Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted abduction and was sentenced to a term of community control. The trial court subsequently found that Defendant had violated the terms of his community control and extended the term of community control. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order declaring that the county probation department, rather than the county prosecuting attorney, represents the State in all community control violation proceedings and that the prosecutor would not be notified of any future hearings. The trial court then conducted a community control violation hearing in Defendant’s case. An assistant prosecuting attorney asserted the right to be present and heard. The trial court denied the prosecuting attorney an opportunity to speak. The court found that Defendant had violated the conditions of community control and imposed a fourteen-day jail sentence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erroneously vested probation officers, rather than prosecutors, with the authority to represent the interests of the State, and therefore, as the State’s legal representative, the prosecuting attorney is entitled to proper notice and an opportunity to appear and be heard at community control violation proceedings. View "State v. Heinz" on Justia Law

Several school districts filed complaints seeking reimbursement for retroactive reductions in school foundation funding. The State Board of Education of Ohio (the department) moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that it was insulated from liability. The trial court held that the General Assembly did not have the constitutional authority to adjust local school funding retrospectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the General Assembly had constitutional authority to retroactively reduce the amount of state funding allocated to local school districts and to immunize the department against the school districts’ legal claims. Remanded. View "Toledo City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Appellant, a nonresident taxpayer, filed a refund claim for an unpaid 2004 tax liability assessment. Appellant contested Ohio Rev. Code 5747.212’s imposition of income tax on a portion of the capital gain that he realized in 2004 when he sold his ownership interest in a limited liability company. The tax commissioner denied the refund claim. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. Appellant appealed, arguing that applying section 5747.212 to him was unconstitutional and that he should be permitted to allocate the gain entirely outside Ohio. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Ohio may levy income tax on Appellant’s capital gain as if it were income from the business itself. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BTA, holding that section 5747.212, as applied to Appellant, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Remanded to the tax commissioner to grant Appellant a refund. View "Corrigan v. Testa" on Justia Law

Appellee applied to the court of common pleas to seal his twenty-four-year-old third-degree-felony conviction for receiving stolen property. The State objected to the application, arguing that Appellee’s fourth-degree-misdemeanor conviction under Ohio Rev. Code 4503.11(A) for failing to register a motor vehicle must be counted as a conviction when determining eligibility. The trial court ordered sealed Appellee’s felony conviction for receiving stolen property. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a violation of section 4503.11 concerning failure to register a motor vehicle must be counted as an offense when determining eligible offender status for record-sealing purposes under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.31; and (2) the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that Appellee was an eligible offender for record-sealing purposes. Remanded. View "State v. J.M." on Justia Law

The Olentangy Local School District Board of Education amended a board policy to require that all communications between board members and staff first pass through the district superintendent or the district treasurer. Adam White, a board member, voted against the policy change. The Columbus Dispatch subsequently published an editorial praising White for his vote. In a series of e-mails between and among a majority of the board members, the board issued a response to the editorial on behalf of the board. The board later ratified that response at a public meeting. White filed this lawsuit alleging that the board violated the Open Meetings Act. The trial court granted the board’s motion for judgment in the pleadings, concluding that the Act does not apply to e-mails. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that serial e-mail communications by a majority of board members regarding a response to public criticism of the board may constitute a private, prearranged discussion of public business in violation of the Act if the communications meet the requirements of the statute. Remanded. View "White v. King" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to several offenses, including gross sexual imposition and three counts of rape. The sentence was memorialized in an entry that recognized 184 days of jail-time credit. Three years later, Appellant filed a motion seeking additional jail-time credit of eighty-seven days for the time he had been held prior to indictment. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, ruling that the entry appealed from was not a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the denial of a motion for jail-time credit pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) is a final, appealable order. Remanded. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant, a juvenile, was bound over to the common pleas court and indicted on four counts of aggravated murder, among related crimes. Defendant moved to suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation, arguing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that his statements were not voluntary. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant subsequently pled no contest to four counts of aggravated murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of tampering with evidence, all with firearm specifications. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that where, as in this case, the interrogation of the defendant is recorded electronically, the statements made are presumed to have been made voluntarily pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2933.81(B). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 2933.81(B) does not affect the analysis of whether a suspect intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and therefore, the State retains the burden to prove a valid waiver; and (2) as applied to statements a juvenile makes during a custodial interrogation, the section 2933.81(B) presumption that such statements are voluntary is unconstitutional. Remanded. View "State v. Barker" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of raping his minor biological daughter. The judge imposed the jointly recommended sentence of three eight-year prison terms to be served consecutively to each other. The court of appeals vacated Appellant’s sentence, holding that while a jointly recommended sentence that is “authorized by law” is not subject to review, Appellant’s sentence was appealable and must be vacated because the trial court did not make the findings required by Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(C)(4) for imposing consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) compliance with section 2929.14(C)(4) was not necessary because the consecutive sentences were jointly recommended and imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple counts of rape under Ohio Rev. Code 2907.02 is discretionary, not mandatory; and (2) therefore, Appellant’s sentence was “authorized by law” and not subject to review on appeal. View "State v. Sergent" on Justia Law

In 2009, Spire Institute (Spire), a nonprofit corporation, entered into an agreement to lease land from Roni Lee, LLC, a for-profit company. By 2012, Spire had constructed Olympic-grade athletic facilities and related improvements on about a quarter of the property. In 2010, Spire sought a real-estate-tax exemption for the entire property under the charitable-use exemption. The tax commissioner denied exemption, finding that Roni Lee used the property for land development and commercial leasing and that Spire was not “engaged in charitable activity in any substantial way.” The commissioner also denied exemption of he undeveloped property under the prospective-use doctrine. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision, holding that Spire failed to establish that any portion of the subject property qualified for a charitable-use exemption. View "Geneva Area Recreational, Educ. & Athletic Trust v. Testa" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the Public Utilities Commission’s modification and approval of the second electric-security plan of the American Electric Power operating companies, Ohio Power Company and Columbus Southern Power Company (collectively, AEP). In the proceedings below, the Commission authored new generation rates for the companies. Five parties appealed, and AEP cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s orders in part and reversed them in part, holding (1) the Commission’s order was unlawful or unreasonable because it allowed AEP to collect unlawful transition revenue or its equivalent through the Retail Stability Rider; and (2) the Commission erred in failing to explain its decision setting the significantly-excessive-earnings test threshold. Remanded. View "In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law