Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by a high-speed police chase. Appellant filed a negligence action against certain police officers, alleging that the officers engaged in a high-speed case of a suspect that ended when Barnhart’s vehicle struck Plaintiff’s vehicle, killing the suspect and seriously injuring Plaintiff. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, concluding (1) as a matter of law, a police officer who pursues a suspect is not the proximate cause of injuries to a third party unless the officer’s conduct is extreme and outrageous; and (2) under this standard, no reasonable juror could conclude that the officers’ actions were the proximate cause of the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) the no-proximate-cause standard applied by the court of appeals in this case is contrary to the express dictates of Ohio Rev. Code 2744.03(A)(6)(b), which provides that law enforcement officers are immune from liability unless they act maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; and (2) applying the correct standard set forth in section 2744.03(A)(6)(b), the officers could not be held liable for damages as a result of their actions. View "Argabrite v. Neer" on Justia Law

Jill Stevenson failed to stop at a stop sign at an intersection and collided with Gary Bibler. A police officer determined that the stop sign was significantly obstructed from a distance as a driver approached it. Bibler and his wife, Yvonne Bibler, filed a complaint alleging that Stevenson was negligent for failing to stop and that the City of Findlay was negligent for failing to ensure that the stop sign was visible. The trial court dismissed Findlay from the case, concluding that the City was entitled to statutory political subdivision immunity and that an exception to immunity did not apply in this case. The Biblers and Stevenson subsequently settled, and the Biblers appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Findlay. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City was not immune pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2744.02(B)(3) and was potentially amenable to liability. Remanded. View "Bibler v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

Matthew Shaughnessy, an attorney who requests and reviews police incident reports, alleged that, on five different occasions, the City of Cleveland failed to produce copies of police incident reports in a reasonable amount of time, which he contended was eight business days. Shaughnessy asked the Supreme Court to order the City to respond to future requests within eight business days and also requested $1,000 in statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied the request for relief and the request for statutory damages, holding that Shaughnessy failed to show that the City had a clear legal city to produce, or that he had a clear legal right to receive, the requested records within eight business days. View "State ex rel. Shaughnessy v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Employee was terminated from his employment after failing a routine drug test administered soon after a workplace accident in which he was injured. Employee’s drug use did not cause the accident. Employee’s workers’ compensation claim was initially allowed for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation. However, the Industrial Commission subsequently determined that Employee voluntarily abandoned his employment by using marijuana prior to the accident and was therefore not eligible for TTD compensation. Employee petitioned for a writ of a mandamus compelling the Commission to vacate its order denying TTD compensation and to issue an order granting Employee TTD compensation. The court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when an employee is terminated after a workplace injury for conduct prior to and unrelated to the injury, the employee’s termination does not amount to a voluntary abandonment of employment for purposes of TTD compensation when (1) the discovery of the dischargeable offense occurred because of the injury; and (2) the employee was medically incapable of returning to work as a result of the workplace injury at the time of the termination. View "State ex rel. Cordell v. Pallet Companies" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI) of a drug of abuse. After a trial, Defendant was convicted. The court of appeals vacated the trial court’s judgment, finding that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s OVI conviction because there was no evidence to connect Defendant’s use of hydrocodone, a widely known drug of abuse, with his impairment. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that expert testimony was necessary to support the OVI conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the OVI conviction and that no expert testimony was required to link the ingestion of hydrocodone with Defendant’s impairment. View "State v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Ross Linert sustained severe injuries when Adrien Foutz, an intoxicated driver, struck Ross’s vehicle from behind, triggering a fuel-fed fire. At the time of the accident, Ross, a veteran police officer, was on patrol in a 2005 Crown Victoria Police Interceptor (CVPI) manufactured by Ford Motor Company. Ross and his wife, Brenda Linert, sued Foutz. The Linerts subsequently added product liability and malice claims against Ford. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ford on all of the Linerts’ claims. The Linerts appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on Ohio Rev. Code 2307.76(A)(2), Ohio’s statute governing manufacturers’ postmarked duty to warn consumers of risks associated with a product that are not discovered until after the product has been sold. The appellate court ordered a new trial on the Linerts’ postmarketing failure-to-warn claim, concluding that the there was sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on the Linerts’ postmarketing failure-to-warn claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly refused to instruct on a postmarketing duty to warn in this case. View "Linert v. Foutz" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of violating Ohio Rev. Code 2923.13. The statute makes it illegal for a person to possess firearms when the person is under indictment for or has been convicted of certain felonies. During trial, Defendant sought to limit how much the jury could learn about his underlying offenses upon which the weapons charges were based. A jury returned a guilty verdict on all three counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it did not require the State to stipulate to Defendant’s indictment and prior convictions and by admitting the full record of his prior offenses. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in refusing Defendant’s stipulation offer, and the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing Defendant to stipulate to his prior convictions and indictment. View "State v. Creech" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging three civil claims brought under Ohio Rev. Code 2307.60. Plaintiff sought recovery for damages arising out of Defendants’ alleged violation of a criminal statute. The trial court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, ruling that civil actions for damages may not be predicated upon an alleged violation of a criminal statute. The Ninth District Court of Appeals then certified a question to the Supreme Court as to whether the current version of Ohio Rev. Code 2307.60 independently authorizes a civil action for damages caused by criminal acts unless otherwise prohibited by law. The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Jacobson v. Kaforey" on Justia Law

The T. Ryan Legg Irrevocable Trust appealed a tax on the trust’s 2006 income. The tax commissioner moved to dismiss, arguing that the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the trust had not shown that the trustee had authorized the filing of the notice of appeal and the petition for reassessment. The BTA denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated the BTA’s decision in part, holding (1) the tax commissioner failed to prove that the trust’s counsel lacked authority to file the tax appeals; (2) the trust’s capital gain was subject to Ohio income tax on an apportioned basis, but the trust had a legal basis for seeking a reduced Ohio allocation; and (3) the tax assessment did not violate due process or equal protection rights. Remanded to the tax commission for a determination of the proper Ohio allocation. View "T. Ryan Legg Irrevocable Trust v. Testa" on Justia Law

Ernest and Louann Giddens resided in Missouri but paid Ohio income tax as owners of shares in a corporation that did some of its business in Ohio. In 2008, that corporation was an S corporation, and therefore, its income passed through for tax purposes. The tax commissioner reduced the amount of the “nonresident tax credit” that relates to a distribution from the corporation. The Giddenses had allocated the distribution outside Ohio, arguing that it constituted a dividend that was “nonbusiness income” allocable to Missouri. The tax commissioner determined that the distribution should be treated as “business income” and concluded that a portion of it was taxable by Ohio based on the proportion of the corporation’s business in Ohio. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Giddenses properly treated the income as nonbusiness - rather than business - income. View "Giddens v. Testa" on Justia Law