Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a limited writ of mandamus and ordering the Ohio Highway Patrol Retirement System Board and Ohio Highway Patrol Retirement System (collectively, the Board) to conduct a “physical-capacity evaluation” of Appellee. The Board originally approved Appellee’s disability retirement application but later terminated Appellee’s disability-retirement benefits based on evidence that Appellee was fully recovered and no longer disabled. Appellee appealed, submitting new evidence and a recommendation that Appellee receive a physical-capacity evaluation. The Board upheld its prior decision to terminate disability-retirement benefits without referring Appellee for a physical-capacity evaluation. The court of appeals granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Board to conduct the physical-capacity evaluation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board’s decision was based upon sufficient medical evidence and that the Board had no legal duty to conduct a physical-capacity evaluation before terminating Appellee’s disability benefits. View "State ex rel. Burroughs v. Ohio Highway Patrol Retirement System Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition. Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and having a weapon while under disability. Appellee, Judge Robert McClelland, granted Appellant’s motion for judicial release and placed him on community control. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court had failed to make the findings required by Ohio Rev. Code 2929.20(J) before granting judicial release. Thereafter, the trial court revoked Appellant’s judicial release and ordered him to serve the remainder of his prison sentence. The trial court subsequently filed an entry stating that the court of appeals’ order had been rendered moot. Appellant sought writs of mandamus and prohibition in the court of appeals to compel Judge McClellan to comply with the prior appellate judgment reversing the grant of judicial release. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to prove that Judge McClellan exercised unauthorized judicial power and that denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy at law exists. View "State ex rel. Peterson v. McClelland" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether three statutes regulating local authorities’ use of red-light and speedy cameras offend the home-rule powers granted to a municipality in Ohio Const. art. XVIII, 3 or whether they qualify as general laws. The court held (1) Ohio Rev. Code 4511.093(B)(1), which requires that a law-enforcement officer be present at the location of a traffic camera, is unconstitutional because it infringes on the municipality’s legislative authority without serving an overriding state interest; (2) Ohio Rev. Code 4511.0912, which prohibits the municipality from issuing a fine to a driver caught speeding by a traffic camera unless that driver reaches certain speeds, unconstitutionally limits the municipality’s legislative powers without serving an overriding state interest; and (3) Ohio Rev. Code 4511.095, which directs the municipality to perform a safety study and a public-information campaign prior to using a camera, unconstitutionally limits the municipality’s home-rule authority without serving an overriding state interest. The court thus reinstated the permanent injunction imposed by the trial court with respect to those three provisions. View "Dayton v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Appellant, an inmate, asserted flaws in the charging instrument and his sentence. The court of appeals dismissed the motion, concluding that Appellant’s petition did not comply with the mandatory filing requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2725.04(D) and 2969.25 and that his claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither of Appellant’s claims was cognizable in this action and that Appellant did not comply with sections 2725.04(D) and 2969.25. View "Wills v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reopened Appellant’s direct appeal of his capital murder conviction to consider whether the trial court had jurisdiction over Appellant’s aggravated murder charge. Appellant was convicted of the kidnapping and murder of ten-year-old Amber Garrett, whose body was discovered in Bright, Indiana. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the aggravated murder charge under Ohio Rev. Code 2901.11(D) because it could not be determined whether Amber was murdered in Ohio or Indiana. Therefore, the offense was conclusively presumed to have taken place in Ohio. View "State v. Wogenstahl" on Justia Law

The placement of a suspect in the front seat of a police vehicle during a traffic stop is not alone determinative of whether the suspect has been subjected to a custodial interrogation.In this case, a state highway patrol trooper initiated a traffic stop of Defendant. The trooper asked Defendant to step out of his car and sit in the front seat of the patrol car, where the trooper asked Defendant how much alcohol he had consumed that evening. The trooper then asked Defendant to perform field sobriety tests. Defendant was subsequently cited with two counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the statements he made to the trooper while he sat in the front seat of the patrol car were obtained without the procedural safeguards established in Miranda v. Arizona. The court granted the motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the relevant inquiry as to whether a suspect has been subjected to a custodial interrogation is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood himself or herself to be in custody. View "Cleveland v. Oles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals that granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission to amend its order awarding permanent-total-disability compensation to adjust the start date of the benefits awarded to Terry Phillips. Phillips suffered a workplace injury in 2011. In 2013, Phillips applied for permanent-total-disability compensation. After a hearing, a staff hearing officer concluded that Phillips was permanently and totally disabled based on the reports of Dr. Amol Soin, Dr. Steven Rosen, and Dr. Norman Berg. R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC filed a complaint in mandamus arguing that the Commission’s order was not supported by the evidence. The magistrate recommended that the court of appeals issue a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to amend its order to eliminate from consideration the reports of Dr. Soin and Dr. Rosen and to adjust the start date of the award to coincide with the date of Dr. Berg’s report. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that R&L failed to demonstrate that the Commission abused its discretion by entering an order not supported by some evidence in the record. View "State ex rel. R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which concluded that the consent of Appellant, the putative father of Child, to Child’s adoption by Appellees was not necessary because Appellant “willfully abandoned” the birth mother during her pregnancy and up to the time that the child was placed with Appellees. Specifically, the court held (1) Ohio Rev. Code 3107.07(B) does not equate the failure to care for and support the mother with willful abandonment of the mother; and (2) the probate court’s determination the Appellant willfully abandoned the mother was both contrary to the express language in section 3107.07(B)(2) (c) and against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because Appellees did not assert any other bases for the adoption to proceed without Appellant’s consent, the court remanded the matter to the probate court to vacate its adoption decree and to dismiss Appellees’ adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of P.L.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that retained the reduced values that the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) adopted for eighteen condominium parcels in Franklin County for tax years 2011 through 2013. The BTA upheld the BOR’s valuation on the grounds that it found no evidence to counter the BOR’s decision to modify the auditor’s original assessment of the property. The Supreme Court held (1) the BTA erred by relying on a presumption of validity rather than independently weighing the evidence; and (2) under recent case law, the reduced values ordered by the BOR were properly carried forward from tax year 2011 to tax years 2012 and 2013. View "Columbus City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity and conspiracy for his role in plotting to kill several local officials. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his conviction and sentence for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity were void because of an alleged defect in his indictment. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s failure to attach to his petition an affidavit as required by Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A) warranted dismissal of his petition; and (2) Appellant’s claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. View "State ex rel. Sands v. Bunting" on Justia Law