Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant filed a petition in the court of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus against Judge Christopher Gee and the Miami County Court of Common Pleas. Specifically, Appellant sought a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Gee to grant him an appeal as of right in his underlying criminal case and to appoint counsel to represent him in the appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of Judge Gee to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. View "State ex rel. Cain v. Gee" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to gross sexual imposition and was sentenced to sixteen months’ imprisonment. In addition, the trial court imposed five years of mandatory postrelease control. In 2014, Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted failure to provide a notice of change of address and was sentenced to one year. The trial court also imposed a prison term for the remainder of the period of postrelease control that Appellant was serving for the gross sexual imposition conviction. Appellant did not appeal. Appellant later filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking a writ ordering Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Kathleen A. Sutula to vacate his sentence for violating the terms of his postrelease control because he was not advised of the possibility of this sentence at his prior sentencing. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for Judge Sutula. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, a writ of mandamus was unavailable. View "State ex rel. Cornwall v. Sutula" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of burglary and other offenses and has been released on parole and convicted of new crimes at least five times. Appellant has filed at least three habeas corpus petition over the years, all of which have been denied. In 2015, Appellant filed the habeas petition that is the subject of this appeal, alleging primarily that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the indictment for his 1979 conviction was not proper. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s habeas petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that habeas corpus was not an appropriate avenue for challenging the validity of an indictment, that Appellant could have raised his arguments in a direct appeal, that Appellant’s petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and that Appellant’s habeas petition was defective. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. LaRose" on Justia Law

This case arose after the City of Cleveland granted a production company a permit to close a portion of a street in downtown Cleveland for sixteen consecutive days so that the company could film scenes for a movie. The street’s closure cut off access to one of two entrances to a parking lot owned by Cuyahoga Lakefront Land, LLC (“Lakefront”) during the permit period. Lakefront brought this original action in the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which found that Cleveland had taken Lakefront’s property without just compensation and issued a writ of mandamus ordering Cleveland to commence appropriation proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no writ should issue because Lakefront failed to show that the temporary loss of access to one of the two entrances to the parking lot was a compensable taking of its property. View "State ex rel. Cuyahoga Lakefront, L.L.C. v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Respondents filed a lawsuit against Petitioners, asserting a claim for negligent misidentification. Petitioners filed motions for judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, to certify questions of state law to the Supreme Court asserting that a claim of negligent misidentification sounds in defamation, and, under the one-year statute of limitations for defamation, Respondents’ claim was time-barred. The federal district court certified three questions of law to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held (1) a plaintiff does not have a cause of action in tort for negligent misidentification, and it would contravene public policy to allow such a claim; and (2) because no cause of action for negligent misidentification exists in Ohio, the certified questions are moot. View "Foley v. University of Dayton" on Justia Law

New York Frozen Foods, Inc. filed its Bedford Heights income-tax returns on a separate-entity basis for tax years 2005 through 2007. In 2010, Frozen Foods and its affiliates filed consolidated amended returns for the same tax years and claimed a refund of taxes it had previously paid based on its separate returns. Regional Income Tax Agency, acting in its capacity as the city’s tax administrator, denied the refund. The Bedford Heights Income tax Board of Review affirmed the denial of refunds. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed, agreeing that the amended returns were improper. Frozen Foods appealed. Bedford Heights cross-appealed, arguing that the BTA erred by failing to deny the refund on an alternative ground. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision to deny Frozen Foods’ claim for a refund on the alternate ground that the city ordinance barred a change from a separate return to a consolidated return when filing an amended return because the change constituted a “change in method of accounting” prohibited by the ordinance. View "New York Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Bedford Heights Income Tax Board of Review" on Justia Law

Respondents, landowner-lessors, filed a putative class action in federal court claiming that Petitioner, the lessee, underpaid gas royalties under the terms of their leases. Under each lease, the lessee must bear all the production costs. The federal court certified to the Ohio Supreme Court a question regarding whether the lessee was permitted to deduct postproduction costs from the lessors’ royalties and, if so, how those costs were to be calculated. Specifically, the federal court asked the Supreme Court whether Ohio follows the “at the well” rule, which permits the deduction of post-production costs, or whether it follows some version of the “marketable product” rule, which limits the deduction of post-production costs under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question and dismissed the cause, holding (1) under Ohio law, an oil and gas lease is a contract that is subject to the traditional rules of contract construction; and (2) therefore, the rights and remedies of the parties in this case are controlled by the specific language of their lease agreement. View "Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In 2000, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio first approved a corporate separation plan for Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, now known as Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. Over the next decade, the Commission approved a series of amendments to the plan. In 2014, Duke filed an application for approval of a fourth amended corporate separation plan, which sought approval to commence offering nonelectric products and services to its customers. The Commission approved Duke’s application. Interstate Gas Supply, Inc. appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the Commission’s orders violated Ohio Rev. Code 4903.09, a statute requiring the Commission to file written opinions setting forth the reasons for its decision in all contested cases. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the Commission violated section 4903.09 by failing to set forth in its order its reasons in sufficient details to enable the Supreme Court to determine how it reached its decision. Remanded. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for Approval of its Fourth Amended Corporate Separation Plan" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder with firearm specifications. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was denied. Appellant then made a request for additional discovery and filed motions to compel discovery. Appellant subsequently filed a petition in mandamus requesting a writ ordering the Hamilton County prosecutor to produce the discovery relevant to his case. The court of appeals dismissed the petition on the grounds that the issues raised in the petition had been decided on direct appeal and in the appeal of the denial of Appellant’s petition for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor had no legal duty to provide discovery, and Appellant had no legal right to discovery; and (2) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, precluding mandamus. View "State ex rel. Littlepage v. Deters" on Justia Law

Albany Commons Ltd., the owner of a 240-unit apartment complex, filed a complaint for tax year 2005 seeking a reduction from the auditor’s valuation of $13,600,000 to $9,720,000. At a hearing before the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR), Albany Commons presented an appraisal by James Horner, a certified appraiser, that proposed a property valuation of $9,338,000. The BOR adopted Horner’s valuation. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopted Horner’s appraisal valuation without adjustment and without discussion of other issues raised by the BOE. BOE again appealed, arguing that the absence of market data from the appraisal report and other flaws in the appraisal rendered the appraisal defective and unreliable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BOE did not establish an abuse of discretion in the BTA’s decision to credit Horner’s testimony and report. View "Columbus City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law