Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Joseph Gorman contracted with James Wilson to purchase a fifteen percent interest in Marine 1, LLC for $300,000. At the time Gorman died, he owed Wilson $187,000 on the contract. The probate court appointed William Lawrence as the executor of Gorman’s estate. The estate’s counsel was Joseph Goldsmith. Wilson’s attorney sent a letter addressed to both Gorman’s personal secretary and the trustee of his trust, purporting to present Wilson’s claim for approximately $200,000 to the executor of Gorman’s estate. The letter was then forwarded to Goldsmith and Lawrence. The trial judge found that the letter was not legally sufficient for presenting Wilson’s claim and granted the estate’s motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Ohio law permits a claim against an estate to be deemed presented when “other individuals connected with the estate receive the claim[.]” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a claimant against an estate does not meet the mandatory requirement under Ohio Rev. Code 2117.06(A)(1)(a) to present a claim to the executor or administrator of an estate if the claimant delivers the claim to a person not appointed by the probate court, even if that person gives it to the executor or administrator. View "Wilson v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary. Before Defendant’s trial was to begin, the court confirmed that Defendant had been offered and rejected a plea offer. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty. Following a sentencing hearing, the court imposed a six-year term of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court vindictively imposed a sentence in retaliation for the exercise of his right to a jury trial in violation of his due process rights. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is no presumption of vindictiveness when, after trial, a court sentences a defendant to a longer term than was offered by the state in plea negotiations; (2) an appellate court may reverse a sentence for vindictiveness only if, upon its examination of the entire record, it clearly and convincingly finds the sentence was based on actual vindictiveness; and (3) applying this standard, the trial court did not vindictively sentence Defendant. View "State v. Rahab" on Justia Law

The Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted five individuals with two misdemeanor counts of dereliction of duty. Thereafter, the city of East Cleveland filed an identical dereliction-of-duty charge against each of the defendants in the East Cleveland Municipal Court. The defendants filed a complaint requesting a writ of prohibition, seeking to prohibit Judge William L. Dawson of the municipal court from exercising jurisdiction over the identical dereliction-of-duty charges against each of the defendants. Thereafter, the county prosecutor moved to dismiss the indictments pending in the common pleas court. The common pleas court found that the duplicate charges filed in the municipal court constituted good cause for dismissal. The defendants amended their complaint in prohibition arguing that Judge Dawson and the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over their cases, that the common pleas court inappropriate dismissed the charges previously filed in that court, and that they could not appeal from those dismissals. The court of appeals granted the requested writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Judge Dawson did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to consider the indictments filed against the defendants in the municipal court and that the defendants had an adequate remedy at law in the form of appeal. View "State ex rel. Dailey v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling Appellee, a Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton county judge, to vacate his sentence as void and to resentencing him “according to the verdict returned by the jury.” The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus. Appellant appealed and also filed a motion for reversal of judgment under S. Ct. Prac. R. 16.07(B) claiming that he was entitled to judgment in his favor because the judge failed to file a brief in this appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant’s motion, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus; and (2) Appellant’s brief did not reasonably appear to sustain reversal. View "State ex rel. Bradford v. Dinkelacker" on Justia Law

Relator filed an original action in mandamus against the Cuyahoga County sheriff seeking to compel, pursuant to Ohio’s Public Records Act, the production of all offense or incident reports in the possession, custody or control of the sheriff’s office in which Edward Fitzgerald was identified as reported, complainant, or victim. Respondent, the public records manager for the sheriff, denied the request on the grounds that the records were security records pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 149.433(A)(1). The Supreme Court sua sponte ordered Respondents to submit the documents sought by Relator so the Court could review them in camera to determine which reports satisfied the definition of a “security record.” The Supreme Court granted the writ in part and denied it in part, concluding that certain records were not security records and were subject to release with the redaction of exempt information. View "State ex rel. Miller v. Pinkney" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were the proper valuations for tax year 2008 of two government-subsidized housing complexes in Franklin County. For each of the two properties, the property owner filed a complaint challenging the auditor’s 2008 valuations. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) rejected the appraisal evidence the property owner presented in support of a claimed reduction and adopted the auditor’s original valuation. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed and adopted the property owners’ appraisal valuations. The South-Western City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the BTA and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the BTA erred by failing to give any consideration to the contravening evidence presented by the BOE at the BTA hearing. View "Lutheran Social Services of Central Ohio Village Housing, Inc. v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

David Emerson owned two adjoining parcels of real property in Erie County. The Erie County auditor’s aggregate valuation of the two parcels for tax year 2011 was $328,270. Emerson challenged the valuations, arguing that his 2009 purchase of the parcels established lower true values because it was a recent arm’s-length transaction. The Erie County Board of Revision (BOR) retained the auditor’s valuation. On appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed the BOR’s decision and valued the property at $180,000 according to the sale price. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Emerson demonstrated a recent arm’s-length sale; and (2) the county cannot rebut the sale price with an appraisal. View "Emerson v. Erie County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The real property in this case was a manufacturing and distribution facility owned and operated by Johnson Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc. The Hamilton County auditor valued the property at $13,571,760 for tax year 2011. Coca-Cola filed a complaint seeking a reduction in value. The Hamilton County Board of Revision (BOR) rejected Coca-Cola’s complaint and retained the auditor’s valuation. On appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) increased the value to $14,000,000 based on a new appraisal submitted by the auditor. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision as modified to correct a clerical error, holding that the BTA’s decision was reasonable and lawful. View "Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hamilton County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant was an inmate at the London Correctional Institution, where he was serving the remainder of an indeterminate sentence since the Adult Parole Authority (APA) revoked his parole in 2014. In 2015, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus against Warden Terry Tibbals and the APA. Appellant requested an order requiring Tibbals to immediately release him from prison under the same conditions of his original parole; alternatively, an order compelling the APA to credit his time served from 2001 to 2011; and an order compelling the APA to grant him a new mitigation/revocation hearing with the appointment of counsel. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Tibbals and the APA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant had not served his maximum sentence and failed to show that he was being held unlawfully, the court of appeals correctly denied Appellant’s request for a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Appellant failed to prove his entitlement to a writ of mandamus by clear and convincing evidence. View "State ex rel. Marsh v. Tibbals" on Justia Law

In July 2015, the Delaware Joint Vocational School District Board of Education passed a resolution to submit a renewal levy to voters at the general election. On November 20, 2015, the Delaware County Board of Elections purported to certify the election result. The county auditor then delivered the abstract of tax rates to the tax commissioner to apply the reduction factors and calculate the tax rate for the school district. When the county auditor discovered that the Board of Elections had not certified the results of the levy using Form 5-U, however, the tax commissioner excluded the levy on the list of tax rates certified for collection to the county auditors in counties with territory in the school district, and the levy was not included on the property tax bills sent to property owners for the first half of tax year 2016. The school board brought this action in mandamus to compel the tax commissioner to apply the reduction factors and calculate the tax rates for the levy. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that because no proper certification of the multicounty election was presented to the tax commissioner demonstrating that the tax was authorized to be levied, the commissioner did not have a clear legal duty to apply reduction factors and calculate tax rates for this levy. View "State ex rel. Delaware Joint Vocational School District Board of Education v. Testa" on Justia Law