Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Schottenstein Real Estate Group filed a rezoning application seeking a mixed-use designation for three parcels of land, two owned by Paul and Mary Jacquemin and a third owned by Arthur and Elizabeth Wesner. The Jerome Township Board of Trustees adopted a resolution approving the rezoning. Thereafter, opponents of the resolution delivered a referendum petition to the township fiscal officer. The Jacquemins filed a protest of the petition with the Union County Board of Elections, and the Wesners filed a separate protest. The Jerome Township Board of Trustees voted to deny the protests and to place the referendum issue on the November 8, 2016 general election ballot. The Jacquemins sought extraordinary relief to prevent the Board from placing the referendum on the ballot. The Supreme Court granted the request for a writ of mandamus, holding that the Board clearly disregarded the applicable legal standard for reviewing petition summaries, as the petition summary in this case was misleading and could not form the basis to submit this issue to a vote. View "State ex rel. Jacquemin v. Union County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

In March 2016, Mike Schadek, an Upper Arlington City Council member, resigned his council seat, and in May, 2016, the Upper Arlington City Council appointed Sue Ralph as Schadek’s replacement. Omar Ganoom filed an election complaint seeking a writ of mandamus against the Franklin County Board of Elections and certain Upper Arlington respondents, alleging that there must be an election in November 2016 with the winner to serve in the vacated council seat until Schadek’s term expires in January 2020 and that Ganoom had taken all the steps necessary to appear on the ballot as a candidate. The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part the writ, holding (1) the Upper Arlington City Charter imposes a clear legal duty upon the city of Upper Arlington to fill Schadek’s seat for its unexpired term at the November 2016 election; and (2) because the matter had not reached the Board of Elections, no relief is granted against the Board. View "State ex rel. Ganoom v. Franklin County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a declaratory-judgment action against Defendant, seeking to quiet title to a mineral interest. At issue between the parties was whether the 1989 version of the Dormant Mineral Act or the 2006 version of the Act applied in this case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the 1989 version of the Act applied, and therefore, Defendant, the owner of the severed mineral estate, did not preserve his rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, the 2006 version of the Act applied in this case; and (2) based on Dodd v. Croskey, Defendant preserved his mineral rights. View "Walker v. Shondrick-Nau" on Justia Law

Nile and Katheryn Batman claimed to hold an interest in minerals underlying the properties owned by Wayne Lipperman and the estate of James Albanese (“Albanese”). Albanese and Lipperman filed separate actions seeking to quiet title to their respective properties, claiming that the severed mineral interests held by the Batmans had been abandoned. Albanese and Lipperman also sought to cancel any oil and gas leases executed in relation to the Batmans’ interests in their properties. The trial court granted summary judgment against Albanese and Lipperman. The court of appeals affirmed in both cases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (ODMA) applies in these cases; and (2) because neither Albanese nor Lipperman complied with the notice and affidavit requirements in the ODMA, the mineral interests are preserved in favor of their holder, the Batmans. View "Albanese v. Batman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants seeking to quiet title to oil and gas rights under his surface lands and requesting a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and compensation for conversion. The federal district court concluded that its ruling on the parties’ motions for summary judgment required a clarification of two areas of Ohio law and certified these questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) the 2006 version of the Dormant Mineral Act, rather than the 1989 version of the Act, applies to all claims asserted after June 30, 2006 alleging that the rights to minerals vested in the surface land holder prior to the 2006 amendments as a result of abandonment; and (2) a payment of a delay rental during the primary of an oil and gas lease is neither a title transaction nor a savings event under the Act. View "Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC" on Justia Law

Paul Bunting sought a writ of mandamus ordering Tuscarawas County Prosecuting Attorney Ryan Styer to prosecute Thomas Weaver for theft of a motorcycle. The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the complaint after the prosecutor untimely filed a motion to dismiss. Bunting appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint because Styer’s failure to prosecute in this case was not an abuse of discretion, and therefore, Bunting did not have a clear legal right to a writ. View "State ex rel. Bunting v. Styer" on Justia Law

Appellant sought a writ of procedendo requiring Judge Kelly Cottrill to rule on his motion to vacate or set aside the judgment of his conviction. Judge Cottrill had ruled on Appellant’s motion but failed to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition, finding that the petition was moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ of procedendo was inappropriate because Judge Cottrill did not refuse to enter judgment but, rather, Appellant was dissatisfied with the entry that she issued. View "State ex rel. Poulton v. Cottrill" on Justia Law

In 2016, Defendant was indicted of several offenses. Before trial, the prosecuting attorney obtained a second indictment. The trial court subsequently granted the State’s motion to dismiss the first indictment. Defendant then pleaded guilty to five counts of gross sexual imposition charged in the second indictment. Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the doctrine of res judicata precluded his convictions because his first indictment was dismissed with prejudice and included the same charges and was based on the same facts and circumstances as the second indictment. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that Defendant’s argument was a double jeopardy claim and that double jeopardy claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the first indictment was dismissed not on the merits but to prevent a double jeopardy violation, the doctrine of res judicata did not preclude Defendant’s convictions. View "State ex rel. Steele v. Eppinger" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant was indicted for murder. After a series of mistrials that were declared in Defendant’s case during the fourteen years since his arrest, Defendant moved to dismiss his indictment, alleging a violation of the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a mistrial or hung jury does not bar retrial or retrials. Defendant appealed, arguing that yet another trial would violate the “fair play” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a double jeopardy challenge to the retrial of a defendant following a mistrial is analyzed under the Double Jeopardy Clause rather than the Due Process Clause; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a defendant’s retrial after several mistrials have been properly declared. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and aggravated murder. After the mitigation phase and the jury recommendation, the trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the aggravated murder. Defendant appealed, raising twenty-one propositions of law. The Supreme Court rejected each of Defendant’s propositions and affirmed his convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) no prejudicial error occurred during the pretrial phase; (2) there was no prejudicial error in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings; (3) the jury instructions and verdict forms did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights; (4) cumulative prosecutorial conduct did not violate Defendant’s due process rights; (5) trial counsel provided effective assistance; (6) nothing in the record supported Defendant’s claim of trial court bias; and (7) Defendant’s death sentence was proportionate and appropriate. View "State v. McKelton" on Justia Law