Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State filed a complaint against D.S. in the juvenile court, alleging that D.S., who was seventeen years old, was delinquent for approaching a couple about to enter their home, brandishing a firearm, and robbing them of their possessions. At the time of the juvenile court’s disposition, D.S. had been held for more than nine months in detention. Defendant requested confinement credit, but the juvenile court denied the request. D.S. appealed. The State conceded that the juvenile court erred in not granting D.S. credit for the time he was confined prior to disposition. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 2152.18(B) requires that predisposition confinement be credited to a juvenile. Remanded for further proceedings, including the proper calculation and award of preconfinement credit. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder, among other offenses. Appellant was sentenced to two life terms of incarceration, to run consecutively. Appellant filed in the trial court in his criminal case a motion to modify his sentence, asserting that he should have been sentenced as if he had been convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. Appellant further argued that, under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.61(A), none of his sentences should have been greater than one to twenty years and that they should have been imposed to run concurrently rather than consecutively. The trial judge overruled the motion. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus based on the same argument he made in his motion to modify his sentence. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Appellant’s argument misinterpreted section 2929.61(A), sentencing errors are generally not remediable by extraordinary writ, and Defendant had access to an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. View "State ex rel. Ridenour v. O'Connell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of attempted murder and several other offenses. Appellant now filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was convicted of attempted felony murder and that because the Supreme Court determined in State v. Nolan that attempted felony murder is not a crime in Ohio, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict him. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that Appellant did not allege a defect in the subject-matter jurisdiction of the sentencing court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction over Appellant’s case and, moreover, Appellant could not argue that his conviction for attempted murder was void under Nolan because he committed, and was convicted of, attempted murder. View "State ex rel. Nichols v. Eppinger" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of creating nudity-oriented material involving a minor, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.323(A)(1), and possession of criminal tools, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2923.24(A). The convictions arose from Defendant surreptitiously recording video of a eleven-year-old female while she was undressed in a bathroom. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court did not apply the proper definition of nudity in convicting him of violating section 2907.323(A)(1). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, with respect to section 2907.323(A)(1), the statutory definition of nudity applies, rather than the narrower definition set forth in State v. Young. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

Jefferson Industries Corporation filed a complaint challenging the valuation for tax year 2011 of a plant involved in manufacturing and stamping car frames. The Madison County Auditor valued the property at $34,500,000. On appeal, the Madison County Board of Revision (BOR) adjusted the valuation to $28,000,000. Jefferson Industries again appealed and offered its appraisal valuation of $10,420,000. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) agreed with the BOR’s value, largely on the basis of the Jefferson Local School District Board of Education’s (BOE) appraisal. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the BTA, holding that the BTA did not explicitly address important evidentiary conflicts but should have. Remanded to the BTA to reconsider the evidence in light of particular objections that were raised to the BOE’s appraisal but were not addressed by the BTA. View "Jefferson Indus. Corp. v. Madison County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Sensible Norwood was a political-action committee established to support an initiative proposing an ordinance to decriminalize hashish and marijuana in the City of Norwood. The Hamilton County Board of Elections voted unanimously not to place the proposed ordinance on the ballot for the November 8, 2016 election, reasoning that it attempted to enact felony offenses and to impose administrative restrictions on the enforcement of existing laws. Sensible Norwood and its founder (together, Relators) initiated this action as an expedited election matter seeking a writ of mandamus to require the Board to place the proposed ordinance on the ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relators failed to establish a clear legal right to the requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of the Board to provide it. View "State ex rel. Sensible Norwood v. Hamilton County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Schottenstein Real Estate Group filed a rezoning application seeking a mixed-use designation for three parcels of land, two owned by Paul and Mary Jacquemin and a third owned by Arthur and Elizabeth Wesner. The Jerome Township Board of Trustees adopted a resolution approving the rezoning. Thereafter, opponents of the resolution delivered a referendum petition to the township fiscal officer. The Jacquemins filed a protest of the petition with the Union County Board of Elections, and the Wesners filed a separate protest. The Jerome Township Board of Trustees voted to deny the protests and to place the referendum issue on the November 8, 2016 general election ballot. The Jacquemins sought extraordinary relief to prevent the Board from placing the referendum on the ballot. The Supreme Court granted the request for a writ of mandamus, holding that the Board clearly disregarded the applicable legal standard for reviewing petition summaries, as the petition summary in this case was misleading and could not form the basis to submit this issue to a vote. View "State ex rel. Jacquemin v. Union County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

In March 2016, Mike Schadek, an Upper Arlington City Council member, resigned his council seat, and in May, 2016, the Upper Arlington City Council appointed Sue Ralph as Schadek’s replacement. Omar Ganoom filed an election complaint seeking a writ of mandamus against the Franklin County Board of Elections and certain Upper Arlington respondents, alleging that there must be an election in November 2016 with the winner to serve in the vacated council seat until Schadek’s term expires in January 2020 and that Ganoom had taken all the steps necessary to appear on the ballot as a candidate. The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part the writ, holding (1) the Upper Arlington City Charter imposes a clear legal duty upon the city of Upper Arlington to fill Schadek’s seat for its unexpired term at the November 2016 election; and (2) because the matter had not reached the Board of Elections, no relief is granted against the Board. View "State ex rel. Ganoom v. Franklin County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a declaratory-judgment action against Defendant, seeking to quiet title to a mineral interest. At issue between the parties was whether the 1989 version of the Dormant Mineral Act or the 2006 version of the Act applied in this case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the 1989 version of the Act applied, and therefore, Defendant, the owner of the severed mineral estate, did not preserve his rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, the 2006 version of the Act applied in this case; and (2) based on Dodd v. Croskey, Defendant preserved his mineral rights. View "Walker v. Shondrick-Nau" on Justia Law

Nile and Katheryn Batman claimed to hold an interest in minerals underlying the properties owned by Wayne Lipperman and the estate of James Albanese (“Albanese”). Albanese and Lipperman filed separate actions seeking to quiet title to their respective properties, claiming that the severed mineral interests held by the Batmans had been abandoned. Albanese and Lipperman also sought to cancel any oil and gas leases executed in relation to the Batmans’ interests in their properties. The trial court granted summary judgment against Albanese and Lipperman. The court of appeals affirmed in both cases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (ODMA) applies in these cases; and (2) because neither Albanese nor Lipperman complied with the notice and affidavit requirements in the ODMA, the mineral interests are preserved in favor of their holder, the Batmans. View "Albanese v. Batman" on Justia Law