Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Steak ’n Shake filed a complaint seeking a reduction for tax year 2009 from the auditor’s valuation of a Steak ’n Shake restaurant. The Warren County Board of Revision retained the auditor’s original valuation for the property. Stake ’n Shake appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). At the BTA hearing, the property owner presented an appraisal report and testimony from a longtime state-certified appraiser, while the county presented an appraisal prepared by an employee of the county’s valuation consultant. The BTA adopted the county’s valuation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Steak ’n Shake’s objections to the competency and lack of independence of the county’s appraiser are rejected; but (2) the BTA erred in its acceptance of the county appraiser’s reliance on encumbered comparable properties in determining the value of the subject property, which is occupied by its owner. Remanded. View "Steak 'n Shake, Inc. v. Warren County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2011, Donald Beck filed complaints against the auditor’s tax-year-2010 valuations of three two-family residential rental properties in Columbus. The Franklin County Board of Revision approved a reduction in the auditor’s original valuation based upon an unspecific sales-comparison and income approach. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the reduction. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed, arguing that the BTA improperly affirmed the reduced valuation when the evidence for the reduction was not in the record. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding that the BOE waived its claim of error because it presented neither argument nor evidence before the BTA. View "Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Mother and Father, who never married, were the parents of Daughter. Mother later moved to New Jersey with Daughter. When Father’s first application to determine custody of Daughter in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court was unsuccessful, Father filed a second application to determine custody. Mother filed an application in a New Jersey family court to transfer jurisdiction to New Jersey. The New Jersey family court denied Mother’s application and ordered that Ohio retain jurisdiction, concluding that Ohio had home-state jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Mother sought a writ of prohibition, asserting that the case should proceed in New Jersey. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mother was ineligible for a writ of prohibition because the jurisdiction issue was litigated in both Ohio and New jersey, and both courts concluded that Ohio was Daughter’s home state for purposes of the UCCJEA; and (2) moreover, Mother had an adequate remedy by way of appeal of both the Ohio and New Jersey decisions regarding jurisdiction, as well as the juvenile court’s custody decision. View "State ex rel. M.L. v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

Employee was injured during the course of his employment with Precision Steel Services, Inc. Employee received compensation for his medical expenses and lost wages. Two years after the accident, Employee applied for an additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR). The Industrial Commission granted a VSSR award to Employee, determining that Precision Steel violated the safety regulations in Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-14(G)(1) and 4123:1-5-15(B) and that those violations proximately caused Employee’s injury. Precision Steel then filed this mandamus action. The court of appeals issued a limited writ, concluding that Precision Steel violated Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-15(B) and ordering that the Commission readjudicate Employee’s claim based on Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-14(G)(1). The Supreme Court reversed and granted a writ of mandamus requiring the Commission to vacate its order and to issue a new order denying Employee’s application for an additional award for VSSR, holding (1) neither Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-14(G) nor 4123:1-5-15(B) establishes a specific safety requirement in the context of this case; and (2) therefore, the Commission’s decision that Precision Steel violated the rules was an abuse of discretion. View "State ex rel. Precision Steel Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Pilkington North America, Inc. entered into a social contract with Toledo Edison Company under which Toledo provided one of Pilkington’s facilities with discounted electric service. The Public Utilities Commission approved the special contract. Pilkington later filed a complaint alleging that Toledo Edison had unlawfully terminated the special contract. Five other companies that also had special contracts with the utility also filed complaints against Toledo Edison. The Commission consolidated the six complaints and dismissed them. With the exception of Pilkington, each of the industrial customers appealed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s order, concluding that Toledo Edison had prematurely terminated the special contracts. Pilkington subsequently filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment with the Commission seeking relief from the Commission’s order dismissing its complaint and its order denying the application for rehearing that the other five complainants filed. The Commission denied Pilkington’s motion, concluding that Pilkington may not use Rule 60(B) as a substitute for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Pilkington did not appeal the Commission’s adverse judgment, that judgment is final, and res judicata precludes the use of Rule 60(B) to obtain relief from that final judgment. View "In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor who was over thirteen but less than sixteen years of age. Defendant, who was twenty-one years old when he committed the offense, was designated a Tier II sex offender/child-victim offender and was required to register with the county sheriff and to verify his residence address every 180 days for twenty-five years. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Tier II sex-offender requirements imposed upon him violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the registration and address-verification requirements for Tier II offenders under Ohio Rev. Code 2950 do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. View "State v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated vehicular assault, endangering children, and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OVI). The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of three years for aggravated vehicular assault, thirty-six months for endangering children, and six months for OVI, all sentences to run concurrently. Appellant challenged her sentences on appeal, arguing that aggravated vehicular assault is an allied offense of OVI and that the two offenses should have merged. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that even if aggravated vehicular assault and OVI are allied offenses, Ohio Rev. Code 2929.41(B)(3) creates and exception that permits a trial court to impose a sentence for both. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a trial court may impose cumulative sentences for both aggravated vehicular assault and OVI when the offense of OVI is the predicate conduct for aggravated vehicular assault. View "State v. Earley" on Justia Law

The parties in this case disputed who was the legal owner or holder of certain mineral rights. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division concluded that the interpretation of Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act in the context of an oil and gas lease was determinative of the case and certified certain questions to the Supreme Court for answers. The questions were as follows: (1) whether a recorded lease of a severed subsurface mineral estate is a title transaction under the Act, and (2) whether the expiration of a recorded lease and the reversion of the rights granted under that lease is a title transaction that restarts the twenty-year forfeiture clock under the Act at the time of the reversion. The Supreme Court answered (1) a recorded lease of severed oil and gas rights is a title transaction under Ohio Rev. Code 5301.56(B)(3)(a) that constitutes a saving event to preclude the severed mineral rights from being deemed abandoned and reunited with the rights to the corresponding surface property; but (2) the unrecorded expiration of such a lease is not a title transaction that restarts the twenty-year clock under the Act. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Buell" on Justia Law

Employee, an ironworker, was injured in a fall while working for Employer, a subcontractor on a bridge project. Employee’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for multiple injuries sustained in the fall. Two years after the incident, Employee applied for an additional award for Employer’s violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), alleging that his fall was caused by Employer’s violation of numerous specific safety regulations. A staff hearing officer with the Industrial Commission granted a VSSR award. Employer filed a complaint and an amended complaint in mandamus, seeking a writ that would compel the Commission to vacate its order and to refund all additional compensation that had been paid by Employer as a result the VSSR award. Employer asserted that the Commission abused its discretion by finding that Employer violated a specific safety requirement because Employee’s injuries were the result of his failure to wear the appropriate personal protective equipment. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it issued a VSSR award, and therefore, the court of appeals properly denied Employee’s request for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Armstrong Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Franklin County auditor valued property owned by Sears, Roebuck & Company at $8,323,000 for the tax year 2005 and for tax years 2006 through 2010. Sears filed a complaint seeking a reduction of value. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) rejected Sears’s claims for reduction. Sears appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), where Sears presented an appraisal determine the value to be $6,300,000 for 2005 and $6,550,000 for 2008. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education presented data as rebuttal evidence. The BTA adopted the Sears appraisal valuations. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision, holding (1) the BTA’s decision was not unreasonably or unlawful on account of alleged formal inadequacies; and (2) the BTA was justified in concluding that the appraiser’s opinion was supported by a viable theory of property value. View "Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law