Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant made a request for public records and information based on events surrounding the arrest for another individual. When the Ohio Department of Public Safety (ODPS) denied portions of the request, Appellant filed this action in mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for mandamus, concluding that ODPS had properly denied portions of Appellant’s request. The court subsequently denied Appellant’s application for reconsideration and en banc consideration, concluding that the requests were a nullity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an application for reconsideration or for en banc consideration under the appellate rules cannot be made in an original action. View "State ex rel. Ziegler v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

Appellee was arrested for operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI). Because he had been convicted of OVI five times in the previous twenty years, Appellee was charged with two fourth-degree felonies under Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d) and the repeat-OVI specification described in Ohio Rev. Code 2941.1413 for each offense. Appellee moved to dismiss the repeat-OVI specification attached to each count, arguing that section 2941.1413 violates equal protection because it allows the State to seek greater punishment without providing proof beyond that required to trigger section 4511.19(G)(1)(d). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Appellee pled no contest to both counts. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 2941.1413 violates equal protection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 4511.19(G)(1)(d) and section 2941.1413 are part of a logical, graduated system of penalties for recidivist OVI offenses and do not violate equal protection. View "State v. Klembus" on Justia Law

Appellee was arrested for operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI). Because he had been convicted of OVI five times in the previous twenty years, Appellee was charged with two fourth-degree felonies under Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d) and the repeat-OVI specification described in Ohio Rev. Code 2941.1413 for each offense. Appellee moved to dismiss the repeat-OVI specification attached to each count, arguing that section 2941.1413 violates equal protection because it allows the State to seek greater punishment without providing proof beyond that required to trigger section 4511.19(G)(1)(d). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Appellee pled no contest to both counts. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 2941.1413 violates equal protection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 4511.19(G)(1)(d) and section 2941.1413 are part of a logical, graduated system of penalties for recidivist OVI offenses and do not violate equal protection. View "State v. Klembus" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of rape of his former stepson and gross sexual imposition on both his former stepson and former stepdaughter. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of the rape of his former stepson. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because the trial court did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction over his case. View "Leyman v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

After the Cuyahoga County fiscal officer valued residential real estate owned by Landowner for tax year 2009, Landowner filed a complaint seeking a reduction. At a hearing before the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (BOR) Landowner presented an appraisal report along with the testimony of the appraiser. The BOR rejected the appraisal and retained the valuation determined by the fiscal officer. Landowner appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). When the BOR certified the record of the proceedings to the BTA, it failed to include the audio recording of the oral testimony before the BOR. The BTA adopted the appraiser’s valuation of the property after reviewing the record, incomplete as it was. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding that the BTA committed plain error by adopting the appraisal valuation given the absence of potentially important evidence that ought to have been part of the record. Remanded for further proceedings with a view to performing an independent valuation of the property. View "Cannata v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellees were employed as sales representatives by a company that was owned by Appellants. Appellants filed a class action lawsuit seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Ohio Rev. Code 4111.14 were unconstitutional and a declaration that, as employees, they were entitled to minimum wage. Specifically, Appellants argued (1) because Ohio Rev. Code 4111.14(B)(1) contains exemptions from the definition of “employee” that Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 34a does not contain, the statute is unconstitutional; and (2) section 4111.14(B) does not apply to claims for minimum wage violations brought under the Constitution. The trial court declared that section 411.14(B)(1) is constitutionally valid and that the exemptions within the statute apply to claims brought under Article II, Section 34a. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the General Assembly exceeded its authority when it defined “employee” differently, and more narrowly, than did the Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 4111.14(B)(1) is constitutional because its definition of the term “employee” does not clearly conflict with the definition of the same term set forth in Article II, Section 34a. View "Haight v. Minchak" on Justia Law

James Smith was indicted on one count of aggravated burglary and one count of rape. Smith was subsequently reindicted on the same two counts, in addition to one count of cocaine possession. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the earlier indictment. Defendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary and rape. Smith later filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was convicted on a dismissed indictment. The trial court denied the motion. Smith then filed this original action in the Court of Appeals seeking a writ of prohibition against Judge Michael Hall and his successor, Judge Dennis Adkins, asserting that Judge Hall lacked jurisdiction in his case because his conviction arose from an indictment that had been dismissed prior to trial. The Court of Appeals dismissed Smith’s complaint for a writ of prohibition, determining that a writ of prohibition was not appropriate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. View "State ex rel. Smith v. Hall" on Justia Law

After his alleged biological son, B.V., was placed for adoption, Steven Walton filed a paternity case in juvenile court seeking to establish his father-child relationship and parental rights and responsibilities regarding B.V. Walton and B.V.’s biological mother later submitted an acknowledgment-of-paternity affidavit to the Central Paternity Registry. Walton then voluntarily dismissed his paternity action and moved the probate court for summary judgment on the adoption, relying on the enforceability of the acknowledgment of paternity. Thereafter, Adoption Connection, the adoption agency with legal custody of B.V., filed a complaint in the juvenile court asking the juvenile court to declare the paternity acknowledgment void. The case was assigned the case number for the paternity case that Walton had voluntarily dismissed. Walton filed this original action in prohibition to stop Respondents - the juvenile court judge and magistrate - from exercising jurisdiction in Adoption Connection’s case. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the juvenile lacked jurisdiction because Walton’s paternity case had been voluntarily dismissed. View "State ex rel. Walton v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder with two felony-murder specifications. Appellant was sentenced to death. After Appellant exhausted his postconviction and federal remedies, the Supreme Court ordered the execution to proceed on September 15, 2009. During the scheduled execution, attempts to insert an IV catheter were unsuccessful. Appellant was injected eighteen times during the botched attempt. Appellant pursued multiple avenues challenging any further attempt by the State to execute him. This appeal arose from Appellant’s successive petition for postconviction relief, in which he asserted that any future attempt to execute him would violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. The trial court denied Appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State was not constitutionally barred from carrying out Appellant’s execution. View "State v. Broom" on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated Appellant, a juvenile, delinquent on sex offenses. At disposition, the juvenile court did not record a finding regarding Appellant’s age at the time the offenses were committed. Upon Appellant’s release from the Ohio Department of Youth Services, the court scheduled a sex-offender-classification hearing. Appellant opposed his classification as a juvenile-sex-offender registrant, arguing that he was ineligible for classification because he was under the age of fourteen when the offenses were committed and because classification would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. After a hearing, the juvenile court found (1) Appellant had committed at least one offense when he was fourteen years of age, and (2) Appellant should be designated a juvenile offender registrant and classified as a Tier II offender. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a determination of a juvenile sex offender’s age at the time of the offense can be made at any time prior to or during the classification hearing; and (2) the imposition of classification upon release from a secure facility and for a time period beyond the juvenile offender’s attainment of age eighteen or twenty-one does not violate the offender’s due process rights or the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law