Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals erred on double jeopardy grounds in reversing the trial court’s decision to grant Appellants’ motions to dismiss an indictment that charged them with ethnic intimidation.Appellants filed their motions to dismiss the indictments brought against them in the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas because they had already been convicted in municipal court for aggravated menacing, which is the predicate offense for the charges of ethnic intimidation that were brought against them in the dismissed indictment. The Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the trial court, holding that, for double-jeopardy purposes, Appellants’ aggravated-menacing convictions were the same offenses as those charged in the dismissed indictment. View "State v. Mutter" on Justia Law

To validly impose postrelease control when the trial court orally provides all the required advisements at the sentencing hearing, the sentencing entry must contain certain required information.In 2011, the court of common pleas imposed postrelease control on Defendant as part of his sentence of convictions for robbery and vandalism. While Defendant was under postrelease control, he pled guilty to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a one-year prison term and imposed a judicial-sanction sentence converting the remainder of the postrelease-control term imposed for his 2011 conviction into prison time. After Defendant completed his prison term for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, he moved the trial court to vacate his judicial-sanction sentence and order his release from prison, arguing that the court did not validly impose postrelease control when it sentenced him for his 2011 convictions. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that the sentencing entry in this case included all of the required information. View "State v. Grimes" on Justia Law

In State v. Aalim, __ N.E.3d __ (Aalim I), the Supreme Court declared that the Ohio Constitution requires that a juvenile who is subject to mandatory bindover receive an amenability hearing. Implicit in this holding was the conclusion that a juvenile-division judge has discretion in deciding whether to transfer to adult court a juvenile in a case where the juvenile is sixteen or seventeen years old and there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed an offense outlined in Ohio Rev. Code 2152.10(A)(2)(b). The Supreme Court then granted the State’s motion for reconsideration, holding that the decision in Aalim I usurped the General Assembly’s exclusive constitutional authority to define the jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas by impermissibly allowing a juvenile division judge discretion to veto the legislature’s grant of jurisdiction to the general division of a court of common pleas over a limited class of juvenile offenders. The court further held that the mandatory bindover of certain juvenile to adult court under Ohio Rev. Code 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b) does not violate the due course of law clause or the equal protection clause of the Ohio Constitution or the analogous provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "State v. Aalim" on Justia Law

The court of appeals properly concluded that the evidence supported the decision of the Industrial Commission that Appellant was not eligible for benefits because he had voluntarily abandoned the workforce for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury.Appellant, who was injured in the course and scope of his employment, filed a complaint in the court of appeals asking the court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Commission to find that he was eligible for permanent total disability benefits. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission’s order was supported by evidence in the record, and the court of appeals did not err in determining that the Commission did not abuse its discretion and that mandamus was inappropriate. View "State ex rel. McKee v. Union Metal Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Public Utilities Commission that authorized Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. to recover costs associated with the environmental remediation of two manufactured-gas-plant (MGP) sites near downtown Cincinnati. The court held that the Commission did not exceed its authority when it allowed Duke to recover the costs incurred to remediate the MGP sites. The court dismissed Appellants’ remaining arguments as moot. Because Appellants did not carry their burden of demonstrating that the Commission’s order was unjust, unreasonable or unlawful, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Article IV, Section 4 of the Westlake City Charter requires the city’s director of law to have been engaged in the active practice of law for any period of six year preceding election.In this case, Andrea Rocco field a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections to issue a certification of nomination and to certify her name for placement upon the November 2017 ballot as a candidate for the city of Westlake’s director of law. Four protests were sustained against Rocco’s candidacy contending that she did not meet requirements to hold the position of director of law. The Cuyahoga County board of Elections voted to sustain the protests. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Rocco demonstrated that the board abused its discretion by denying her a certificate of nomination because the evidence established that Rocco did engaged in the active practice of law for a period of six years preceding the November 2017 election. View "State ex rel. Rocco v. Cuyahoga County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The amendment to Ohio Rev. Code 5713.03 enacted in 2012 (H.B. 487) applied to the circumstances of this case and required a remand to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) for further consideration.At issue here was a 2013 real property valuation for a lease-encumbered property that had been the subject of recent arm’s-length sales. The Supreme Court held that the H.B. 487 amendment required the BTA to determine the value of the subject property’s unencumbered fee-simple estate. Because the BTA did not properly consider appraisal evidence that purported to explain why the subject property’s recent sale price did not reflect the value of the unencumbered fee-simple estate, the court vacated the BTA’s decision and remanded the case for the BTA to address and weigh the evidence before it. View "Terraza 8, LLC v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

West Carrollton City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that retained the auditor’s update-year valuation of $4,716,690 for 2011 for the two contiguous parcels of property at issue in this case. Specifically, the BOE argued, inter alia, that the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully by refusing either to rely on the land-sale price and actual-cost evidence to value to the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code barred the direct use of the land-sale price in Carmax Auto Superstores, Inc.’s 2008 acquisition of the property because Carmax spent more than $7 million on subsequently added improvements; and (2) neither the 2008 land-sale price nor the actual construction costs affirmatively negated the auditor’s valuation, and therefore, the BTA acquired no duty to perform an independent valuation. View "West Carrollton City Schools Board of Education v. Montgomery County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) upheld the tax commissioner’s denial of a property tax exemption for Appellant’s four dialysis-service centers for tax year 2007 and the denial of Appellant’s requested remission of the property taxes it paid for those facilities for tax year 2006. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA as to tax year 2006 and reversed it as to tax year 2007, holding that remission was properly denied for tax year 2006, but for tax year 2007, Appellant’s use of space at the four centers qualified for exemption. Because some of the space listed in the facilities was leased to private physicians, the properties should be split-listed, with a portion taxable and the dialysis-service facilities exempt. View "Dialysis Centers of Dayton, LLC v. Testa" on Justia Law

At issue was a lessor’s right to terminate an oil and gas lease when a lessee fails to make minimum annual rental or royalty payments. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lessors in this case and ordered forfeiture of the lease at issue, declaring that the lease had terminated under its own terms because the lessees had failed to a minimum annual rental of $5,500 under the lease and that the lease was void as against public policy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provision in the lease requiring the lessee to pay $5,500 annually did not invoke the termination provision in the unrelated delay-rental clause; and (2) the lease did not qualify as a no-term, perpetual lease, and therefore, the lease was not void as against public policy. View "Bohlen v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC" on Justia Law