Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

David Emerson owned two adjoining parcels of real property in Erie County. The Erie County auditor’s aggregate valuation of the two parcels for tax year 2011 was $328,270. Emerson challenged the valuations, arguing that his 2009 purchase of the parcels established lower true values because it was a recent arm’s-length transaction. The Erie County Board of Revision (BOR) retained the auditor’s valuation. On appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed the BOR’s decision and valued the property at $180,000 according to the sale price. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Emerson demonstrated a recent arm’s-length sale; and (2) the county cannot rebut the sale price with an appraisal. View "Emerson v. Erie County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The real property in this case was a manufacturing and distribution facility owned and operated by Johnson Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc. The Hamilton County auditor valued the property at $13,571,760 for tax year 2011. Coca-Cola filed a complaint seeking a reduction in value. The Hamilton County Board of Revision (BOR) rejected Coca-Cola’s complaint and retained the auditor’s valuation. On appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) increased the value to $14,000,000 based on a new appraisal submitted by the auditor. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision as modified to correct a clerical error, holding that the BTA’s decision was reasonable and lawful. View "Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hamilton County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant was an inmate at the London Correctional Institution, where he was serving the remainder of an indeterminate sentence since the Adult Parole Authority (APA) revoked his parole in 2014. In 2015, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus against Warden Terry Tibbals and the APA. Appellant requested an order requiring Tibbals to immediately release him from prison under the same conditions of his original parole; alternatively, an order compelling the APA to credit his time served from 2001 to 2011; and an order compelling the APA to grant him a new mitigation/revocation hearing with the appointment of counsel. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Tibbals and the APA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant had not served his maximum sentence and failed to show that he was being held unlawfully, the court of appeals correctly denied Appellant’s request for a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Appellant failed to prove his entitlement to a writ of mandamus by clear and convincing evidence. View "State ex rel. Marsh v. Tibbals" on Justia Law

In July 2015, the Delaware Joint Vocational School District Board of Education passed a resolution to submit a renewal levy to voters at the general election. On November 20, 2015, the Delaware County Board of Elections purported to certify the election result. The county auditor then delivered the abstract of tax rates to the tax commissioner to apply the reduction factors and calculate the tax rate for the school district. When the county auditor discovered that the Board of Elections had not certified the results of the levy using Form 5-U, however, the tax commissioner excluded the levy on the list of tax rates certified for collection to the county auditors in counties with territory in the school district, and the levy was not included on the property tax bills sent to property owners for the first half of tax year 2016. The school board brought this action in mandamus to compel the tax commissioner to apply the reduction factors and calculate the tax rates for the levy. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that because no proper certification of the multicounty election was presented to the tax commissioner demonstrating that the tax was authorized to be levied, the commissioner did not have a clear legal duty to apply reduction factors and calculate tax rates for this levy. View "State ex rel. Delaware Joint Vocational School District Board of Education v. Testa" on Justia Law

In State v. Gonzales (Gonzales I), the Supreme Court determined that, in prosecuting cocaine-possession offenses under Ohio Rev. Code 2925.11(C)(4)(b) through (f) involving mixed substances, the State must prove that the weight of the actual cocaine, excluding the weight of any filler materials, meets the statutory threshold. The State filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Gonzalez I was based on inconsistent application of the principles of statutory construction. The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration, vacated its decision in Gonzalez I, and held that the entire mixture or compound, including any fillers that are part of the usable drug, must be considered for the purpose of determining the appropriate penalty for cocaine possession under section 2925.11(C)(4). View "State v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

In 1986, Appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of rape and six counts of complicity to rape. The trial court sentenced Appellant to four terms of life imprisonment and ordered that Appellant serve each of the life sentences consecutively. In 2015, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the trial court acted outside its jurisdiction and improperly imposed the life terms because of errors in the sentencing entry. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s habeas petition was properly dismissed because Appellant did not set forth a valid challenge to the jurisdiction of the sentencing court and because Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to raise his sentencing errors. View "Dunkle v. Department of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Powell City Council approved an ordinance rezoning certain property from planned commercial and residence districts to downtown residence district. Thereafter, Brian Ebersole sought a writ of mandamus to compel Powell City Council to place the new ordinance on the May 2017 ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Ebersole was not entitled to a writ of mandamus because, under the city charter, the City had no clear legal duty to place the matter on the ballot. Therefore, Ebersole’s proper course of action was to challenge the validity of the ordinance by way of a suit for declaratory judgment, a form of relief that this Court had no original jurisdiction to grant. View "State ex rel. Ebersole v. City Council of Powell" on Justia Law

Relators were the members of the committee that nominated Gary Johnson and William Weld to appear on Ohio’s November 2016 ballot as independent candidates for president and vice president of the United States. Johnson and Weld jointly received 3.17 percent of the total votes cast in Ohio for president and vice president. Relators subsequently brought this action in mandamus seeking to require the Ohio Secretary of State to recognize Relators as a political party under Ohio Rev. Code 3517.01. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relators were not entitled to the writ because they do not qualify as a political party, as their candidates were nominated as independent candidates without any political-party affiliation, and section 3517.01 and Ohio Rev. Code 3501.01 permit only established political parties to retain ballot access if they receive at least three percent of the vote. View "State ex rel. Fockler v. Husted" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by a high-speed police chase. Appellant filed a negligence action against certain police officers, alleging that the officers engaged in a high-speed case of a suspect that ended when Barnhart’s vehicle struck Plaintiff’s vehicle, killing the suspect and seriously injuring Plaintiff. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, concluding (1) as a matter of law, a police officer who pursues a suspect is not the proximate cause of injuries to a third party unless the officer’s conduct is extreme and outrageous; and (2) under this standard, no reasonable juror could conclude that the officers’ actions were the proximate cause of the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) the no-proximate-cause standard applied by the court of appeals in this case is contrary to the express dictates of Ohio Rev. Code 2744.03(A)(6)(b), which provides that law enforcement officers are immune from liability unless they act maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; and (2) applying the correct standard set forth in section 2744.03(A)(6)(b), the officers could not be held liable for damages as a result of their actions. View "Argabrite v. Neer" on Justia Law

Jill Stevenson failed to stop at a stop sign at an intersection and collided with Gary Bibler. A police officer determined that the stop sign was significantly obstructed from a distance as a driver approached it. Bibler and his wife, Yvonne Bibler, filed a complaint alleging that Stevenson was negligent for failing to stop and that the City of Findlay was negligent for failing to ensure that the stop sign was visible. The trial court dismissed Findlay from the case, concluding that the City was entitled to statutory political subdivision immunity and that an exception to immunity did not apply in this case. The Biblers and Stevenson subsequently settled, and the Biblers appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Findlay. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City was not immune pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2744.02(B)(3) and was potentially amenable to liability. Remanded. View "Bibler v. Stevenson" on Justia Law