Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Ohio Board of Nursing commenced a professional disciplinary action against Beverly Clayton, a staff nurse in the intensive care unit (ICU) of Mercy Hospital Western Hills, for alleged violations of Ohio Rev. Code 4723. In a number of separate motions, Clayton requested subpoenas for the personal appearance of numerous people and subpoenas duces tecum seeking to obtain several different collections of documents. The Board filed a motion to limit subpoena request, arguing that the number of requests was successive. The hearing examiner denied the Board’s motion in large part but granted the request with respect to certain ICU patient records. After a hearing, the hearing examiner concluded that discipline was warranted. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The court of appeals affirmed, implying that the hearing examiner’s decision to limit the subpoena may have been erroneous but that Clayton failed to establish prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a hearing examiner for the Board of Nursing has the discretion to limit or quash subpoenas requested during disciplinary proceedings; and (2) the hearing examiner’s decision to limit Clayton’s subpoena duces tecum in this case was not an abuse of discretion. View "Clayton v. Ohio Bd. of Nursing" on Justia Law

Appellant, who is serving a life sentence on a conviction for aggravated murder, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he remained in prison solely under an order that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue. The claim was unsuccessfully raised in one of Appellant’s prior petitions for habeas corpus. The court of appeals dismissed the case on grounds of res judicata. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the appellate court to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and to provide Defendant with notice and an opportunity to respond. The court of appeals again dismissed the petition on remand. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s habeas claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. View "Jefferson v. Bunting" on Justia Law

In 2012, a principal of Lipson O’Shea Legal Group made a request for records from Cuyahoga County Board of Health (Cuyahoga County BOH) seeking documentation of homes in the County where a minor child was found to have elevated blood lead levels. Cuyahoga County BOH sought a declaratory judgment with respect to its obligations to maintain the confidentiality of the records sought by Lipson O’Shea. The trial court granted summary judgment for Cuyahoga County BOH, concluding that the release of the records was prohibited by Ohio Rev. Code 3701.01, which exempts from disclosure certain health information if the information could be used to reveal the individual’s identity. The court of appeals reversed, declaring that, rather than withholding all records, Cuyahoga County BOH must examine each document, redact any protected health information, and release any remaining unprotected information not otherwise excepted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some of the information in the requested records prepared by the Cuyahoga County BOH is not protected health information, and therefore, it cannot be said that all of the information responsive to the request is protected. View "Cuyahoga County Bd. of Health v. Lipson O'Shea Legal Group" on Justia Law

Relator was seventeen years old at the time two delinquency complaints were filed against him. Respondent was the judge of the juvenile division of the county court of common pleas. After a bindover hearing was scheduled, Respondent ordered the state to comply with Relator’s discovery request for several police reports, and the state disclosed all requested documents except for one police report. Relator moved to dismiss the case as a sanction for the failure to produce the report. Respondent dismissed the cases with prejudice as a sanction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state was required to produce the requested documents. The state then filed a request to schedule a bindover hearing. Respondent granted the state’s motion. Relator sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Respondent from proceeding with the hearing, arguing that his cases had been dismissed with prejudice and had been reviewed by the Supreme Court without remand. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relator had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appeal, and Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed. View "State ex rel. R.W. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellant was granted a default judgment against Bank of America and filed a praecipe for a writ of execution. BAC Field Services filed a motion to stay the execution of judgment and a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court granted the motions. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to clarify its reasoning. Thereafter, Appellant moved the trial court to reinstate the default judgment. When the court had not ruled on the motion, Appellant filed this action requesting writs of prohibition barring the trial court from vacating the default judgment and barring BAC from appearing in the case. The court of appeals denied the writs. After Appellant appealed, the trial court again vacated the default judgment and responded to the court of appeals’ instruction to clarify its reasoning. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) declared the petition for a writ of procedendo moot because the trial court had issued a decision clarifying its reasons for vacating the default judgment; and (2) affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment denying Appellant’s petition for writs of prohibition because the court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed. View "State ex rel. Haley v. Davis" on Justia Law

503 South Front Street, LP, a for-profit corporation, owned 30,000 square feet of commercial space and leased the property for a term of thirty years to ShadoArt Productions, a nonprofit organization. ShadoArt filed an application for exemption under Ohio Rev. Code 5709.12 and 5709.121, which statutes articulate the substantive requirements for public-use and charitable-use exemptions. The tax commissioner denied the request. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. On appeal, ShadoArt argued that because Ohio Rev. Code 5715.27, which permits certain long-term lessees to file applications for exemption, authorizes it to file an application for exemption, it was also entitled to receive an exemption under sections 5709.12 and 5709.121. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) amended section 5715.27 did not alter the substantive requirements for any specific exemption under chapter 5709; and (2) ShadoArt’s claim for exemption did not satisfy the requirements set forth in sections 5709.12 and 5709.121 because the property does not belong to a charitable institution. View "ShadoArt Prods., Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

Petitioners executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. The notary acknowledgment on the mortgage was left blank. The mortgage was subsequently recorded with the county recorder. The interest in the mortgage was later assigned to Bank. Thereafter, Petitioners initiated a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and commenced an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid the mortgage as defectively executed. The bankruptcy court determined that its interpretation of Ohio Rev. Code 1301.401 would be dispositive in this case and certified to the Supreme Court questions of state law concerning whether section 1301.401 has an effect on the case. The Supreme Court answered that section 1301.401 applies to all recorded mortgages in Ohio and acts to provide constructive notice to the world of the existence and contents of a recorded mortgage that was deficiently executed under Ohio Rev. Code 5301.01. View "In re Messer" on Justia Law

Rural Health Collaborative of Southern Ohio, Inc. owned a facility in Adams County that was operated under lease by Dialysis Clinic, Inc. Rural Health filed a charitable-use exemption application for the property. The tax commissioner denied the exemption. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) concluded that Rural Health qualified as a charitable institution under Ohio Rev. Code 5709.121(A)(2) and granted the exemption. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s grant of exemption and remanded, holding (1) the BTA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Rural Health qualifies as a charitable institution; but (2) BTA erred in granting the exemption because the BTA did not fully analyze the claim under Ohio Rev. Code 5709.121(A)(1). Remanded. View "Rural Health Collaborative of S. Ohio, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former correctional institution employees and a labor union, filed this action against numerous government Defendants, alleging that 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 153, the budget bill for the 2012-2013 biennium, violates the Ohio Constitution. H.B. 153 modified prior law governing contracts for the private operation and management of a state correctional institution in several ways. The court of common pleas granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether employees of privately owned or operated prisons were employees, as defined by Ohio Rev. Code 4117.01(C); and (2) the court had jurisdiction over the constitutional challenges to H.B. 153, but Plaintiffs failed to state a claim that H.B. 153 was unconstitutional. The court of appeals reversed in part and ordered the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether H.B. 153 violates the one-subject rule in Ohio Const. art. II, 15(D). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) H.B. 153 is constitutional; and (2) the State Employee Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine public-employee status under section 4117.01(C). View "State ex rel. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass’n v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained against him, including laboratory and chemical tests of his alcohol level. The trial court granted the motion. The appellate court affirmed, ruling that the State had failed to establish substantial compliance with Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05(F) because it allowed a blood sample to remain unrefrigerated for four hours and ten minutes before it was placed in the mail, and therefore, Defendant’s blood-alcohol test results were inadmissible. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State demonstrated substantial compliance with Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05’s requirement that blood be refrigerated, but, in conformity with State v. Burnside, the case is remanded to provide Baker with an opportunity to rebut the presumption of admissibility. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law