Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property, one a felony and the other a misdemeanor. The court of common pleas ordered Defendant to serve the felony and misdemeanor sentences consecutively. Defendant appealed, arguing that a sentencing order running a jail term for a misdemeanor consecutively to a prison sentence for a felony is contrary to Ohio Rev. Code 2929.41. The court of appeals reversed the part of the trial court’s order that imposed the two sentences consecutively and modified the sentence to run the terms of confinement concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a trial court may not impose consecutive sentences for felony and misdemeanor convictions under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.41(B)(1). Remanded. View "State v. Polus" on Justia Law

The Village of Piketon and Boone Coleman Construction, Inc. entered into a contract for construction of a public road. The contract contained a liquidated damages provision specifying that Boone Coleman would pay $700 to Piketon for each day after the specified completion date that the contract was not substantially completed. Boone Coleman did not complete the project until well over a year after the parties’ extended completion date. Boone Coleman sued Piketon alleging that Piketon had failed to pay $147,477 of the contract price for the construction. Piketon filed a counterclaim seeking liquidated damages. The trial court awarded Piketon $277,900 in liquidated damages. The appellate court reversed, holding that the resulting amount of liquidated damages was so unreasonable as to constitute a penalty. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the court erred in its use of a retrospective analysis to reach its conclusion and in failing to focus on the per diem nature of the liquidated damages. Remanded for consideration of the enforceability of the liquidated damages provision in light of this opinion. View "Piketon v. Boone Coleman Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant was convicted of one count of rape and three counts of gross sexual imposition (GSI). Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for the rape conviction and four years for each of the three GSI convictions. The sentence for one of the GSI convictions was to be served concurrently with the life sentence, and the sentences for the other two GSI convictions were to be served consecutively to each other and to the life sentence. In 2015, Appellant filed this original action for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that he had served the minimum required eight years for two counts of GSI and was therefore eligible for parole. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief in habeas corpus because his maximum sentence had not expired and he had available various remedies to challenge his sentence by way of appeal and in postconviction relief and mandamus proceedings. View "State ex rel. Lockhart v. Sheldon" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of rape, attempted murder, kidnapping, and burglary. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was untimely. The trial judge denied the petition without issuing findings of fact or conclusions of law. Appellant subsequently filed this action requesting a writ of mandamus compelling the judge to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the denial of his postconviction relief petition. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus was properly denied where Appellant had no clear legal right to the relief he requested, the trial judge had no clear duty to provide it, and Appellant had an adequate remedy at law. View "State ex rel. Dillon v. Cottrill" on Justia Law

The Ohio Board of Nursing commenced a professional disciplinary action against Beverly Clayton, a staff nurse in the intensive care unit (ICU) of Mercy Hospital Western Hills, for alleged violations of Ohio Rev. Code 4723. In a number of separate motions, Clayton requested subpoenas for the personal appearance of numerous people and subpoenas duces tecum seeking to obtain several different collections of documents. The Board filed a motion to limit subpoena request, arguing that the number of requests was successive. The hearing examiner denied the Board’s motion in large part but granted the request with respect to certain ICU patient records. After a hearing, the hearing examiner concluded that discipline was warranted. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The court of appeals affirmed, implying that the hearing examiner’s decision to limit the subpoena may have been erroneous but that Clayton failed to establish prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a hearing examiner for the Board of Nursing has the discretion to limit or quash subpoenas requested during disciplinary proceedings; and (2) the hearing examiner’s decision to limit Clayton’s subpoena duces tecum in this case was not an abuse of discretion. View "Clayton v. Ohio Bd. of Nursing" on Justia Law

Appellant, who is serving a life sentence on a conviction for aggravated murder, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he remained in prison solely under an order that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue. The claim was unsuccessfully raised in one of Appellant’s prior petitions for habeas corpus. The court of appeals dismissed the case on grounds of res judicata. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the appellate court to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and to provide Defendant with notice and an opportunity to respond. The court of appeals again dismissed the petition on remand. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s habeas claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. View "Jefferson v. Bunting" on Justia Law

In 2012, a principal of Lipson O’Shea Legal Group made a request for records from Cuyahoga County Board of Health (Cuyahoga County BOH) seeking documentation of homes in the County where a minor child was found to have elevated blood lead levels. Cuyahoga County BOH sought a declaratory judgment with respect to its obligations to maintain the confidentiality of the records sought by Lipson O’Shea. The trial court granted summary judgment for Cuyahoga County BOH, concluding that the release of the records was prohibited by Ohio Rev. Code 3701.01, which exempts from disclosure certain health information if the information could be used to reveal the individual’s identity. The court of appeals reversed, declaring that, rather than withholding all records, Cuyahoga County BOH must examine each document, redact any protected health information, and release any remaining unprotected information not otherwise excepted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some of the information in the requested records prepared by the Cuyahoga County BOH is not protected health information, and therefore, it cannot be said that all of the information responsive to the request is protected. View "Cuyahoga County Bd. of Health v. Lipson O'Shea Legal Group" on Justia Law

Relator was seventeen years old at the time two delinquency complaints were filed against him. Respondent was the judge of the juvenile division of the county court of common pleas. After a bindover hearing was scheduled, Respondent ordered the state to comply with Relator’s discovery request for several police reports, and the state disclosed all requested documents except for one police report. Relator moved to dismiss the case as a sanction for the failure to produce the report. Respondent dismissed the cases with prejudice as a sanction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state was required to produce the requested documents. The state then filed a request to schedule a bindover hearing. Respondent granted the state’s motion. Relator sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Respondent from proceeding with the hearing, arguing that his cases had been dismissed with prejudice and had been reviewed by the Supreme Court without remand. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relator had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appeal, and Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed. View "State ex rel. R.W. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellant was granted a default judgment against Bank of America and filed a praecipe for a writ of execution. BAC Field Services filed a motion to stay the execution of judgment and a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court granted the motions. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to clarify its reasoning. Thereafter, Appellant moved the trial court to reinstate the default judgment. When the court had not ruled on the motion, Appellant filed this action requesting writs of prohibition barring the trial court from vacating the default judgment and barring BAC from appearing in the case. The court of appeals denied the writs. After Appellant appealed, the trial court again vacated the default judgment and responded to the court of appeals’ instruction to clarify its reasoning. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) declared the petition for a writ of procedendo moot because the trial court had issued a decision clarifying its reasons for vacating the default judgment; and (2) affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment denying Appellant’s petition for writs of prohibition because the court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed. View "State ex rel. Haley v. Davis" on Justia Law

503 South Front Street, LP, a for-profit corporation, owned 30,000 square feet of commercial space and leased the property for a term of thirty years to ShadoArt Productions, a nonprofit organization. ShadoArt filed an application for exemption under Ohio Rev. Code 5709.12 and 5709.121, which statutes articulate the substantive requirements for public-use and charitable-use exemptions. The tax commissioner denied the request. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. On appeal, ShadoArt argued that because Ohio Rev. Code 5715.27, which permits certain long-term lessees to file applications for exemption, authorizes it to file an application for exemption, it was also entitled to receive an exemption under sections 5709.12 and 5709.121. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) amended section 5715.27 did not alter the substantive requirements for any specific exemption under chapter 5709; and (2) ShadoArt’s claim for exemption did not satisfy the requirements set forth in sections 5709.12 and 5709.121 because the property does not belong to a charitable institution. View "ShadoArt Prods., Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law