Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On April 25, 2011, Marcella Atkinson entered a long-term care facility. On June 16, 2011, Marcella and her husband Raymond submitted a Medicaid application for Marcella’s care. On August 9, 2011, Marcella transferred title to the house to Raymond. On September 28, 2011 the Knox County Department of Job and Family Services approved Marcella for Medicaid. The agency, however, delayed Medicaid benefits for Marcella until April 2012, asserting that the transfer of the home to Raymond was improper because it exceed the community-spouse resource allowance (CSRA) and was for less than fair market value. The Ohio Department of Job and Family Services upheld the determination. The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) during the period between an application for Medicaid benefits and the notice of Medicaid approval, Medicaid law allows an institutionalized spouse to transfer a home or equivalent assets to a spouse living in the community to the extent that it does not exceed the CSRA; and (2) in this case, the state may have imposed a penalty on Raymond that was not authorized by law. Remanded. View "Estate of Atkinson v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs." on Justia Law

A Newton Falls ordinance repealed a provision allowing residents a credit for income taxes paid to another municipality. Relator circulated petitions to place an initiative on the ballot to restore the tax credit and to mandate that the restoration of the credit be repealed only by popular vote. The Trumbull County Board of Elections (Board) certified more than the required number of valid signatures to place the measure on the ballot. Because Kathleen King, clerk of Newton Falls, had not transmitted a certified copy of the proposed initiative, along with the supporting petitions, to the Board for placement on the ballot, Relator filed this suit for a writ of mandamus to compel King to transmit the petition and certified text to the Board. The Supreme Court granted the writ and ordered King to transmit the petitions and certified text of the proposed initiative to the Board. View "State ex rel. Lange v. King" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, sought several forms of relief challenging the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and correction’s attachment of money in her prison account. Specifically, Appellant claimed that the money was exempt from garnishment or attachment because it originated from a pension. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s entire case without notice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly dismissed most of Appellant’s complaint; but (2) erred in dismissing, without notice, Appellant’s mandamus claims regarding, inter alia, the exempt status of the pension money placed in her prison account and, rather, should have allowed Appellant to brief the issues before deciding the merits. View "State ex rel. Williams v. Trim" on Justia Law

L.R. was the biological mother of six children, including her youngest children, Z.R. L.R.’s five older children were adjudicated dependent and neglected in the Summit County Juvenile Court, and L.R. never regained custody of those children. After L.R. gave birth to Z.R., Summit County Children Services (SCCS) filed a complaint in Summit Count Juvenile Court alleging that Z.R. was a dependent child. L.R. moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was combined with a motion to transfer the cases of Z.R.’s siblings to the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court. The Summit County Juvenile Court denied the motion to dismiss, found Z.R. to be a dependent child, and transferred Z.R.’s case to Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court. The appellate court reversed, concluding that SCCS had failed to establish proper venue in the Summit County Juvenile Court because Z.R.’s residence and alleged dependency occurred solely in Cuyahoga County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute and rule governing venue do not control the jurisdiction of a juvenile court and that it is within a juvenile court’s sound discretion to remedy an alleged venue defect by transferring a case to a proper venue. View "In re Z.R." on Justia Law

Insurer issued an automobile policy to Philip Laboy as the named insured. The policy provided that Insurer would pay “any negotiated reduced rate accepted by a medical provider.” Three members of Laboy’s family, also insureds under the policy, were involved in an automobile accident. The Laboys submitted some of their medical bills both to Insurer and to their health-insurance provider. The Laboys later reached a settlement with the third-party tortfeasor. When Insurer exercised its contractual right to subrogation against the Laboys, the Laboys objected, arguing that Insurer had overpaid the medical providers. As evidence, the Laboys showed that Insurer had paid discounted rates to medical providers totaling $1,441 in medical expenses but that their own health insurer paid only $648 for those same medical expenses. The Laboys filed a class-action lawsuit against Insurer, alleging claims for breach of contract and breach of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court entered summary judgment for Insurer. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s judgment, holding that the only reasonable interpretation of the policy is that “any negotiated reduced rate accepted by a medical provider” means a negotiated reduced rate that Insurer was contractually entitled to pay and does not include the reduced rates negotiated by the Laboys’ health-insurance provider. View "Laboy v. Grange Indem. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Relator, a federal inmate, made a public-records request of Respondent, the chief of police of the Cedar Point Police Department. Alleging that Respondent failed to provide the requested records, Relator sued in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the case, concluding that Relator failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C)(2), which requires an inmate’s affidavit of indigency in a suit against a government entity or employee to contain a statement of the inmate’s assets. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the definition of “inmate” for purposes of section 2969.25(C) is a person confined in a state prison and does not include persons in confinement in federal prison; and (2) because Relator is an inmate in a federal prison, the court of appeals erred in dismissing Relator’s complaint for failing to comply with section 2969.25. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Sheets v. Chief of Police" on Justia Law

Appellant in this appeal contested twenty-seven assessments of delinquent sales tax. Appellant’s liability derived from previous assessments against a pet store business of which Appellant was co-owner and an officer. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the tax commissioner’s determination upholding the assessments against Appellant. Appellant argued on appeal that she may contest the validity of the service of the assessments against the corporation as a defense against her derivative liability. The Supreme Court agreed. Noting that the record in this case documented successful service as to seven of the twenty-seven assessments but did not show completed service of the others, the Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision to uphold the seven assessments as to which completed service was shown. The Court then vacated the BTA’s decision with regard to the other twenty assessments, holding that a successful challenge to the service on the corporation will invalidate the derivative-liability assessment against the responsible individual. Remanded with instructions that the BTA take additional evidence and determine whether service of those twenty assessments was perfected on the corporation. View "Cruz v. Testa" on Justia Law

This case originated with the question of whether, for tax year 2006, the present value of William MacDonald’s future annuity payments qualified as taxable wages or as a pension under a Shaker Heights ordinance that exempts pensions from the municipal income tax. The tax administrator and the municipal tax board held that the amount at issue was subject to municipal income tax. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed. The court of appeals affirmed. The city of Shaker Heights appealed, arguing that the BTA violated a duty of deference to the determination of the municipal tax board. Specifically, the city argued that when the legislature enacted Ohio Rev. Code 5717.011, authorizing appeal to the BTA in addition to the preexisting right of appeal to the common pleas courts under Ohio Rev. Code 2506, the legislature must have intended that the BTA review decisions of the municipal tax boards using the same standard of review that applies under chapter 2506. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the BTA’s standard of review under section 5717.011 is de novo as to both facts and law; and (2) the BTA in this case properly exercised its own independent judgment in determining the facts and the law. View "MacDonald v. Shaker Heights Bd. of Income Tax Review" on Justia Law

In this appeal, Navistar, Inc. claimed it was due a credit against the new commercial-activity tax (CAT), which was enacted to replace to replace the existing corporate-franchise and personal property taxes for industrial corporations like Navistar. In 2007, Navistar, Inc. undertook a restatement of its 2004 financial restatement, which increased Navistar’s valuation allowance from 62.4 percent to 100 percent. As a consequence, the tax commissioner reduced the amount of Navistar’s potential CAT credit from over $27 million to zero. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the tax commissioner’s decision. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding that the tax commissioner’s use of Navistar’s restated valuation allowance as the basis for the final determination was justified only if the restate valuation allowance was a correction of error, which could be the case here only if Navistar’s original valuation allowance was not in compliance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Remanded for a determination of whether the original valuation allowance was in compliance with GAAP based upon all the evidence in the record. View "Navistar, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from alleged acts of pre-leasing housing discrimination that resulted in alleged emotional distress. At the relevant time, the defendants in the underlying case (“Insureds”) were covered under an umbrella insurance policy issued by Insurer. After Insureds settled the underlying case, Insureds sued Insurer for breach of contract for failing to defend Insureds pursuant to the umbrella policy. A federal trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Insurer on its duty to defend and indemnify Insureds under the umbrella policy. The federal court of appeals reversed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the umbrella policy’s intentional-acts exclusion - through application of the inferred-intent doctrine - obviated Insurer’s duty to defend in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the umbrella policy at issue here arguably provides coverage for emotional-distress damages through its coverage for humiliation; and (2) emotional-distress damages are not inherent in a claim for discrimination, and therefore, the inferred-intent doctrine was inapplicable. View "Granger v. Auto-Owners Ins." on Justia Law