Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Relator requested records for public golf courses operated by Cleveland Metroparks. Metroparks declined to provide the records, asserting that they were exempt from disclosure because they were trade secrets or protected by the attorney client privilege. Relator then filed this mandamus action. The court of appeals granted in part and denied in part the request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that Metroparks failed to establish that some documents were exempt from disclosure but that the remaining documents were either trade secrets or protected by the attorney client privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to strike certain affidavits; (2) the court of appeals properly denied Relator’s request for a writ of mandamus with regard to the names and e-mail addresses of Metroparks customers; and (3) the court of appeals did not err by not conducting an in camera review of the documents Relator requested. View "Salemi v. Cleveland Metroparks" on Justia Law

This action raised several challenges to recently enacted legislation and administrative rules related to gambling in the state. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against several state entities challenging the constitutionality of video lottery terminals and H.B. 1, the act that authorized them, and legislative actions that related to Ohio’s four casinos, particularly H.B. 277 and H.B. 519. Lastly, Plaintiffs claimed that Ohio Const. art. XV, 6, H.B.1, H.B. 277, and H.B. 519 violate equal protection by granting a monopoly to the gaming operators whom the state approved. The trial court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the action for lack of standing and for failure to state claim, concluding that none of the plaintiffs had standing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish that they had organizational standing or standing based on their status as individuals experiencing the negative effects of gambling, parents and a teacher of public-school students, and contributors to the commercial-activity tax; and (2) one plaintiff, however, sufficiently alleged standing to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss his equal protection claim. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich" on Justia Law

Appellant’s father (Decedent) died after receiving surgery at Aultman Hospital. Appellant requested a copy of Decedent’s complete medical record. The Hospital produced the medical record that existed in the medical-records department. Dissatisfied with the Hospital’s response, Appellant filed this action to compel the production of Decedent’s complete medical record. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital, concluding that the Hospital had produced the requested medical record, as defined by Ohio Rev. Code 3701.74(A)(8). The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the term “medical record” as that term is used in Ohio Rev. Code 3701.74 does not include all patient data but consists only of information maintained by the medical-records department. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) data that was generated in the process of the patient’s healthcare treatment and that pertains to the patient’s medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition qualifies as a “medical record”; but (2) “medical record” means any patient data “generated and maintained by a health care provider” without limitation as to the physical location or department where it is kept. Remanded. View "Griffith v. Aultman Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) failed timely to record in the appropriate county recorder’s office the satisfaction of her residential mortgage within ninety days after payoff, as required by Ohio Rev. Code 5301.36(B). After the class was certified, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) issued a cease-and-desist order (consent order) to Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the FHFA consent order did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the consent order did not preclude the trial court from exercising jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. 4635(b), the federal statute governing judicial review of FHFA orders; but (2) 12 U.S.C. 4617(j)(4) barred the trial court from ordering Fannie Mae to pay damages under section 5301.36(C) while Fannie Mae is under FHFA’s conservatorship. View "Radatz v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n" on Justia Law

Appellant made a request for public records and information based on events surrounding the arrest for another individual. When the Ohio Department of Public Safety (ODPS) denied portions of the request, Appellant filed this action in mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for mandamus, concluding that ODPS had properly denied portions of Appellant’s request. The court subsequently denied Appellant’s application for reconsideration and en banc consideration, concluding that the requests were a nullity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an application for reconsideration or for en banc consideration under the appellate rules cannot be made in an original action. View "State ex rel. Ziegler v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

Appellee was arrested for operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI). Because he had been convicted of OVI five times in the previous twenty years, Appellee was charged with two fourth-degree felonies under Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d) and the repeat-OVI specification described in Ohio Rev. Code 2941.1413 for each offense. Appellee moved to dismiss the repeat-OVI specification attached to each count, arguing that section 2941.1413 violates equal protection because it allows the State to seek greater punishment without providing proof beyond that required to trigger section 4511.19(G)(1)(d). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Appellee pled no contest to both counts. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 2941.1413 violates equal protection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 4511.19(G)(1)(d) and section 2941.1413 are part of a logical, graduated system of penalties for recidivist OVI offenses and do not violate equal protection. View "State v. Klembus" on Justia Law

Appellee was arrested for operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI). Because he had been convicted of OVI five times in the previous twenty years, Appellee was charged with two fourth-degree felonies under Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d) and the repeat-OVI specification described in Ohio Rev. Code 2941.1413 for each offense. Appellee moved to dismiss the repeat-OVI specification attached to each count, arguing that section 2941.1413 violates equal protection because it allows the State to seek greater punishment without providing proof beyond that required to trigger section 4511.19(G)(1)(d). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Appellee pled no contest to both counts. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 2941.1413 violates equal protection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 4511.19(G)(1)(d) and section 2941.1413 are part of a logical, graduated system of penalties for recidivist OVI offenses and do not violate equal protection. View "State v. Klembus" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of rape of his former stepson and gross sexual imposition on both his former stepson and former stepdaughter. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of the rape of his former stepson. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because the trial court did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction over his case. View "Leyman v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

After the Cuyahoga County fiscal officer valued residential real estate owned by Landowner for tax year 2009, Landowner filed a complaint seeking a reduction. At a hearing before the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (BOR) Landowner presented an appraisal report along with the testimony of the appraiser. The BOR rejected the appraisal and retained the valuation determined by the fiscal officer. Landowner appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). When the BOR certified the record of the proceedings to the BTA, it failed to include the audio recording of the oral testimony before the BOR. The BTA adopted the appraiser’s valuation of the property after reviewing the record, incomplete as it was. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding that the BTA committed plain error by adopting the appraisal valuation given the absence of potentially important evidence that ought to have been part of the record. Remanded for further proceedings with a view to performing an independent valuation of the property. View "Cannata v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellees were employed as sales representatives by a company that was owned by Appellants. Appellants filed a class action lawsuit seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Ohio Rev. Code 4111.14 were unconstitutional and a declaration that, as employees, they were entitled to minimum wage. Specifically, Appellants argued (1) because Ohio Rev. Code 4111.14(B)(1) contains exemptions from the definition of “employee” that Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 34a does not contain, the statute is unconstitutional; and (2) section 4111.14(B) does not apply to claims for minimum wage violations brought under the Constitution. The trial court declared that section 411.14(B)(1) is constitutionally valid and that the exemptions within the statute apply to claims brought under Article II, Section 34a. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the General Assembly exceeded its authority when it defined “employee” differently, and more narrowly, than did the Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 4111.14(B)(1) is constitutional because its definition of the term “employee” does not clearly conflict with the definition of the same term set forth in Article II, Section 34a. View "Haight v. Minchak" on Justia Law