Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the mayor of Streetsboro resigned, Arthur Scott was appointed to serve as acting mayor. Five months later, Scott was elected to serve for the remainder of the former mayor’s term. Following his reelection, Scott filed a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that he was underpaid for his service as mayor and acting mayor and that he was entitled to compensation for unused vacation, sick, and personal leave. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Streetsboro. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant Scott’s motion to strike several documents that Streetsboro attached to its response to Scott’s motion for summary judgment; (2) did not err in granting summary judgment to Streetsboro regarding Scott’s entitlement to additional pay for his service as acting mayor and as the elected mayor of the city; but (3) erred in granting summary judgment to Streetsboro as to Scott’s entitlement to compensation for unused vacation, sick, and personal leave. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Scott v. Streetsboro" on Justia Law

A complaint was filed in juvenile court alleging that A.G. was delinquent for engaging in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted aggravated robbery and kidnapping, with firearms specifications as to each. A.G. admitted to the allegations in the complaint. The juvenile court found the allegations proved beyond a reasonable doubt and ordered that A.G. be committed to the Department of Youth Services for minimum terms of one year for each of the aggravated robbery and kidnapping adjudications. A.G. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred in failing to merge his adjudications for aggravated robbery and kidnapping as “allied offenses of similar import” and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the allied-offenses issue. The Court of Appeals denied relief, concluding that the aggravated robbery and kidnapping would constituted allied offenses of similar import under Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25 if committed by an adult but that criminal statutes do not apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that juvenile courts must conduct the same double-jeopardy analysis in delinquency proceedings that other courts apply in adult criminal proceedings to protect a child’s right against double jeopardy. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

Under the prior version of R.C. 3519.01(A), if the attorney general certified the summary of a proposal to change the law or amend the constitution as fair and truthful, that proposal would be filed with the secretary of state and supporters could begin circulating petitions. The section now provides that a petition is transferred to the Ballot Board, not to the secretary of state, for review after certification, and that “[o]nly one proposal of law or constitutional amendment to be proposed by initiative petition shall be contained in an initiative petition to enable the voters to vote on that proposal separately.” If the Board determines that the petition contains more than one proposed law or constitutional amendment, it must divide the petition into individual petitions and certify its approval to the attorney general; supporters must submit separate summaries for approval. The Board divided Ethics First’s submission into three separate proposed amendments. Ethics First brought a mandamus petition. After holding that it had jurisdiction, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The modest imposition posed by requiring new summaries does not unduly restrict the right of initiative, The “separate petitions” requirement is not content-based. It applies to all petitions. View "Ethics First-You Decide Ohio Political Action Comm.. v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Attorneys employed by the Franklin County Public Defender sought membership and service credit in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System for their years of service prior to January 1999, and challenged a decision the Ohio Public Employees Retirement Board’s denial of service credit. Persons hired by the Franklin County Public Defender on or before December 31, 1984, are public employees entitled to PERS benefits; effective January 1, 1999, the Franklin County Public Defender’s employees have been enrolled in and considered to be members of PERS. During the intervening years, pursuant to the Ohio Public Defender Act (R.C. Chapter 120), the Franklin County Public Defender Commission and its employees paid Social Security taxes on wages and did not consider the office to be a county agency. The Court of Appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a writ of mandamus to compel the board to award service credit, rejecting an argument that “there was no person holding the office of Franklin County Public Defender between 1985 and 1999 because a person was appointed as the ‘Director’ of the corporation. The plain language in R.C. 120.14(A)(1) indicates that the attorneys were employed by a public official, and hence, were public employees. View "Altman-Bates v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant, convicted of kidnapping, felonious assault, and two counts of rape, challenged the dismissal of his petition for habeas relief, contending that he was not served with an arrest warrant or initial charging papers prior to his allegedly unlawful arrest and thus, that the Erie County Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction to convict and sentence him. The court affirmed the judgment because a challenge to the sufficiency or validity of an indictment is not cognizable in habeas corpus. Furthermore, appellant was charged with the criminal offenses of which he was convicted by an indictment, and he had an adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal to challenge his convictions by raising the sufficiency of that indictment. View "Jury v. Miller" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. A majority of this court affirmed the conviction but vacated the death sentence. Before that decision was released, appellant filed an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen his direct appeal in the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which was denied. Appellant then filed an appeal of right with this court. At issue is whether appellant was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. Based on State v. Maxwell, the court held that failure to challenge the state expert forensic pathologist's testimony or the autopsy report was not ineffective representation, because any such challenge would have failed as a matter of law. The court rejected the following six claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel: failure to object to the court's questioning of the state witnesses; failure to object to prejudicial comments made by a witness for the state; failure to make a record; failure to object to the removal of prospective juror Nos. 11 and 31; failure to present expert psychological testimony during the mitigation phase; and failure to object to the autopsy report or the testimony of the pathologist. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant. The court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

The Franklin County auditor valued a two-story office building at $2,205,000. The property owner filed a complaint seeking a reduction. Before the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) the owner presented an appraisal valuing the property at $1,000,000. The BOR adopted the lower value. The Dublin City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the BOR’s valuation. BOE appealed, arguing that the appraisal did not constitute probative evidence of value, and therefore, the BTA should not have adopted that value for the real property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in light of the plain applicability of the Bedford rule, the BTA did not err in its decision. View "Dublin City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The FirstEnergy Companies Ohio Edison Company, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, and Toledo Edison Company (collectively, FirstEnergy) submitted an application for an electric-security plan (ESP). The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio approved the application. After FirstEnergy began implementing the terms of the ESP, it filed an application to extend the plan and identified the changes it would make to the existing plan. The Commission approved the application. Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council (NOPEC) and the Environmental Law and Policy Center (ELPC) appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained sufficient probative evidence to show that the Commission’s determination was not manifestly against the weight of the evidence or clearly unsupported by the record. View "In re Application of Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, Aaron Von was convicted in Colorado of sexual assault of a child and sexual assault in the third degree. In 2011, Von moved to Ohio and registered as a sex offender. Von later moved to terminate his duty to comply with sex offender registration laws pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2950.15. The trial court denied Von’s motion to terminate his duty to comply with sex offender registration laws because, at the time of his convictions, Megan’s Law was in effect in Ohio, and it contained no provision to terminate one’s status as a registered sex offender post-conviction. The court further concluded that later amendments were not retroactive. The appellate court reversed, concluding that offenders classified under Megan’s Law may avail themselves of the privilege legislatively granted to Adam Walsh Act offenders to terminate their registration obligations. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the registration termination procedure delineated in section 2950.15 does not apply to sex offenders who committed their offenses prior to January 1, 2008; and (2) the appellate court properly remanded this matter for a determination of Von’s sex offender classification pursuant to Megan’s Law. Remanded. View "In re Von" on Justia Law

Cynthia Huntsman operated a farm on which she kept multiple species of wild animals that are regulated by the Ohio Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act. Huntsman had no permit to possess “dangerous wild animals” under the Act. The Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) ordered the transfer of multiple dangerous wild animals found in Huntsman’s facility to a temporary holding facility established by the ODA. A Stark County Common Pleas Court judge granted Huntsman a temporary restraining order against the ODA and ordered the ODA to return the seized animals to Huntsman. The director of the ODA sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from proceeding in the underlying case and ordered him to vacate his previous orders in the case, holding that the judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to order the return of the dangerous wild animals seized from Huntsman and her farm. View "State ex rel. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Agriculture v. Forchione" on Justia Law