Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Inge Fox injured her left arm and hand in the course and scope of her employment with Manpower of Dayton, Inc. Fox’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for several medical and psychological conditions. In 2013, Fox applied for permanent-total-disability compensation. The Industrial Commission granted the application, finding that Fox’s inability to work was based solely on the medical impairment caused by her allowed conditions. Manpower requested a writ of mandamus that would compel the Commission to vacate its award of permanent total disability compensation to Fox. The court of appeals denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Manpower failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to extraordinary relief in mandamus. View "State ex rel. Manpower of Dayton, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were Dr. Abubakar Atiq Durrani and several medical providers and hospitals. Plaintiffs in the underlying cases were more than fifty of Dr. Durrani’s former patients. Judge Robert Ruehlman of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County was one of the twelve judges to whom the cases were originally assigned. Plaintiffs in the Durrani cases filed with Administrative Judge Robert Winkler a motion to transfer and consolidate the cases to the docket of Judge Ruehlman. Judge Ruehlman signed and entered the proposed consolidation order that Plaintiffs had submitted and sua sponte began signing entries of reassignment transferring the cases to his docket. Appellants filed a complaint for extraordinary relief seeking a writ of prohibition and writ of mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed and issued a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition, holding (1) Appellants lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and had a clear legal right to have each underlying case returned to the judge to whom the case was originally assigned; and (2) Judge Ruehlman patently and unambiguously lacked the authority to order the consolidation of the underlying malpractice cases. View "State ex rel. Durrani v. Ruehlman" on Justia Law

Dynamic Industries, Inc. (DI) owned real property on which stood a building that DI claimed was unsalvageable. After an application was filed to have the building designated a historic landmark, DI filed an application seeking a permit to demolish the building. The City of Cincinnati did not process DI’s application because the historic-designation application was still pending. DI filed in the court of appeals an original action in mandamus seeking a peremptory writ compelling the City to immediately issue its requested permit and related relief. The City subsequently passed an ordinance approving the historic-designation application. When the building became a historic landmark, DI was precluded from obtaining a demolition permit unless it first obtained a certificate of appropriateness, for which DI did not apply. The court of appeals dismissed DI’s complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over DI’s claims in declaratory and injunctive relief and for money damages; and (2) DI failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before asserting its takings and general mandamus claims, and therefore, those claims were unripe and unavailing. View "State ex rel. Dynamic Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated and one count of murder in connection with the killing of Darian Polk. The trial court ordered the convictions merged for the purposes of sentencing. The State elected to have Defendant sentenced for the aggravated murder charged in count three. The trial court, however, imposed concurrent sentences on each of the three offenses instead of sentencing on only one offense. Defendant moved to correct his sentences, arguing that all of which convictions should be merged as allied offenses into a single conviction for aggravated murder. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the appellate court to vacate the sentences imposed for murder in count one and aggravated murder in count two, holding (1) imposing separate sentences for allied offenses of similar import is contrary to law, and those sentences are void; (2) Defendant’s convictions were allied offenses of similar import; and (3) because the State designated one allied offense for sentencing, a remand for resentencing was not necessary in this case. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a petition in the court of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus against Judge Christopher Gee and the Miami County Court of Common Pleas. Specifically, Appellant sought a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Gee to grant him an appeal as of right in his underlying criminal case and to appoint counsel to represent him in the appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of Judge Gee to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. View "State ex rel. Cain v. Gee" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to gross sexual imposition and was sentenced to sixteen months’ imprisonment. In addition, the trial court imposed five years of mandatory postrelease control. In 2014, Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted failure to provide a notice of change of address and was sentenced to one year. The trial court also imposed a prison term for the remainder of the period of postrelease control that Appellant was serving for the gross sexual imposition conviction. Appellant did not appeal. Appellant later filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking a writ ordering Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Kathleen A. Sutula to vacate his sentence for violating the terms of his postrelease control because he was not advised of the possibility of this sentence at his prior sentencing. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for Judge Sutula. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, a writ of mandamus was unavailable. View "State ex rel. Cornwall v. Sutula" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of burglary and other offenses and has been released on parole and convicted of new crimes at least five times. Appellant has filed at least three habeas corpus petition over the years, all of which have been denied. In 2015, Appellant filed the habeas petition that is the subject of this appeal, alleging primarily that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the indictment for his 1979 conviction was not proper. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s habeas petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that habeas corpus was not an appropriate avenue for challenging the validity of an indictment, that Appellant could have raised his arguments in a direct appeal, that Appellant’s petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and that Appellant’s habeas petition was defective. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. LaRose" on Justia Law

This case arose after the City of Cleveland granted a production company a permit to close a portion of a street in downtown Cleveland for sixteen consecutive days so that the company could film scenes for a movie. The street’s closure cut off access to one of two entrances to a parking lot owned by Cuyahoga Lakefront Land, LLC (“Lakefront”) during the permit period. Lakefront brought this original action in the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which found that Cleveland had taken Lakefront’s property without just compensation and issued a writ of mandamus ordering Cleveland to commence appropriation proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no writ should issue because Lakefront failed to show that the temporary loss of access to one of the two entrances to the parking lot was a compensable taking of its property. View "State ex rel. Cuyahoga Lakefront, L.L.C. v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Respondents filed a lawsuit against Petitioners, asserting a claim for negligent misidentification. Petitioners filed motions for judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, to certify questions of state law to the Supreme Court asserting that a claim of negligent misidentification sounds in defamation, and, under the one-year statute of limitations for defamation, Respondents’ claim was time-barred. The federal district court certified three questions of law to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held (1) a plaintiff does not have a cause of action in tort for negligent misidentification, and it would contravene public policy to allow such a claim; and (2) because no cause of action for negligent misidentification exists in Ohio, the certified questions are moot. View "Foley v. University of Dayton" on Justia Law

New York Frozen Foods, Inc. filed its Bedford Heights income-tax returns on a separate-entity basis for tax years 2005 through 2007. In 2010, Frozen Foods and its affiliates filed consolidated amended returns for the same tax years and claimed a refund of taxes it had previously paid based on its separate returns. Regional Income Tax Agency, acting in its capacity as the city’s tax administrator, denied the refund. The Bedford Heights Income tax Board of Review affirmed the denial of refunds. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed, agreeing that the amended returns were improper. Frozen Foods appealed. Bedford Heights cross-appealed, arguing that the BTA erred by failing to deny the refund on an alternative ground. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision to deny Frozen Foods’ claim for a refund on the alternate ground that the city ordinance barred a change from a separate return to a consolidated return when filing an amended return because the change constituted a “change in method of accounting” prohibited by the ordinance. View "New York Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Bedford Heights Income Tax Board of Review" on Justia Law