Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Epic Aviation, LLC, a vendor of jet fuel, sold jet fuel to AirNet Systems, Inc., collected sales tax on it, and remitted the tax to the state. Epic, on behalf of AirNet, sought a refund of sales tax paid by AirNet on its purchases of jet fuel from Epic from January 1, 2006 through April 30, 2009. The tax commissioner denied the claim for refund. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. Epic appealed, arguing that AirNet’s jet fuel purchases were exempt from sales tax because AirNet purchased the fuel intending to use the fuel “directly in the rendition of a public utility service” under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.02(B)(42)(a). The tax commissioner denied the exemption, finding that the business of AirNet, which does not hold a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the federal government, was not sufficiently regulated to qualify as a “public utility service.” The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision and remanded, holding that Epic should have an opportunity to present evidence to establish the portion of the jet fuel purchased by AirNet that is exempt from taxation under the common-carrier standard as clarified in this opinion. View "Epic Aviation, LLC v. Testa" on Justia Law

For tax years 2002 through 2007, Appellants filed no Ohio tax returns, contending that income was earned outside Ohio. The tax commissioner assessed Ohio individual income tax against Appellants for the tax years at issue but initially failed to give notice of his reliance on the unrebutted presumption that Appellants were, in fact, Ohio residents and domiciliaries. Appellants challenged the commissioner’s assessment. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed, concluding that Appellants failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate an error in the commission’s final determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) all income of Ohio residents is taxable, regardless of where the income is earned or received; and (2) Appellants failed to prove that they do not have to pay the amounts assessed, despite the tax commissioner’s failure to give notice of his reliance on the presumption of Ohio residency. View "Krehnbrink v. Testa" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging several claims of error, including ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court dismissed Appellant’s petition because he had or has adequate remedies at law to raise these claims. Appellant appealed, challenging the appellate court’s dismissal of his habeas action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Appellant’s habeas case because Appellant had or has adequate remedies at law in the form of direct appeal and postconviction relief to raise his claims. View "Kneuss v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a complaint for a writ prohibiting the chief of the collections enforcement section of the Ohio attorney general’s office from enforcing a demand for Appellant to reimburse the state for money paid out of the Crime Victims Reparations Fund. The magistrate recommended dismissing the writ on grounds that Appellant failed to comply with the mandatory filing requirements for seeking a waiver of prepaying full filing fees. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in dismissing Appellant’s complaint for noncompliance with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C)(1); and (2) Appellant waived all but plain error and failed to preserve his sole argument. View "State ex rel. Ralios v. Iannotta" on Justia Law

After the mayor of Streetsboro resigned, Arthur Scott was appointed to serve as acting mayor. Five months later, Scott was elected to serve for the remainder of the former mayor’s term. Following his reelection, Scott filed a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that he was underpaid for his service as mayor and acting mayor and that he was entitled to compensation for unused vacation, sick, and personal leave. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Streetsboro. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant Scott’s motion to strike several documents that Streetsboro attached to its response to Scott’s motion for summary judgment; (2) did not err in granting summary judgment to Streetsboro regarding Scott’s entitlement to additional pay for his service as acting mayor and as the elected mayor of the city; but (3) erred in granting summary judgment to Streetsboro as to Scott’s entitlement to compensation for unused vacation, sick, and personal leave. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Scott v. Streetsboro" on Justia Law

A complaint was filed in juvenile court alleging that A.G. was delinquent for engaging in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted aggravated robbery and kidnapping, with firearms specifications as to each. A.G. admitted to the allegations in the complaint. The juvenile court found the allegations proved beyond a reasonable doubt and ordered that A.G. be committed to the Department of Youth Services for minimum terms of one year for each of the aggravated robbery and kidnapping adjudications. A.G. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred in failing to merge his adjudications for aggravated robbery and kidnapping as “allied offenses of similar import” and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the allied-offenses issue. The Court of Appeals denied relief, concluding that the aggravated robbery and kidnapping would constituted allied offenses of similar import under Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25 if committed by an adult but that criminal statutes do not apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that juvenile courts must conduct the same double-jeopardy analysis in delinquency proceedings that other courts apply in adult criminal proceedings to protect a child’s right against double jeopardy. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

Under the prior version of R.C. 3519.01(A), if the attorney general certified the summary of a proposal to change the law or amend the constitution as fair and truthful, that proposal would be filed with the secretary of state and supporters could begin circulating petitions. The section now provides that a petition is transferred to the Ballot Board, not to the secretary of state, for review after certification, and that “[o]nly one proposal of law or constitutional amendment to be proposed by initiative petition shall be contained in an initiative petition to enable the voters to vote on that proposal separately.” If the Board determines that the petition contains more than one proposed law or constitutional amendment, it must divide the petition into individual petitions and certify its approval to the attorney general; supporters must submit separate summaries for approval. The Board divided Ethics First’s submission into three separate proposed amendments. Ethics First brought a mandamus petition. After holding that it had jurisdiction, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The modest imposition posed by requiring new summaries does not unduly restrict the right of initiative, The “separate petitions” requirement is not content-based. It applies to all petitions. View "Ethics First-You Decide Ohio Political Action Comm.. v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Attorneys employed by the Franklin County Public Defender sought membership and service credit in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System for their years of service prior to January 1999, and challenged a decision the Ohio Public Employees Retirement Board’s denial of service credit. Persons hired by the Franklin County Public Defender on or before December 31, 1984, are public employees entitled to PERS benefits; effective January 1, 1999, the Franklin County Public Defender’s employees have been enrolled in and considered to be members of PERS. During the intervening years, pursuant to the Ohio Public Defender Act (R.C. Chapter 120), the Franklin County Public Defender Commission and its employees paid Social Security taxes on wages and did not consider the office to be a county agency. The Court of Appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a writ of mandamus to compel the board to award service credit, rejecting an argument that “there was no person holding the office of Franklin County Public Defender between 1985 and 1999 because a person was appointed as the ‘Director’ of the corporation. The plain language in R.C. 120.14(A)(1) indicates that the attorneys were employed by a public official, and hence, were public employees. View "Altman-Bates v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant, convicted of kidnapping, felonious assault, and two counts of rape, challenged the dismissal of his petition for habeas relief, contending that he was not served with an arrest warrant or initial charging papers prior to his allegedly unlawful arrest and thus, that the Erie County Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction to convict and sentence him. The court affirmed the judgment because a challenge to the sufficiency or validity of an indictment is not cognizable in habeas corpus. Furthermore, appellant was charged with the criminal offenses of which he was convicted by an indictment, and he had an adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal to challenge his convictions by raising the sufficiency of that indictment. View "Jury v. Miller" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. A majority of this court affirmed the conviction but vacated the death sentence. Before that decision was released, appellant filed an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen his direct appeal in the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which was denied. Appellant then filed an appeal of right with this court. At issue is whether appellant was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. Based on State v. Maxwell, the court held that failure to challenge the state expert forensic pathologist's testimony or the autopsy report was not ineffective representation, because any such challenge would have failed as a matter of law. The court rejected the following six claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel: failure to object to the court's questioning of the state witnesses; failure to object to prejudicial comments made by a witness for the state; failure to make a record; failure to object to the removal of prospective juror Nos. 11 and 31; failure to present expert psychological testimony during the mitigation phase; and failure to object to the autopsy report or the testimony of the pathologist. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant. The court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law