Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a juvenile, was bound over to the common pleas court and indicted on four counts of aggravated murder, among related crimes. Defendant moved to suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation, arguing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that his statements were not voluntary. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant subsequently pled no contest to four counts of aggravated murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of tampering with evidence, all with firearm specifications. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that where, as in this case, the interrogation of the defendant is recorded electronically, the statements made are presumed to have been made voluntarily pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2933.81(B). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 2933.81(B) does not affect the analysis of whether a suspect intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and therefore, the State retains the burden to prove a valid waiver; and (2) as applied to statements a juvenile makes during a custodial interrogation, the section 2933.81(B) presumption that such statements are voluntary is unconstitutional. Remanded. View "State v. Barker" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of raping his minor biological daughter. The judge imposed the jointly recommended sentence of three eight-year prison terms to be served consecutively to each other. The court of appeals vacated Appellant’s sentence, holding that while a jointly recommended sentence that is “authorized by law” is not subject to review, Appellant’s sentence was appealable and must be vacated because the trial court did not make the findings required by Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(C)(4) for imposing consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) compliance with section 2929.14(C)(4) was not necessary because the consecutive sentences were jointly recommended and imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple counts of rape under Ohio Rev. Code 2907.02 is discretionary, not mandatory; and (2) therefore, Appellant’s sentence was “authorized by law” and not subject to review on appeal. View "State v. Sergent" on Justia Law

In 2009, Spire Institute (Spire), a nonprofit corporation, entered into an agreement to lease land from Roni Lee, LLC, a for-profit company. By 2012, Spire had constructed Olympic-grade athletic facilities and related improvements on about a quarter of the property. In 2010, Spire sought a real-estate-tax exemption for the entire property under the charitable-use exemption. The tax commissioner denied exemption, finding that Roni Lee used the property for land development and commercial leasing and that Spire was not “engaged in charitable activity in any substantial way.” The commissioner also denied exemption of he undeveloped property under the prospective-use doctrine. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision, holding that Spire failed to establish that any portion of the subject property qualified for a charitable-use exemption. View "Geneva Area Recreational, Educ. & Athletic Trust v. Testa" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the Public Utilities Commission’s modification and approval of the second electric-security plan of the American Electric Power operating companies, Ohio Power Company and Columbus Southern Power Company (collectively, AEP). In the proceedings below, the Commission authored new generation rates for the companies. Five parties appealed, and AEP cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s orders in part and reversed them in part, holding (1) the Commission’s order was unlawful or unreasonable because it allowed AEP to collect unlawful transition revenue or its equivalent through the Retail Stability Rider; and (2) the Commission erred in failing to explain its decision setting the significantly-excessive-earnings test threshold. Remanded. View "In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission approved a capacity charge for the American Electric Power operating companies - Ohio Power Company and Columbus Southern Power (collectively, AEP) - and authorized AEP to implement a new cost-based charge for capacity service that AEP offers to competitive retail electric service (CRES) providers. The Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) appealed, and AEP cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s orders in part and reversed them in part, holding (1) OCC’s propositions of law failed; and (2) AEP identified one instance where the Commission committed reversible error. Remanded. View "In re Comm’n Review of the Capacity Charges of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

T.L.M. appealed the judgments in his three cases. The court of appeals granted a limited remand of the three cases for the juvenile court to rule on the recalculation of credit on his sentence. The juvenile court subsequently awarded T.L.M. additional credit for time served. The State filed a notice of appeal of each of T.L.M.’s cases in the juvenile court, which were dismissed for a procedural defect. The State then filed a second set of notices of appeal with accompanying motions for leave to appeal, but the motions were filed after the deadline for such an appeal had passed. T.L.M. moved to dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals denied the motions and granted the State’s motions for leave to appeal. T.L.M. requested a peremptory writ to hold in abeyance the appellate court proceedings and prohibit the court of appeals from hearing the appeals. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the court of appeals never obtained jurisdiction to decide whether the State could appeal because the State did not file its motions in the court of appeals before the deadline. View "State ex rel. T.L.M. v. Judges of the First Dist. Court of Appeals" on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellant was convicted of two counts of rape. The sentencing entry stated that Appellant “shall be subject to post release control of up to three years.” The trial court later journalized a nunc pro tunc order correcting the 2003 order by stating that Appellant “shall be subject to post release control of up to five years.” After completing his term of incarceration, Appellant filed a motion to terminate postrelease control. The court of common pleas found that the motion was actually a petition for postconviction relief and dismissed it as untimely. Appellant filed filed an action in mandamus and/or prohibition requesting a writ compelling the trial court to issue a valid final judgment in the underlying case. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that the trial court lost jurisdiction to take action in the criminal case where Appellant had served the maximum prison term. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that Appellant had an alternate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appealing the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to terminate his postrelease control. View "State ex rel. Rudert v. Collier" on Justia Law

Sarunas Abraitis, the former executor of his mother’s estate, applied to admit his mother’s will to probate. The will provided that if Abraitis’s father predeceased his mother, her entire estate would be divided equally between Abraitis and his brother, Vytautas. The matter was assigned to Judge Laura Gallagher. While the estate was being administered, Vytautas died. Abraitis subsequently filed an application to probate a different, later will that his mother executed and that bequeathed to him the entire estate. Vytautas’s former wife, Vivian, filed a complaint to contest the later will. The action was also assigned to Judge Gallagher. Abraitis filed two actions in prohibition alleging that Judge Gallagher lacked jurisdiction. As grounds for the writ, Abraitis referred to collateral proceedings regarding his mother’s guardianship and federal and state tax proceedings, arguing that because none of the parties objected or moved to intervene in the tax cases, the probate court was precluded from hearing any matter concerning the estate. The court of appeals dismissed Abraitis’s complaints in prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Abraitis had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and that Judge Gallagher did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the probate court action. View "State ex rel. Abraitis v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

In 1991, Larry Dawson was convicted of aggravated murder and other crimes. In 2012, Dawson filed a motion for an oral hearing to correct a “void” sentence on the alleged ground that the entry did not address all the charges. Judge Lynne Callahan denied the motion. Dawson appealed. The appellate court concluded that the original sentencing entry was a final, appealable order and that Dawson’s sentencing entry disposed of all charges against him. In 2014, Dawson moved the court to issue a valid judgment. Judge Callahan denied the motion. Dawson then petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus and/or procedendo ordering Judge Callahan and the Summit County Court of Common Pleas (collectively, Respondents) to resentence him and issue a final judgment of conviction. The Court of Appeals concluded that Dawson was not entitled to either writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Dawson could have raised the issues in his direct appeal that he asserts now, and because the same issue had already been addressed in the appeal of Dawson’s motion for a new sentence, the case is res judicata. View "State ex rel. Dawson v. Summit County Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of domestic violence, a misdemeanor in the first-degree. During trial, the victim asserted the privilege against self-incrimination at least eight times in response to questions posed to him about Defendant’s assault. Defendant appealed, raising four claims of error. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s inquiry into the victim’s claim of privilege nor by the trial court’s instruction to the victim to read his prior statement during his examination; (2) Defendant failed to establish that an impermissible judicial bias deprived him of a fair trial; and (3) assuming the trial court erred in allowing the victim to read his prior statement at trial, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Arnold" on Justia Law