Int’l v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by a Lake Township patrol officer and canine handler for a marked lane violation on an interstate highway. The officer walked her dog around the vehicle Defendant was driving, leading to the discovery oxycodone tablets and a baggie of marijuana. It is undisputed that the township police officer exercised law-enforcement powers not granted to township police officers. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, but the court denied it, concluding that the officer had probable cause to stop Defendant for a marked lane violation. Defendant was subsequently convicted. Defendant appealed, asserting that the officer lacked statutory authority to stop him for a marked lane violation on an interstate highway, and therefore, the stop and subsequent arrest and search were unconstitutional. The appellate court reversed Defendant’s conviction, concluding that the stop violated the Ohio Constitution because the marked lane violation occurred outside the officer’s territorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the officer acted without authority to stop Defendant for a minor misdemeanor traffic offense on an interstate highway, the traffic stop, the arrest, and the search were unreasonable and violated Ohio Const. art. I, 14. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate at London Correctional Institution (LCI), made several public-records requests of LCI that were denied. While his last request was granted, Appellant filed an action in mandamus in the court of appeals to obtain the documents that he had not received. Appellant also sought statutory damages under Ohio Rev. Code 149.43. The court of appeals denied Appellant a writ and denied his claim for statutory damages. The Supreme Court reversed, granted a writ of mandamus, and awarded Appellant statutory damages and court costs because Appellant’s requests were not ambiguous, overbroad, or unduly burdensome and because Appellant complied with the requirements of section 149.43(C)(1). View "State ex rel. Carr v. London Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

In 2009, Appellants acquired by way of a deed the surface rights to certain land in Harrison County. The deed did not convey to Appellants all of the mineral rights underlying their surface property. But after an oil and gas company inquired about leasing the mineral rights to the land, Appellants initiated procedures under the Dormant Mineral Act to have the mineral interests deemed abandoned and vested in them along with their surface ownership. Less than one month after Appellants published a notice of abandonment of the mineral interests underlying their property, John Croskey recorded a quitclaim deed for mineral interests underlying the property. The trial court determined that the Croskey affidavit preserved the mineral-rights holders’ interests for purposes of the Dormant Mineral Act and thus concluded that Appellants could not establish a claim for the abandonment of the oil and gas rights underlying their surface property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a mineral-interest holder’s claim to preserve filed pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5301.56(H)(1)(a) is sufficient to preclude the mineral interests from being deemed abandoned if filed within sixty days after notice of the surface owner’s intent to declare those interests abandoned. View "Dodd v. Croskey" on Justia Law