Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee was charged with rape and kidnapping. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on unconstitutional preindictment delay. The court of common pleas dismissed the charges, concluding that the State’s indictment of Appellee one day before the expiration of the applicable twenty-year statute of limitations prejudiced Appellee. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Appellee suffered actual prejudice as a result of the nearly twenty-year delay between the alleged offenses and the indictment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals applied an incorrect standard in its analysis of Appellee’s preindictment-delay claim. Remanded. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was property owned by Innkeeper Ministries, Inc. that contained two large residential buildings and various recreational amenities. Innkeeper’s mission was to invite religious leaders to stay at the property at no charge and to enjoy the amenities and free meals as a type of spiritual retreat. Innkeeper filed an exemption application in 2008 seeking an exemption for, inter alia, charitable use. The tax commissioner denied exemption, stating, as for charitable use, that the activity at issue did not meet the charity standard. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, given the residential use of the property by a caretaker couple, the BTA erred by failing to require proof of the primacy of charitable hospitality. View "Innkeeper Ministries, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of a motorcycle accident involving a Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) utility pole. Plaintiff and his wife sued CEI, FirstEnergy Service Company (First Energy), and their parent company (collectively, Defendants), asserting, inter alia, claims for negligence and qualified nuisance. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs on their qualified nuisance and loss of consortium claims but returned a verdict for CEI and FirstEnergy on the negligence claim. Defendants appealed, arguing that Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. provided an absolute bar to liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, CEI and FirstEnergy could not be held liable under any theory of liability asserted by Plaintiffs. View "Link v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

Manuel Perez was injured while working in the construction industry and was awarded temporary-total-disability compensation. Prior to his injury, Perez owned and was operating an auto-repair business. Years later, the Industrial Commission of Ohio determined that Perez was overpaid temporary-total-disability compensation for more than four years and that he committed fraud in applying for it. The court of appeals affirmed the Commission’s finding of an overpayment and dismissed the fraud finding for insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion (1) in finding that Perez had been overpaid compensation while operating his auto-repair business; and (2) when it concluded that the evidence supported a finding of fraud. View "State ex rel. Perez v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After Michael Onderko was terminated from Sierra Lobo, Inc. for his “deceptive” attempt to obtain workers’ compensation benefits for a “non-work-related injury,” Onderko filed a complaint against Sierra Lobo, alleging retaliatory discharge. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sierra Lobo on the grounds that Onderko failed to prove that his injury occurred at the workplace. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a workplace injury is not a required element of a retaliatory discharge claim under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under section 4123.90 does not require a showing that the plaintiff suffered a workplace injury; and (2) failure to appeal the denial of a workers’ compensation claim does not foreclose a claim for retaliatory discharge under section 4123.90. View "Onderko v. Sierra Lobo, Inc." on Justia Law

School Choice Ohio, Inc., a private nonprofit corporation that informs parents about educational opportunities for their children, sent a public-records request to Springfield City School District seeking information regarding students enrolled in the school in the district during the 2013-2014 academic year. Springfield denied the request based on a student-information policy it had adopted that required parental written consent before Springfield would release certain student information. School Choice filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus compelling Springfield to produce the requested information and to amend Springfield’s student-information policy. The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part the complaint and ordered Springfield to provide the requested records that pertain to students whose parents had signed Springfield’s consent form and that fell within the categories of personally identifiable information identified in Springfield’s consent form, holding (1) School Choice had a clear legal right to access the personally identifiable information of Springfield’s students whose parents had consented to the release of the information; and (2) School Choice failed to establish a clear legal right to compel Springfield to amend its student-information policy. View "State ex rel. Sch. Choice Ohio, Inc. v. Cincinnati Pub. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Appellant, a property owner, applied to exempt real property used as a public community school for tax year 2010. The tax commissioner denied the exemption to the property that Appellant leased to the community school. Appellant appealed, arguing that because it was wholly owned by a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation whose members include the community school to whom the property is leased, the property should qualify for exemption under the public-schoolhouse exemption and an exemption for exclusive charitable use. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of an exemption, concluding that the record showed a “view to profit” on the part of the lessor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained sufficient support for the BTA’s view-to-profit finding. View "250 Shoup Mill, LLC v. Testa" on Justia Law

As the result of an audit, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation reclassified some of Aaron’s Inc.’s employees for purposes of workers’ compensation premiums, applied the reclassifications retroactively, and billed Aaron’s for more than $2 million in back premiums. Aaron’s filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the Bureau abused its discretion by failing adequately to explain why it decided to apply the reclassifications retroactively and not solely prospectively as Aaron’s had advocated. The administrator’s designee concluded that the Bureau properly exercised its discretion to apply the reclassification retroactively. Aaron’s subsequently filed the instant complaint seeking a writ of mandamus regarding the order of the administrator’s designee. A magistrate concluded that the administrator’s designee appropriately exercised his discretion in ordering the reclassifications to be applied retroactively. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s decision and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bureau did not abuse its discretion when it applied the audit adjustment to the twenty-four months prior to the current payroll period. View "State ex rel. Aaron's, Inc. v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

During Husband and Wife’s divorce proceedings, the trial court entered a decree of dissolution approving and incorporating a separation agreement that the parties entered into. The agreement provided that Husband pay spousal support to Wife for her lifetime. Husband later filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B), requesting that the spousal support order be vacated because his annual income had decreased significantly. The trial court dismissed Husband’s motion, concluding that Rule 60(B) relief was not available because the trial court had not retained jurisdiction to modify the spousal support award. The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed but certified that its holding was in direct conflict with the holding of the Tenth District in Noble v. Noble. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a trial court does not have jurisdiction under Rule 60(B) to vacate or modify an award of spousal support in a decree of divorce or dissolution where the decree does not contain a reservation of jurisdiction to modify the award of spousal support pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 3105.18(E). View "Morris v. Morris" on Justia Law

Steve Maddox and eight other named relators (collectively, Maddox) brought this original action in mandamus against the village of Lincoln Heights and several of the village’s officials (collectively, the village). Maddox alleged that several classes of people who work for or have worked for the village had not been provided employee benefits owed to them and requested a writ directing the village to provide the withheld benefits. The parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement consisting of money payments to class members. The Supreme Court referred the case to mediation, with instructions for the parties to attempt an out-of-court settlement without court approval, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to preside over this monetary settlement because no class had yet been certified and nothing prevented the parties from settling the case without the approval of the Court. View "State ex rel. Maddox v. Village of Lincoln Heights" on Justia Law