Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pilkington North America, Inc. entered into a social contract with Toledo Edison Company under which Toledo provided one of Pilkington’s facilities with discounted electric service. The Public Utilities Commission approved the special contract. Pilkington later filed a complaint alleging that Toledo Edison had unlawfully terminated the special contract. Five other companies that also had special contracts with the utility also filed complaints against Toledo Edison. The Commission consolidated the six complaints and dismissed them. With the exception of Pilkington, each of the industrial customers appealed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s order, concluding that Toledo Edison had prematurely terminated the special contracts. Pilkington subsequently filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment with the Commission seeking relief from the Commission’s order dismissing its complaint and its order denying the application for rehearing that the other five complainants filed. The Commission denied Pilkington’s motion, concluding that Pilkington may not use Rule 60(B) as a substitute for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Pilkington did not appeal the Commission’s adverse judgment, that judgment is final, and res judicata precludes the use of Rule 60(B) to obtain relief from that final judgment. View "In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor who was over thirteen but less than sixteen years of age. Defendant, who was twenty-one years old when he committed the offense, was designated a Tier II sex offender/child-victim offender and was required to register with the county sheriff and to verify his residence address every 180 days for twenty-five years. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Tier II sex-offender requirements imposed upon him violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the registration and address-verification requirements for Tier II offenders under Ohio Rev. Code 2950 do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. View "State v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated vehicular assault, endangering children, and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OVI). The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of three years for aggravated vehicular assault, thirty-six months for endangering children, and six months for OVI, all sentences to run concurrently. Appellant challenged her sentences on appeal, arguing that aggravated vehicular assault is an allied offense of OVI and that the two offenses should have merged. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that even if aggravated vehicular assault and OVI are allied offenses, Ohio Rev. Code 2929.41(B)(3) creates and exception that permits a trial court to impose a sentence for both. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a trial court may impose cumulative sentences for both aggravated vehicular assault and OVI when the offense of OVI is the predicate conduct for aggravated vehicular assault. View "State v. Earley" on Justia Law

The parties in this case disputed who was the legal owner or holder of certain mineral rights. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division concluded that the interpretation of Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act in the context of an oil and gas lease was determinative of the case and certified certain questions to the Supreme Court for answers. The questions were as follows: (1) whether a recorded lease of a severed subsurface mineral estate is a title transaction under the Act, and (2) whether the expiration of a recorded lease and the reversion of the rights granted under that lease is a title transaction that restarts the twenty-year forfeiture clock under the Act at the time of the reversion. The Supreme Court answered (1) a recorded lease of severed oil and gas rights is a title transaction under Ohio Rev. Code 5301.56(B)(3)(a) that constitutes a saving event to preclude the severed mineral rights from being deemed abandoned and reunited with the rights to the corresponding surface property; but (2) the unrecorded expiration of such a lease is not a title transaction that restarts the twenty-year clock under the Act. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Buell" on Justia Law

Employee, an ironworker, was injured in a fall while working for Employer, a subcontractor on a bridge project. Employee’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for multiple injuries sustained in the fall. Two years after the incident, Employee applied for an additional award for Employer’s violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), alleging that his fall was caused by Employer’s violation of numerous specific safety regulations. A staff hearing officer with the Industrial Commission granted a VSSR award. Employer filed a complaint and an amended complaint in mandamus, seeking a writ that would compel the Commission to vacate its order and to refund all additional compensation that had been paid by Employer as a result the VSSR award. Employer asserted that the Commission abused its discretion by finding that Employer violated a specific safety requirement because Employee’s injuries were the result of his failure to wear the appropriate personal protective equipment. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it issued a VSSR award, and therefore, the court of appeals properly denied Employee’s request for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Armstrong Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Franklin County auditor valued property owned by Sears, Roebuck & Company at $8,323,000 for the tax year 2005 and for tax years 2006 through 2010. Sears filed a complaint seeking a reduction of value. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) rejected Sears’s claims for reduction. Sears appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), where Sears presented an appraisal determine the value to be $6,300,000 for 2005 and $6,550,000 for 2008. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education presented data as rebuttal evidence. The BTA adopted the Sears appraisal valuations. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision, holding (1) the BTA’s decision was not unreasonably or unlawful on account of alleged formal inadequacies; and (2) the BTA was justified in concluding that the appraiser’s opinion was supported by a viable theory of property value. View "Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Amber Risner was killed in a collision with a tractor-trailer at the intersection of State Route 220 and State Route 332. Appellees, Amber’s parents, filed a complaint as the administrators of Amber’s estate against the Ohio Department of Transportation (“ODOT”), alleging negligent design and maintenance of the intersection. The court of claims granted summary judgment in favor of ODOT, concluding that ODOT was performing maintenance, rather than highway improvement, when it installed flashing lights in the intersection, and therefore, ODOT did not have a duty to upgrade the intersection to current design standards. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) ODOT is immune from liability with respect to its decisions whether to improve an existing highway and what type of improvements it will make; (2) however, in executing its decisions to improve a highway, ODOT may be subject to liability if it fails to act in accordance with current construction standards; and (3) applying the discretionary-function doctrine to the facts of this case, ODOT is immune from liability for damages resulting from its decisions at issue here. View "Risner v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder and was sentenced to death on each count. The appellate court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case on the basis of an error in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and a Brady violation. Upon his release from prison, Appellant filed a claim for wrongful imprisonment pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48. The trial court dismissed the claim, concluding that Appellant failed to meet his statutory burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not commit the murders. Thereafter, another individual pleaded guilty to the murders for which Appellant was found guilty, and the legislature amended section 2743.48 to expand the definition of a wrongfully imprisoned individual to include those released as a result of a procedural error occurring subsequent to sentencing. Thereafter, Appellant filed a second claim for wrongful imprisonment. The trial court ultimately declared Appellant to be a wrongfully imprisoned individual. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the amended statute did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s alleged injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 2743.48 applied retroactively to permit litigation of Appellant’s claim. View "Johnston v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder and six counts of attempted murder. Defendant was sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, vacated the death sentence, and remanded for a new trial. After a new jury was convened, Defendant was convicted on all charges and specifications and again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) no error occurred in the selection and removal of jury members; (2) the trial court did not make erroneous evidentiary rulings that denied him a fair trial; (3) the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury; (4) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (5) no prejudicial error occurred during the penalty phase; (6) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during either the guilt phase or penalty phase of trial; (7) Defendant’s counsel provided effective assistance during both phases of trial; and (8) Defendant’s death sentence was appropriate and proportional. View "State v. Dean" on Justia Law

Relator, who had been convicted of a sexually-oriented offense, was indicted for failure to notify the appropriate county sheriff’s office when he changed his residential address. Relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, asserting that Judge Frank G. Forchione lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case for the failure to notify and indicating that only Judge Haas, who presided over his original criminal case, had jurisdiction. The court of appeals granted Judge Forchione’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Relator had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appeal was not entitled to a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Black v. Forchione" on Justia Law