Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

As the result of an audit, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation reclassified some of Aaron’s Inc.’s employees for purposes of workers’ compensation premiums, applied the reclassifications retroactively, and billed Aaron’s for more than $2 million in back premiums. Aaron’s filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the Bureau abused its discretion by failing adequately to explain why it decided to apply the reclassifications retroactively and not solely prospectively as Aaron’s had advocated. The administrator’s designee concluded that the Bureau properly exercised its discretion to apply the reclassification retroactively. Aaron’s subsequently filed the instant complaint seeking a writ of mandamus regarding the order of the administrator’s designee. A magistrate concluded that the administrator’s designee appropriately exercised his discretion in ordering the reclassifications to be applied retroactively. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s decision and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bureau did not abuse its discretion when it applied the audit adjustment to the twenty-four months prior to the current payroll period. View "State ex rel. Aaron's, Inc. v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

During Husband and Wife’s divorce proceedings, the trial court entered a decree of dissolution approving and incorporating a separation agreement that the parties entered into. The agreement provided that Husband pay spousal support to Wife for her lifetime. Husband later filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B), requesting that the spousal support order be vacated because his annual income had decreased significantly. The trial court dismissed Husband’s motion, concluding that Rule 60(B) relief was not available because the trial court had not retained jurisdiction to modify the spousal support award. The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed but certified that its holding was in direct conflict with the holding of the Tenth District in Noble v. Noble. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a trial court does not have jurisdiction under Rule 60(B) to vacate or modify an award of spousal support in a decree of divorce or dissolution where the decree does not contain a reservation of jurisdiction to modify the award of spousal support pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 3105.18(E). View "Morris v. Morris" on Justia Law

Steve Maddox and eight other named relators (collectively, Maddox) brought this original action in mandamus against the village of Lincoln Heights and several of the village’s officials (collectively, the village). Maddox alleged that several classes of people who work for or have worked for the village had not been provided employee benefits owed to them and requested a writ directing the village to provide the withheld benefits. The parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement consisting of money payments to class members. The Supreme Court referred the case to mediation, with instructions for the parties to attempt an out-of-court settlement without court approval, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to preside over this monetary settlement because no class had yet been certified and nothing prevented the parties from settling the case without the approval of the Court. View "State ex rel. Maddox v. Village of Lincoln Heights" on Justia Law

Bank filed this foreclosure action against Debtors. Debtors counterclaimed, alleging that Bank did not own the promissory note or the mortgage at the time it commenced the foreclosure action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Bank, finding that Bank was the holder of the note and the assignee of the mortgage prior to the commencement of the action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) only the current holder of both the note and the mortgage has standing to file a foreclosure action, and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Bank owned the note at the time it commenced the foreclosure action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when debt on a promissory note secured by a mortgage has been discharged by a bankruptcy court, the holder of the mortgage has standing to foreclose on the property and to collect the deficiency on the note from the foreclosure sale of the property; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding any of the elements of Bank’s foreclosure action. View "Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Holden" on Justia Law

A circuit court in Boone County, Kentucky entered a multimillion dollar judgment against Stanley Chesley, a former attorney, for his conduct in a class action lawsuit that eventually settled. Chesley filed suit in Ohio state court seeking an injunction to prevent Respondents from collecting on the judgment and to relitigate the case. The Hamilton County Common Pleas Court Judge Robert Ruehlman acted outside its jurisdiction to repeatedly shield Chesley and his assets from creditors. Relator Angela Ford filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to preclude Judge Ruehlman from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the Hamilton County case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition and ordered the judge to vacate his orders, holding that Judge Ruehlman had no statutory authority to grant relief in this case. View "State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman" on Justia Law

Consumer, an Ohio resident, defaulted on credit-card debt. Consumer was sued by the entities that purchased her debt in an effort to collect on the debt. Consumer counterclaimed, alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA). The trial court entered judgment against Consumer. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the underlying cause of action for default on the credit card in this case accrued in Delaware, the home state of the bank that issued the credit card and where Consumer’s payments were made; (2) Delaware’s statute of limitations determines whether the collection action was timely filed; (3) the filing of a time-barred collection action may form the basis of a violation under the FDCPA and the OSCPA; (4) a consumer can bring actionable claims under the FDCPA and the OSCPA based upon debt collectors’ representations made to courts in legal filings; and (5) debt buyers collecting on credit-card debt and their attorneys are subject to the OSCPA. View "Taylor v. First Resolution Inv. Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging constitutional violations with regard to his conviction and requesting the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate the propriety of the criminal proceedings brought against him. Appellant filed an affidavit of indigence requesting a waiver of fees and costs but failed to comply with the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C)(1). The court of appeals’ magistrate recommended that the court dismiss the case for Appellant’s failure to satisfy the statutory requirements. The court of appeals accepted and adopted the magistrate’s decision and recommendation and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the case on the basis recommended by the magistrate. View "State ex rel. Davenport v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him because of several alleged errors. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that Appellant had adequate remedies at law. Appellant appealed and filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, holding that the claims or which Appellant sought relief were not cognizable in habeas corpus and Appellant had, and has used, adequate remedies at law to assert those claims; and (2) denied Appellant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing as moot. View "State ex rel. Gibson v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to nineteen years in prison. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging several claims of error. The court of appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the form of an appeal and a postconviction motion for relief. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claims for which Appellant sought relief were not cognizable in habeas corpus and that Appellant possessed an alternative remedy at law to assert those claims. View "State ex rel. Rackley v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of gross sexual imposition and was sentenced to eighteen months in prison. After serving his prison sentence, Appellant was released but was still subject to the reporting requirements that were imposed because he was adjudicated a sexual predator. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeals seeking an order striking his reclassification as a sexual predator applied under Megan’s Law and the AWA Act. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant was not in prison or otherwise restrained of his liberty, he was not eligible for habeas corpus relief. View "Cook v. State" on Justia Law