Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The clerk of the Cleveland City Council rejected a referendum petition seeking to repeal Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17, finding that it would “unconstitutionally impair an already existing and binding contract.” Several individuals sent a letter to Relator, the law director of the city of Cleveland, demanding that she exercise her authority to seek a writ of mandamus compelling the clerk to accept the petition. In response, Relator commenced the present complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk to determine the sufficiency of the referendum petition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the clerk had a clear legal duty to verify the sufficiency of the petition signatures, and Relators had a clear legal right to compel the performance of that duty. View "State ex rel. Langhenry v. Britt" on Justia Law

The clerk of the Cleveland City Council rejected a referendum petition seeking to repeal Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17, finding that it would “unconstitutionally impair an already existing and binding contract.” Several individuals sent a letter to Relator, the law director of the city of Cleveland, demanding that she exercise her authority to seek a writ of mandamus compelling the clerk to accept the petition. In response, Relator commenced the present complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk to determine the sufficiency of the referendum petition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the clerk had a clear legal duty to verify the sufficiency of the petition signatures, and Relators had a clear legal right to compel the performance of that duty. View "State ex rel. Langhenry v. Britt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his habeas corpus petition Appellant asserted that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over his indictment due to alleged problems relating to the charging complaint and his arrest. The court of appeals granted the motion to dismiss filed by Respondent, the warden of the Marion Correctional Institution, on the ground that Appellant failed to submit an affidavit describing his prior civil actions, as required under Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A), and that Appellant’s claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. View "Patrick v. Bunting" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder, but his conviction was reversed on appeal and remanded. Appellant was subsequently retried and convicted of murder and aggravated murder. In his habeas corpus petition, Appellant asserted that the trial court acted without jurisdiction on remand and also claimed actual innocence. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that Appellant had been properly convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction and had an adequate remedy at law by which to raise his arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to state a proper claim in habeas. View "Swain v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the Second District Court of Appeals, holding that the general division of the court of common pleas must sentence a juvenile under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 2929 for all offenses for which the juvenile is convicted in a case if, under Ohio Rev. Code 2152.121(B)(4), at least one offense for which the juvenile was convicted was subject to mandatory transfer.Appellee in this case was charged with being a delinquent child for action that would constitute multiple counts of both aggravated robbery and kidnapping if committed by an adult. The case was transferred from the juvenile court to the general division of the court of common pleas under the mandatory transfer provisions of section 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii). Appellee then pled guilty to some charges that were subject to mandatory transfer and some charges that were subject to discretionary transfer. The court of appeals ruled that the charges that were subject to discretionary transfer and resulted in convictions were also subject to the “reverse bindover” provisions of section 2152.121(B)(3). The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the sentence imposed by the trial court for the reasons set forth above. View "State v. D.B." on Justia Law

Appellant failed to disclose his sealed criminal conviction on an application for employment and on applications to renew his registration as an adult-services worker with the Ohio Department of Developmental Disabilities. Consequently, Appellant’s employment was terminated by the Franklin County Board of Developmental Disabilities. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant’s termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the questions on the registration applications that explicitly required disclosure of sealed convictions did not violate Ohio Rev. Code 2953.33(B) because the questions bore a direct and substantial relationship to Appellant’s position and to his qualifications for registration; and (2) Appellant was not excused from answering those questions. View "Gyugo v. Franklin County Board of Developmental Disabilities" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a limited writ of mandamus and ordering the Ohio Highway Patrol Retirement System Board and Ohio Highway Patrol Retirement System (collectively, the Board) to conduct a “physical-capacity evaluation” of Appellee. The Board originally approved Appellee’s disability retirement application but later terminated Appellee’s disability-retirement benefits based on evidence that Appellee was fully recovered and no longer disabled. Appellee appealed, submitting new evidence and a recommendation that Appellee receive a physical-capacity evaluation. The Board upheld its prior decision to terminate disability-retirement benefits without referring Appellee for a physical-capacity evaluation. The court of appeals granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Board to conduct the physical-capacity evaluation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board’s decision was based upon sufficient medical evidence and that the Board had no legal duty to conduct a physical-capacity evaluation before terminating Appellee’s disability benefits. View "State ex rel. Burroughs v. Ohio Highway Patrol Retirement System Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition. Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and having a weapon while under disability. Appellee, Judge Robert McClelland, granted Appellant’s motion for judicial release and placed him on community control. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court had failed to make the findings required by Ohio Rev. Code 2929.20(J) before granting judicial release. Thereafter, the trial court revoked Appellant’s judicial release and ordered him to serve the remainder of his prison sentence. The trial court subsequently filed an entry stating that the court of appeals’ order had been rendered moot. Appellant sought writs of mandamus and prohibition in the court of appeals to compel Judge McClellan to comply with the prior appellate judgment reversing the grant of judicial release. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to prove that Judge McClellan exercised unauthorized judicial power and that denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy at law exists. View "State ex rel. Peterson v. McClelland" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether three statutes regulating local authorities’ use of red-light and speedy cameras offend the home-rule powers granted to a municipality in Ohio Const. art. XVIII, 3 or whether they qualify as general laws. The court held (1) Ohio Rev. Code 4511.093(B)(1), which requires that a law-enforcement officer be present at the location of a traffic camera, is unconstitutional because it infringes on the municipality’s legislative authority without serving an overriding state interest; (2) Ohio Rev. Code 4511.0912, which prohibits the municipality from issuing a fine to a driver caught speeding by a traffic camera unless that driver reaches certain speeds, unconstitutionally limits the municipality’s legislative powers without serving an overriding state interest; and (3) Ohio Rev. Code 4511.095, which directs the municipality to perform a safety study and a public-information campaign prior to using a camera, unconstitutionally limits the municipality’s home-rule authority without serving an overriding state interest. The court thus reinstated the permanent injunction imposed by the trial court with respect to those three provisions. View "Dayton v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Appellant, an inmate, asserted flaws in the charging instrument and his sentence. The court of appeals dismissed the motion, concluding that Appellant’s petition did not comply with the mandatory filing requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2725.04(D) and 2969.25 and that his claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither of Appellant’s claims was cognizable in this action and that Appellant did not comply with sections 2725.04(D) and 2969.25. View "Wills v. Turner" on Justia Law