Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Martin was convicted in Cleveland Heights Municipal Court of receiving stolen property and other charges. The Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal for lack of a final order. Martin sought a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Buchanan to issue a final, appealable order. The Eighth District denied the petition because Judge Buchanan had set the matter for a hearing to address the finality of the judgment, so Martin had an adequate remedy at law. Martin’s petition also sought a writ of prohibition against the clerk of courts, alleging that a third party had posted his bail in an unrelated case and that the clerk had fraudulently applied those sums to the fines and costs assessed in this case. The Eighth District also denied that writ, finding that the depositor had consented to that disposition of funds. While his appeal was pending, Judge Buchanan issued a judgment entry. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Martin’s mandamus petition was moot. Three elements are necessary for a writ of prohibition: the exercise of judicial power, lack of authority to exercise that power, and lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The clerk’s action did not constitute the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial authority. View "Martin v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

K.R. filed suit in the domestic-relations court to establish paternity and to allocate parental rights and responsibilities for M.W.’s minor child. On Friday, April 14, the court held a hearing on its own motion; Magistrate McKinley issued a decision, finding probable cause to believe that the child was a neglected, abused, and/or dependent child, that she was in immediate danger, and that removal was necessary to prevent immediate or threatened physical or emotional harm. He ordered the child placed in the immediate custody of Richland County Children Services (RCCS) and ordered the case transferred to the juvenile court. The following Monday, RCCS sought to set aside that decision. Days later, Judge Cockley signed a judgment entry adopting the magistrate’s decision. RCCS sought a writ of mandamus to compel a ruling on RCCS’s motion and a writ of prohibition vacating the decision and barring the domestic-relations court from issuing future custody orders that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the motion to dismiss, granted a peremptory writ of prohibition, and denied the requested writ of mandamus as moot. The domestic-relations court’s only recourse, upon suspicion of abuse, neglect, or dependency, is to transfer the matter to the juvenile court. Magistrate McKinley and Judge Cockley unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to order that the child be placed in the immediate custody of RCCS. View "Richland County Children Services. v. Richland County. Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Scott W. Nusbaum to issue a final, appealable order in a proceeding brought under Ohio Rev. Code 2935.09. The appeals court granted Judge Nusbaum’s motion to dismiss under Ohio R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6). Appellant appealed. Judge Nusbaum filed an unopposed motion to strike Appellant’s merit brief, arguing that Appellant served him with a different, typewritten document, also captioned as a merit brief. The Supreme Court denied the motion to strike but affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s mandamus action, holding that Appellant failed to establish that Judge Nusbaum had a clear legal duty to issue a final, appealable order. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Nusbaum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus to compel Judge David L. Johnson to vacate Appellant’s aggravated murder conviction and issue a final appealable order disposing of one count of having a weapon while under disability that was charged in the same criminal case.At the time of this appeal, Appellant had been imprisoned for more than fifteen years, his conviction and sentence had been upheld on direct appeal, and his collateral attack on the finality of his conviction had been rejected by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that Appellant’s appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate his judgment of conviction was an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and accordingly, Appellant’s complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. View "State ex rel. Peoples v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the judgment of the court of appeals in which the court concluded that the Industrial Commission of Ohio should not have denied the application of Appellee for permanent total disability compensation, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment to the extent that it granted a limited writ of mandamus. The Commission denied Appellee's application, in part, based on Appellee’s refusal to participate in rehabilitative services. The court of appeals issued the limited writ ordering the Commission to address the merits of Appellee’s application without relying on his alleged refusal to accept vocational-rehabilitation services. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and ordered the Commission to consider all the evidence in the record that is related to vocational-rehabilitation services before determining whether Appellee was entitled to permanent total disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Gulley v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling the trial court to issue a final, appealable order for his 1986 convictions and sentence. In his petition, Appellant argued that the 1986 judgment entry was unsigned and therefore void. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court’s 1986 judgment was a final judgment and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even accepting as true Appellant’s assertion that the entry was unsigned, res judicata barred Appellant from raising his claim that the entry did not comply with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32. View "State ex rel. Woods v. Dinkelacker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) dismissing NASCAR Holdings, Inc.’s notice of appeal solely because it was filed by an attorney who was not licensed to practice law in Ohio.The Department of Taxation issued an assessment against NASCAR for $549,520. The Tax Commissioner affirmed the assessment. NASCAR filed a notice of appeal to the BTA. The notice was signed by a Florida-based attorney who was not licensed to practice law in Ohio. The BTA dismissed the appeal, finding that the attorney had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when he prepared and filed the notice of appeal on NASCAR’s behalf and that this rendered the notice of appeal void ab initio, thereby depriving the Board of jurisdiction over NASCAR’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA erred in not applying Jemo Associates, Inc. v. Lindley, 415 N.E.2d 292 (Ohio 1980), to the facts of this case. View "NASCAR Holdings, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

In this mandamus case in which Appellant challenged an order of the Industrial Commission granting an additional award for the violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), the nip-point rule found in Ohio Admin. Code 4123:1-5-11(D)(10)(a) did not apply.The Commission determined that Appellant had violated the nip-point rule, thereby causing an industrial injury to Duane Ashworth. The court of appeals denied Appellant’s request for a writ. The Supreme Court reversed and issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to issue a new order that denies Ashworth’s application for a VSSR award, holding that the nip-point rule did not apply because an administrative code provision applicable to the rubber and plastics industry expressly covered the machine that Ashworth was operating. For the Commission to require Appellant to comply with the nip-point rule, it must ignore this provision, and the Commission’s failure to apply the provision was not reasonable and thus an abuse of its discretion. View "State ex rel. 31, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

Century Negotiations, Inc. engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by conducting debt-settlement negotiations on behalf of Ohio consumers, as charged by the Ohio State Bar Association.The Board found that Century Negotiations engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by conducting debt-settlement negotiations for more than 3,000 Ohio customers. The Board concluded that no civil penalty was warranted because the company, inter alia, agreed not to engage in the unauthorized practice of law in the future. The Supreme Court adopted the Board’s findings and recommendation and issued an injunction prohibiting Century Negotiations from engaging in further conduct that constitutes the practice of law in Ohio. View "Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Century Negotiations, Inc." on Justia Law

Home Advocate Trustees, LLC (HAT) engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by providing legal counsel to Ohio residents whose Ohio real property was in foreclosure, as charged in a complaint by the Ohio State Bar Association.A panel of the Board of Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice of law granted default judgment against HAT and recommended that the Supreme Court issue an injunction prohibiting HAT from engaging in further acts of the unauthorized practice of law and impose a civil penalty. The Board adopted the panel’s findings and recommendation. The Supreme Court adopted the Board’s findings of fact and determination that HAT engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, adopted the Board’s recommendation that an injunction prohibiting HAT from attempting to represent the legal interests of others performing legal services in Ohio, and agreed that HAT’s conduct warranted the imposition of civil penalties. View "Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Home Advocate Trustees, L.L.C." on Justia Law