Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Darlene Burnham brought a personal injury action against the Cleveland Clinic and Cleveland Clinic Health System (collectively, Clinic). During discovery, Burnham requested certain documents that the Clinic alleged were not discoverable because they were shielded by the attorney-client privilege. Burnham filed a motion to compel discovery. The trial court granted the motion to compel. The Clinic appealed, arguing that the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege and were not discoverable. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that there was no final, appealable order to review because the Clinic had failed to establish that there would be prejudice resulting from disclosure of the documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a discovery order compelling the production of documents allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege is a final, appealable order subject to immediate review because such an order causes harm and prejudice that cannot be meaningfully remedied by a later appeal; and (2) because the Clinic has plausibly alleged that the attorney-client privilege would be breached by disclosure of the requested materials, the order compelling the disclosure is a final, appealable order. View "Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic" on Justia Law

Marilynne Earles was injured in the course and scope of her employment with BF Goodrich Company, Specialty Chemicals Division (Goodrich). Earles returned to work with certain restrictions. Later, Earles find an application for wage-loss compensation based on a reduction in her earnings while working in a light-duty position. A district hearing officer denied the application. A union representative subsequently filed an appeal on behalf of Earles. The Industrial Commission accepted the appeal and awarded wage-loss compensation. Goodrich filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in (1) concluding that Earles’s wage loss was the direct result of her inability to return to her previous position due to the physical restrictions resulting from her claim; and (2) concluding that the appeal was timely filed. View "State ex rel. BF Goodrich Co., Specialty Chemicals Division v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Cincinnati Enquirer requested the disclosure of recordings from cameras mounted on the dashboards of two Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) cars. The OSHP denied the request in its entirety. The Enquirer subsequently filed this mandamus action alleging that the OSHP and Ohio Department of Public Safety (ODPS) violated the Ohio Public Records Act by refusing to release the recordings. Thereafter, ODPS provided copies of the recordings to the Enquirer. The Supreme Court held (1) subject to redaction, the Enquirer had a clear legal right to the requested records and that the defendants had a clear legal duty to provide the records; and (2) the Enquirer was not entitled to attorney fees, statutory damages, or court costs. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

In 1995, Defendant was convicted of felonious assault on a police officer. After being released on parole, Defendant pleaded guilty in 2011 to resisting arrest, was given a suspended sentence, and was placed on community control. In 2013, Defendant stipulated to a violation of his community-control sanctions and was ordered to serve the sentence for the 2011 resisting-arrest conviction. In 2015, after Defendant had completed his resisting-arrest sentence, the parole board found that Defnedant had violated his parole for the 1995 sentence and imposed an additional term of confinement on that basis. Defendant filed this action in habeas corpus claiming that the board did not have authority to extend his incarceration. The court of appeals dismissed the action on the basis that Defendant failed to attach all his commitment papers to his petition. The Supreme Court affirmed on another ground, holding that Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25 by filing an affidavit of indigence without attaching a statement of his inmate balance for each of the preceding six months. View "Robinson v. Miller" on Justia Law

Appellant was the defendant in a criminal case in which he was found not guilty by reason of insanity and found to be a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order. In 2014, Appellant filed a motion asserting that the trial court lacked authority to order his original commitment. The trial court denied relief, and Appellant appealed. In 2015, Appellant filed a motion to terminate his involuntary confinement. The trial court stayed the action pending the outcome of Appellant’s appeal from the denial of the 2014 motion. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for writs of mandamus and procedendo requesting that the trial court judge be ordered either to grant or hold a hearing on the 2015 motion. The court of appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court’s denial of the 2014 motion. In 2016, the court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition for writs of mandamus and procedendo, concluding that the request for a writ of procedendo was moot and that the judge had not abused his discretion in issuing the stay. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case was moot, and the the trial court did not err in failing to consider the 2015 motion earlier. View "State ex rel. Rohrer v. Holzapfel" on Justia Law

Defendant, a legal resident of the United States, was indicted on two counts of robbery. Defendant admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt in order to enroll in a diversion program. Defendant later moved to vacate his plea, arguing that his admission of guilt operated as a conviction under federal law and that the trial court erred by failing to provide him the advisement contained in Ohio Rev. Code 2943.031(A), which requires courts to alert noncitizens that a guilty plea or no-contest plea may affect their immigration status. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 2943.031(A) required the trial court to advise Defendant that his admission of guilt made for purposes of entering into the pretrial diversion program may affect his immigration status; and (2) because the trial court failed to give that advisement, the trial court must vacate the dismissal of the case against Defendant and vacate the admission of guilt executed as part of the pretrial diversion program process. Remanded. View "State v. Kona" on Justia Law

Mason Companies, Inc., a company based in Wisconsin, appealed from the imposition of Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) on revenue it earned from its sales of goods through orders received via telephone, mail, and the Internet. Mason challenged the imposition of the CAT assessments based on its being operated outside Ohio, employing no personnel in Ohio, and maintaining no facilities in Ohio. The Supreme Court upheld the CAT assessments against Mason, holding that, after applying the holding in Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, the lack of Mason’s physical presence within Ohio was not a necessary condition for imposing the obligations of the CAT law given that the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold adequately assured that Mason’s nexus with Ohio was substantial. View "Mason Cos., Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

In this companion case to Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, the Supreme Court considered Newegg, Inc.’s appeal from the imposition of Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) on revenue it earned from sales of computer-related products that it shipped into the state of Ohio. Newegg contested its CAT assessments based on its being operated outside Ohio, employing no personnel in Ohio, and maintaining no facilities in Ohio. In Crutchfield, the Supreme Court held that, under the Commerce Clause, the physical presence of an interstate business within Ohio is not a necessary condition for imposing the obligations of the CAT law given that the $500,000 sales receipts threshold adequately assures that the taxpayer’s nexus with Ohio is substantial. After applying Crutchfield’s holding in this case, the Supreme Court upheld the CAT assessments against Newegg. View "Newegg, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The tax commissioner issued commercial-activity tax (CAT) assessments against the Crutchfield Corporation on revenue it earned from sales of electronic products that it shipped from the state of Ohio. Crutchfield, whose business in Ohio consisted solely of shipping goods from outside the state to its consumers in Ohio using the United States Postal Service or common-carrier delivery services, challenged the issuance of CAT assessments against it, arguing that Ohio may not impose a tax on the gross receipts associated with its sales to Ohio consumers because Crutchfield lacks a “substantial nexus” with Ohio. Citing case law interpreting this substantial-nexus requirement, Crutchfield argued that its nexus to Ohio was not sufficiently substantial because it lacked a “physical presence” in Ohio. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the assessments issued by the tax commissioner. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA and upheld the CAT assessments against Crutchfield, holding (1) the physical presence requirement recognized by the United States Supreme Court for purposes of use-tax collection does not extend to business-privileges taxes such as the CAT; and (2) the statutory threshold of $500,000 of Ohio sales constitutes a sufficient guarantee of the substantiality of an Ohio nexus for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

Scott and Dawn Smith (together, Insureds) filed an insurance claim with Erie Insurance Company (Insurer) seeking uninsured-motorist coverage as a result of injuries suffered by Scott in a no-contact accident allegedly caused by an unidentified vehicle. Insurer denied the claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to Insurer, concluding that a provision in the policy requiring Insureds to provide “independent corroborative evidence” that the unknown driver caused the injury meant that Insureds had to submit evidence, independent of Scott’s own testimony, corroborating that the accident was caused by an unknown motorist, and this they failed to do. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy’s requirement of independent corroborative evidence could be met using evidence derived from the insured’s testimony. View "Smith v. Erie Insurance Co." on Justia Law