Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders issued by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) finding that the presence of stray gas near Appellants’ properties created a verifiable safety hazard that justified Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc.’s discontinuing gas service to the homes. Specifically, the court held (1) Appellants’ argument that PUCO misinterpreted Ohio Rev. Code 4905.20 and 4905.21 by permitting Columbia Gas to withdraw natural-gas service without filing an abandonment application was unavailing; and (2) PUCO did not err in determining that Columbia Gas did not violate Ohio Rev. Code 4905.22’s prohibition against furnishing inadequate service. View "In re Complaints of Lycourt-Donovan v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

When a juvenile whose parents are deceased appears at an amenability hearing, the juvenile is not required to ask for the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL). Rather, a GAL must be appointed as mandated by Ohio Rev. Code 2151.281(A)(1) and Juv. R. 4(B)(1). Further, the juvenile court’s failure to appoint a GAL in a delinquency proceeding is subject to criminal plain-error review if the juvenile does not object.After an amenability hearing, a judge concluded that Appellant, a juvenile, was not amenable to care and rehabilitation in the juvenile system and that Appellant was to be transferred to adult court. In common pleas court, Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of burglary, two counts of felonious assault, and one count of aggravated robbery, each including a firearm specification. On appeal, Appellant argued that the juvenile court committed plain error when it failed to appoint a GAL for his amenability hearing. The court of appeals concluded that the juvenile court erred in failing to appoint a GAL but that Appellant was unable to demonstrate prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show that the juvenile court’s error in failing to appoint a GAL at the amenability hearing affected the outcome of the proceeding. View "State v. Morgan" on Justia Law

There was no error in the determination of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio that the plan of the Illuminating Company to remove a silver maple tree located near the company’s transmission line was reasonable. The tree belonged to Mary-Martha and Dennis Corrigan and stood within the company’s easement running through the Corrigan’s property. The Corrigans appealed, arguing primarily that the evidence did not support findings that pruning was impracticable and that the tree posed a threat to the line. The Supreme Court rejected the Corrigans’ evidentiary challenges, holding that the Corrigans failed to show that the Commission’s decision was unlawful or unreasonable. View "Corrigan v. Illuminating Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of aggravated murder with three death specifications and his sentence of death. The court held (1) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for change of venue; (2) Defendant’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance in conducting voir dire; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the murder weapon as evidence; (4) the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress Defendant’s post-arrest statements; (5) the evidence was legally sufficient to convict Defendant of tampering with evidence; (6) guilt-phase evidence was properly used against Defendant in the penalty phase; (7) the state did not make improper statements during closing arguments in the penalty phase; (8) there was no error in the trial court’s sentencing opinion; and (9) the death sentence was proportionate to those affirmed in similar cases. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the common pleas court had jurisdiction over a motion to show cause. Appellant, an attorney, filed this action for a writ of prohibition arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold a show cause hearing in a civil lawsuit. The court of appeals granted the motion to dismiss filed by the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas and Judge Elizabeth Thomakos, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction over the contempt proceedings and that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding that Appellant failed to establish the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to rule on the contempt motion. View "State ex rel. Mancino v. Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the law-of-the-case doctrine requires a court to apply the findings of a superior court in a criminal case to a civil case brought by the criminal defendant against individuals and entities who were not parties to the criminal case. The court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not require a court to follow a superior court’s decision in a prior appeal involving one of the parties but in the context of a different case. Rather, the law-of-the-case doctrine applies only to rulings in the same case. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which ruled that summary judgment was improper in this case because the law-of-the-case doctrine applied. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court’s holding was not a proper application of the law-of-the-case doctrine. View "Reid v. Cleveland Police Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a case certified to it by the Twelfth District Court of Appeals in this medical malpractice case, holding that, for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2317.43(A), a statement expressing apology is “a statement that expresses a feeling of regret for an unanticipated outcome of the patient’s medical care and may include an acknowledgment that the patient’s medical care fell below the standard of care.” Under the statute, statements expressing apology are inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability or as evidence of an admission against interest. The trial court in this case excluded the statements of a medical doctor, concluding that the statements were an “attempt at commiseration” and were therefore inadmissible under the apology statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 2317.43(A) is unambiguous and that the doctor’s statements were correctly excluded. View "Stewart v. Vivian" on Justia Law

Any dismissal of a count in an indictment resolves that count and does not prevent a judgment of conviction from being final and appealable.Defendant was indicted on two counts of kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of grand theft. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts except the kidnapping counts. The trial court declared a mistrial on the kidnapping counts, and the trial court dismissed those counts. The trial court entered judgment on the convictions. When Defendant appealed his judgment of conviction, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order because the trial court had dismissed the kidnapping counts without prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, reinstated Defendant’s appeal, and remanded the cause to the appellate court for further proceedings, holding that a dismissal without prejudice of a count in a multipoint indictment does not prevent the judgment of conviction on the remaining counts from being a final, appealable order. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The term “harm,” for purposes of Ohio’s kidnapping statute, encompasses not only physical harm but also psychological harm.The kidnapping statute reduces the level of the offense from a first-degree felony to a second-degree felony if the victim is released in a “safe place unharmed.” The court of appeals reversed a first-degree kidnapping conviction based on its determination that there was no physical harm to the victim and that “harm” for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2905.01 could not include psychological harm. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain meaning of “harm” includes both physical and psychological harm; and (2) counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a safe-place-unharmed instruction, and there was no plain error in the trial judge’s failure to sua sponte provide the instruction. View "State v. Mohamed" on Justia Law

The ordinary meaning of “person” under Ohio’s Dram Shop Act, Ohio Rev. Code 4399.18, includes not only patrons but also dancers, workers, independent contractors, and others served by the liquor-permit holder.A dancer at a strip club left the club intoxicated and caused an accident. The accident victim filed claims for common-law-negligence and violations of the Dram Shop Act against the club and Michael Ferraro, the sole officer and shareholder of the club. A magistrate directed a verdict in favor of Ferraro as to his personal liability and in favor of the club as to its liability under the Act. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the victim on the negligence claim. The victim appealed the trial court’s judgment directing a verdict for Ferraro on the issue of personal liability. The court of appeals reversed the judgment against the club on the common-law-negligence claim, which rendered moot the question of Ferraro’s personal liability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Act applies to determine the liability of a permit holder who sold intoxicating beverages to an intoxicated worker or independent contractor whose intoxication causes an injury; and (2) because the Act applies, Ferraro and the club may not be held liable under common-law-negligence principles. View "Johnson v. Montgomery" on Justia Law