Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Relators filed a petition with the Medina County Board of Elections proposing the adoption of a county charter. The Director of the Board of Elections voted on whether to certify the proposed charter petition to the Board of County Commissioners, which resulted in a two-to-two tie. Secretary of State Jon Husted broke the tie against the motion to certify the proposed charter petition to the County Commissioners. Relators sought a writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary of State and the Board to place the proposed charter on the November 2016 ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relators were not entitled to a writ of mandamus because there was an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through which Relators could have challenged the Board’s decision. View "State ex rel. Jones v. Husted" on Justia Law

The Meigs County Homes Rule Committee and its members (collectively, the committee) sought to place a proposed charter for Meigs County on the November 2016 ballot. The committee submitted the petition to the Meigs County Board of Elections (the board), which certified the petition. The Meigs County Board of Commissioners and its members (collectively, the commissioners) refused to certify the initiative for placement on the ballot, concluding that the board failed to act within the time frame required by Ohio Rev. Code 307.94. The committee sought of a writ of mandamus compelling placement of the proposed charter on the ballot. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that the board’s initial letter to the commissioners certifying the petition satisfied the requirements of section 307.94. View "State ex rel. Meigs County Home Rule Comm. v. Meigs County Bd. of Comm’rs" on Justia Law

Victoria Ullman filed an action requesting a declaration that the JobsOhio Act, which authorized the creation of a nonprofit corporation for the purposes of promoting economic development, was unconstitutional. Ullman, who was counsel and then amicus curiae in previous cases involving the same issue, filed this action on her own behalf. Respondents filed motions to dismiss the complaint. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, finding that Ullman lacked standing to proceed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ullman lacked standing under the public-right doctrine as articulated in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward and State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash. View "State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted" on Justia Law

Following a mistrial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated burglary and rape. Judge Ethna Cooper presided over the mistrial and the retrial. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant later filed a motion to issue a final appealable order and to vacate a void judgment. Judge Cooper denied the motion. Appellant then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals was correct in dismissing Appellant’s petition because Appellant had available an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. View "State ex rel. Bevins v. Cooper" on Justia Law

In 1995, Jeffrey Keith was found guilty of arson and grand theft. In 2015, after a long procedural history, Keith petitioned the Court of Appeals to order the original judge in his case, Judge Gaul, to rule on his motion for leave to file a delayed motion for a new trial. When Keith filed his motion in 2002, Judge Gaul had been assigned to the case, but the case was later assigned to Judge Russo. Judge Russo filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court of appeals granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because a ruling on Keith’s 2002 motion would be constrained by the law-of-the-case doctrine, issuing a writ ordering such a ruling would be a “vain act.” View "State ex rel. Keith v. Gaul" on Justia Law

After he retired, Robert Marmaduke filed a disability-benefit application with the Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund (OP&F). Finding that Marmaduke was permanently and partially disabled, the Disability Evaluation Panel recommended awarding Marmaduke a permanent-partial disability benefit. Marmaduke appealed, but the OP&F’s board of trustees reaffirmed its award of a permanent-partial disability benefit. The court of appeals affirmed the board’s determination that Marmaduke was entitled to a permanent-partial, rather than permanent-total, disability benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OP&F did not abuse its discretion in awarding Marmaduke a permanent-partial disability benefit. View "State ex rel. Marmaduke v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Julie Steinle filed a complaint for divorce against Garrette Steinle, and the case was assigned to Judge John Dewey. Garrette filed three motions for partial summary judgment dealing with various assets at issue in the divorce. After Judge Dewey granted the motions in part Garrette filed a motion for findings of fact, requesting that Judge Dewey either find that all of the facts he had asserted in the motions were uncontroverted or provide a list of those facts that the judge found to be in dispute. Judge Dewey denied Garrette’s motion. Garrette then filed this action in mandamus requesting an order directing the judge to issue findings of fact. The court of appeals granted Judge Dewey’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the complaint and that Garrette had not shown a clear legal right to the requested relief. View "State ex rel. Steinle v. Dewey" on Justia Law

Dennis Carter sustained serious injuries when Larry Reese attempted to move a tractor-trailer that had pinned Carter’s leg between the trailer and a loading dock. Carter and his wife sued Reese. Reese asserted Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute as a defense. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Reese pursuant to the statute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Reese was not liable in civil damages pursuant to Ohio’s Good Samaritan statute because (1) Reese administered emergency care at the scene of an emergency, and the statute expressly states that no person shall be liable in civil damages for acts performed at the scene of an emergency, and (2) no allegation of willful or wanton misconduct was asserted against Defendant. View "Carter v. Reese" on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant was convicted of first-degree-felony rape and kidnapping for offenses he committed in 1993. The trial court sentenced Defendant in accordance with the sentencing law in effect at the time of the 1993 offenses. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that he should have been sentenced under the law in effect at the time of his 2014 sentencing. The law in effect in 2014 reduced the potential prison sentences for Defendant’s offenses as compared with the potential prison sentences for those offenses under the law in effect in 1993. The Court of Appeals agreed with Defendant, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was entitled to the benefit of the shorter potential sentences under the law in effect at the time of sentencing. Remanded. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Dayton Public Schools notified Cox of its intent to terminate her employment for allegedly striking a student. An arbitration award, finding just cause for her termination, was handed down on December 10, 2013. The arbitrator e-mailed the decision to the School District attorneys on December 10, but Cox was not included as a recipient of the e-mail. On December 18, 2013, the Board of Education passed a formal resolution adopting the arbitrator’s decision and directed that Cox be served with the order by certified mail. On March 10, 2014, Cox moved to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award. The School District argued that notice of a petition seeking the vacation or modification of an arbitration award pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2711 must be received by the adverse party or its attorney within the statutory three-month period contained in R.C. 2711.13. The trial court dismissed. The Court of Appeals reversed; the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. The three-month period for service of Cox’s motion began on December 11, 2013. On the same numerical day three months later, Cox sent notice of her motion by certified mail. Service was complete at the time of mailing and was timely. View "Cox v. Dayton Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law