Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cornerstone Developers, Ltd. sought extraordinary relief to prevent a tax levy for Sugarcreek Township from appearing on the March 15, 2016 election ballot because it was allegedly not in compliance with state laws. The Supreme Court (1) granted in part the requested writ of mandamus, holding that the Board of Election was under a clear legal duty to remove the levy from the ballot because it was untimely; but (2) declined to issue a writ of prohibition because the Board was not engaged in a quasi-judicial function when it prepared the ballot. View "State ex rel. Cornerstone Developers, Ltd. v. Greene County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Relator was convicted of having an unlawful interest in a public contract and was sentenced to six months in jail. Relator sought writs of prohibition, mandamus, and habeas corpus. The Supreme Court denied the writs by ordered that Relator’s sentence be stayed pending resolution of her appeal. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the conviction. Relator then filed a motion in the court of appeals for en banc reconsideration. Relator asked the trial court judge to stay execution of her sentence, but he declined. Thereafter, Relator filed this action for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court judge from executing her sentence until, among other conditions, the court of appeals decided her motion for en banc reconsideration. The Supreme Court denied the writs and dismissed the case, holding (1) because there was no order of this Court prohibiting the trial court judge from exercising judicial authority there was no basis upon which to issue a writ of prohibition to the judge; and (2) because the sheriff would not be exercising judicial authority in admitting Relator into jail, the issuance of a writ of prohibition against him would be inappropriate. View "State ex rel. Hunter v. Dinkelacker" on Justia Law

These consolidated actions involved an original action in the Supreme Court and an appeal of a judgment of the court of appeals and concerned the interpretation of several nearly identical oil and gas leases. In the original action, Relator, an absent and unnamed plaintiff in a class action, challenged the court of appeals’ order tolling the leases in the class action pending appeal and sought writs of prohibition and mandamus. The appeal challenged the court of appeals’ interpretation of the leases in the class action. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in the class action, holding that the court of appeals correctly interpreted the leases; (2) denied a writ of mandamus or prohibition in the original action because Relator had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by moving to intervene in the appeal and because the court of appeals did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue an order tolling the leases; and (3) denied the motions of the appellee in the appeal to toll the terms of the leases. View "State ex rel. Claugus Family Farm, L.P. v. Seventh Dist. Court of Appeals" on Justia Law

Gabriella Moir was the plaintiff in the underlying divorce case. Judge Mary Kovack, the only judge in the Medina County Domestic Relations Court, recused herself from the case. Acting in her capacity as the administrative judge of that court, Judge Kovack subsequently issued orders assigning magistrates to the visiting judge, Judge Carol Dezso of Summit County Domestic Relations Court, for the purpose of presiding over the divorce. Moir brought this action for a writ of prohibition against Judge Kovack and Judge Dezso, as well as the two courts and one of the assigned magistrates, asserting that the two judges lacked jurisdiction to assign magistrates in the case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ as to Judge Kovack, holding (1) because Judge Kovack recused herself based on a potential conflict of interest, she was without jurisdiction to assign magistrates in the case; and (2) Judge Dezso as the appointed judge may assign magistrates to help her hear the case. View "State ex rel. Moir v. Kovack" on Justia Law

This appeal involved Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a gun that was found in a search of a car legally parked on a public street that Defendant was sitting in just before his arrest on a warrant for domestic violence. After Defendant was arrested, an officer conducted an inventory search of the car, during which he found a handgun. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that there was probable cause to arrest Defendant based on the domestic-violence warrant and that, pursuant to that arrest, the inventory search of the car prior to towing was proper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrantless inventory search of the lawfully parked vehicle in this case was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Ohio Const. art. I, 14. View "State v. Leak" on Justia Law

A petition was submitted to to the clerk of the Hilliard City Council to amend the city charter. The City Council voted against an ordinance to place the proposed charter amendment on the March 15, 2016 ballot. Relators sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Hilliard City Council to approve an ordinance placing a proposed city-charter amendment on the March 15, 2016 ballot. Relators subsequently commenced this original action for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the city council’s objections to the petition were unavailing, and therefore, the city council was compelled to approve the necessary ordinance to place the initiative petition on the March 15, 2016 ballot. View "State ex rel. Carrier v. Hilliard City Council" on Justia Law

Cuyahoga County filed an exemption to a tract of real property it acquired in 2004. The property consisted of a marina/restaurant that operated in conjunction with an adjacent public park. The tax commissioner granted the application as to the the public park portion but denied the application as to the remainder constituting the marina and restaurant. In doing so, the Commissioner invoked his authority to order a split between the taxable and exempt portions. The County appealed, arguing that the Commissioner erred by finding that the property was not used exclusively for a public purpose. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed primarily on the ground that the marina and restaurant were operated “with a view to profit.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the marina and restaurant are considered separately from the park, the denial of the exemption was neither unreasonable nor unlawful. View "Cuyahoga County v. Testa" on Justia Law

In 2010, New Thistledown, LLC, which owned Thistledown Racetrack, petitioned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief. Thistledown was purchased at an auction for $43,000,000. The bankruptcy court authorized the sale, stating that the sale price constituted reasonably equivalent value and fair consideration of the purchased assets. For tax year 2010, the Cuyahoga County fiscal officer assigned a value of $14,264,000 to the parcels comprising Thistledown. The Board of Education of Warrensville Heights City School District filed a complaint with the board of revision (BOR) seeking an increase in valuation. The BOR retained the fiscal officer’s initial valuation. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) rejected the 2010 sale price as evidence of value and valued the real property at $13,800,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA reasonably and lawfully determined that the 2010 sale did not establish the true value of Thistledown; and (2) the evidence supported the BTA’s finding that Thistledown was worth $13,800,000 as of the tax-lien date. View "Warrensville Heights City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged the aspect of Ohio’s Putative Father Registry (OPFR) that limits the time frame during which a man can register as a putative father in order to gain a right to receive notice of any subsequent adoption proceedings involving the man’s putative child. The deadline, in the version of the law that applied to Appellant, is thirty days after the child’s birth, but has since been reduced by the Legislature to fifteen days. In his complaint, Appellant contended that the deadline is unconstitutional as applied to the putative fathers of children who are relinquished for adoption more than thirty days after birth. Specifically, Appellant argued that putative fathers have a due process right to register with the OPFR at any point prior to the initiation of a child’s adoption proceedings. The trial court denied all relief requested by Appellant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant failed to take sufficient action to protect his legal rights or to support his constitutional challenge, he was not able to demonstrate that he was injured by the application of the statutory putative-father-registration deadline. View "In re Adoption of H.N.R." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Talawanda City School District Board of Education (BOE) filed its application to exempt property located within the district. The tax commissioner granted an exemption for all of the property except for a parcel being farmed pursuant to lease, concluding that the pecuniary benefit realized by the farmer disqualified the land from exemption because that portion was not used for school purposes. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) following its amendment in 2010, Ohio Rev. Code 3313.44 does not contain a restriction requiring that the property owned by the BOE be used exclusively for school purposes; and (2) the entire property described in the BOE’s application shall be exempt for the year at issue. View "Talawanda City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Testa" on Justia Law