Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court answered a case certified to it by the Twelfth District Court of Appeals in this medical malpractice case, holding that, for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2317.43(A), a statement expressing apology is “a statement that expresses a feeling of regret for an unanticipated outcome of the patient’s medical care and may include an acknowledgment that the patient’s medical care fell below the standard of care.” Under the statute, statements expressing apology are inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability or as evidence of an admission against interest. The trial court in this case excluded the statements of a medical doctor, concluding that the statements were an “attempt at commiseration” and were therefore inadmissible under the apology statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 2317.43(A) is unambiguous and that the doctor’s statements were correctly excluded. View "Stewart v. Vivian" on Justia Law

Any dismissal of a count in an indictment resolves that count and does not prevent a judgment of conviction from being final and appealable.Defendant was indicted on two counts of kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of grand theft. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts except the kidnapping counts. The trial court declared a mistrial on the kidnapping counts, and the trial court dismissed those counts. The trial court entered judgment on the convictions. When Defendant appealed his judgment of conviction, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order because the trial court had dismissed the kidnapping counts without prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, reinstated Defendant’s appeal, and remanded the cause to the appellate court for further proceedings, holding that a dismissal without prejudice of a count in a multipoint indictment does not prevent the judgment of conviction on the remaining counts from being a final, appealable order. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The term “harm,” for purposes of Ohio’s kidnapping statute, encompasses not only physical harm but also psychological harm.The kidnapping statute reduces the level of the offense from a first-degree felony to a second-degree felony if the victim is released in a “safe place unharmed.” The court of appeals reversed a first-degree kidnapping conviction based on its determination that there was no physical harm to the victim and that “harm” for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2905.01 could not include psychological harm. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain meaning of “harm” includes both physical and psychological harm; and (2) counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a safe-place-unharmed instruction, and there was no plain error in the trial judge’s failure to sua sponte provide the instruction. View "State v. Mohamed" on Justia Law

The ordinary meaning of “person” under Ohio’s Dram Shop Act, Ohio Rev. Code 4399.18, includes not only patrons but also dancers, workers, independent contractors, and others served by the liquor-permit holder.A dancer at a strip club left the club intoxicated and caused an accident. The accident victim filed claims for common-law-negligence and violations of the Dram Shop Act against the club and Michael Ferraro, the sole officer and shareholder of the club. A magistrate directed a verdict in favor of Ferraro as to his personal liability and in favor of the club as to its liability under the Act. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the victim on the negligence claim. The victim appealed the trial court’s judgment directing a verdict for Ferraro on the issue of personal liability. The court of appeals reversed the judgment against the club on the common-law-negligence claim, which rendered moot the question of Ferraro’s personal liability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Act applies to determine the liability of a permit holder who sold intoxicating beverages to an intoxicated worker or independent contractor whose intoxication causes an injury; and (2) because the Act applies, Ferraro and the club may not be held liable under common-law-negligence principles. View "Johnson v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

The clerk of the Cleveland City Council rejected a referendum petition seeking to repeal Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17, finding that it would “unconstitutionally impair an already existing and binding contract.” Several individuals sent a letter to Relator, the law director of the city of Cleveland, demanding that she exercise her authority to seek a writ of mandamus compelling the clerk to accept the petition. In response, Relator commenced the present complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk to determine the sufficiency of the referendum petition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the clerk had a clear legal duty to verify the sufficiency of the petition signatures, and Relators had a clear legal right to compel the performance of that duty. View "State ex rel. Langhenry v. Britt" on Justia Law

The clerk of the Cleveland City Council rejected a referendum petition seeking to repeal Cleveland Ordinance No. 305-17, finding that it would “unconstitutionally impair an already existing and binding contract.” Several individuals sent a letter to Relator, the law director of the city of Cleveland, demanding that she exercise her authority to seek a writ of mandamus compelling the clerk to accept the petition. In response, Relator commenced the present complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk to determine the sufficiency of the referendum petition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the clerk had a clear legal duty to verify the sufficiency of the petition signatures, and Relators had a clear legal right to compel the performance of that duty. View "State ex rel. Langhenry v. Britt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his habeas corpus petition Appellant asserted that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over his indictment due to alleged problems relating to the charging complaint and his arrest. The court of appeals granted the motion to dismiss filed by Respondent, the warden of the Marion Correctional Institution, on the ground that Appellant failed to submit an affidavit describing his prior civil actions, as required under Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(A), and that Appellant’s claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. View "Patrick v. Bunting" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder, but his conviction was reversed on appeal and remanded. Appellant was subsequently retried and convicted of murder and aggravated murder. In his habeas corpus petition, Appellant asserted that the trial court acted without jurisdiction on remand and also claimed actual innocence. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that Appellant had been properly convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction and had an adequate remedy at law by which to raise his arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to state a proper claim in habeas. View "Swain v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the Second District Court of Appeals, holding that the general division of the court of common pleas must sentence a juvenile under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 2929 for all offenses for which the juvenile is convicted in a case if, under Ohio Rev. Code 2152.121(B)(4), at least one offense for which the juvenile was convicted was subject to mandatory transfer.Appellee in this case was charged with being a delinquent child for action that would constitute multiple counts of both aggravated robbery and kidnapping if committed by an adult. The case was transferred from the juvenile court to the general division of the court of common pleas under the mandatory transfer provisions of section 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii). Appellee then pled guilty to some charges that were subject to mandatory transfer and some charges that were subject to discretionary transfer. The court of appeals ruled that the charges that were subject to discretionary transfer and resulted in convictions were also subject to the “reverse bindover” provisions of section 2152.121(B)(3). The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the sentence imposed by the trial court for the reasons set forth above. View "State v. D.B." on Justia Law

Appellant failed to disclose his sealed criminal conviction on an application for employment and on applications to renew his registration as an adult-services worker with the Ohio Department of Developmental Disabilities. Consequently, Appellant’s employment was terminated by the Franklin County Board of Developmental Disabilities. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant’s termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the questions on the registration applications that explicitly required disclosure of sealed convictions did not violate Ohio Rev. Code 2953.33(B) because the questions bore a direct and substantial relationship to Appellant’s position and to his qualifications for registration; and (2) Appellant was not excused from answering those questions. View "Gyugo v. Franklin County Board of Developmental Disabilities" on Justia Law