Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ of mandamus that ordered the administrator of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (Bureau) to vacate the order of the administrator’s designee finding that Daily Services LLC was the successor to I-Force, LLC and was responsible for I-Force’s rights and obligations, holding that Daily Services failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to relief in mandamus.After Daily Services received from the Bureau an invoice for more than $3.48 million for I-Force’s unpaid premiums, it filed a protest. An adjudicating committee determined that Daily Services was the successor to I-Force under former Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-02(C)(1). The administrator’s designee upheld the decision. The court of appeals, however, concluded that Daily Services did not “wholly succeed” the business operations of I-Force. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Bureau did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Daily Services wholly succeeded the business operations of I-Force even if it did not assume every customer, employee, or lease held by I-Force; and (2) the Bureau’s statutory obligation to safeguard the Workers’ Compensation Fund authorizes it to find that an employer is a “successor in interest” when that employer attempts to evade workers’ compensation liabilities. View "State ex rel. Daily Services, LLC v. Morrison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a motion to dismiss Appellant’s complaint for a writ of mandamus challenging the Industrial Commission’s determination that it had continuing jurisdiction to reconsider a previous order denying a claim for death benefits because of a clear mistake of fact regarding how the decedent worker died, holding that the complaint did state a claim for relief.Appellant’s complaint for a writ of mandamus alleged that the Commission abused its discretion in determining that the staff hearing officer had based the disallowance of the claim for death benefits on a clear mistake of fact. Because this question involved whether there was a factual mistake sufficient to invoke the continuing-jurisdiction provisions of Ohio Rev. Code 4123.52, the question was a proper subject matter for an action seeking a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the action on the basis that the Commission’s decision to exercise its continuing jurisdiction was appealable to the court of common pleas. View "State ex rel. Belle Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a motion to dismiss Appellant’s complaint for a writ of mandamus challenging the Industrial Commission’s determination that it had continuing jurisdiction to reconsider a previous order denying a claim for death benefits because of a clear mistake of fact regarding how the decedent worker died, holding that the complaint did state a claim for relief.Appellant’s complaint for a writ of mandamus alleged that the Commission abused its discretion in determining that the staff hearing officer had based the disallowance of the claim for death benefits on a clear mistake of fact. Because this question involved whether there was a factual mistake sufficient to invoke the continuing-jurisdiction provisions of Ohio Rev. Code 4123.52, the question was a proper subject matter for an action seeking a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the action on the basis that the Commission’s decision to exercise its continuing jurisdiction was appealable to the court of common pleas. View "State ex rel. Belle Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The unambiguous language of Ohio Rev. Code 2744.02(B)(3), which provides that a political subdivision may be held liable for the negligent failure to keep public roads in repair and the negligent failure to remove obstructions from them, required that the City of Campbell be granted judgment as a matter of law in this personal injury action seeking recovery based on the City’s alleged failure to remove foliage that was growing thirty-four feet in front of a stop sign.The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether section 2744.02(B)(3) applied as an exception to the City’s immunity from suit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the stop sign at issue was in repair and not obstructed, this matter must be remanded to the trial court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the City. View "Pelletier v. City of Campbell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the two courts of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and Appellant’s petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus.Appellant was convicted in two separate common pleas cases, one involving the murder and robbery of Christine Kozak (the Kozak case) and the other case involving the robberies of David Sotka and the Lawson Milk Company (the Sotka case). In both of his petitions, Appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the general division of the common pleas court in both the Kozak case and the Sotka case. Both petitions alleged that there was an allegedly defective transfer from the juvenile division. The Supreme Court held (1) the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant’s habeas petition for failure to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus; and (2) Appellant had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to challenge the validity of the bindover, and therefore, Appellant’s request for writs of prohibition and mandamus were properly dismissed. View "Johnson v. Sloan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of habeas corpus sought by Tyrone Oliver and commanded Oliver’s immediate release from incarceration.In 1993, Oliver was sentenced to an indeterminate prison sentence of eight to twenty-five years for involuntary manslaughter. The Bureau of Sentence Computation calculated his maximum-sentence release date as January 9, 2018. Oliver received parole release in July 2003. In February 2005 he pleaded guilty to a domestic violence charge and received a two year sentence. On January 26, 2018, Oliver filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Oliver’s 2005 sentence for domestic violence was to be served concurrently with, not consecutively to, his 1993 sentence for involuntary manslaughter, and therefore, Oliver had served his maximum sentence and was entitled to immediate release. View "State ex rel. Oliver v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of habeas corpus sought by Tyrone Oliver and commanded Oliver’s immediate release from incarceration.In 1993, Oliver was sentenced to an indeterminate prison sentence of eight to twenty-five years for involuntary manslaughter. The Bureau of Sentence Computation calculated his maximum-sentence release date as January 9, 2018. Oliver received parole release in July 2003. In February 2005 he pleaded guilty to a domestic violence charge and received a two year sentence. On January 26, 2018, Oliver filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Oliver’s 2005 sentence for domestic violence was to be served concurrently with, not consecutively to, his 1993 sentence for involuntary manslaughter, and therefore, Oliver had served his maximum sentence and was entitled to immediate release. View "State ex rel. Oliver v. Turner" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the Ohio use tax applied to Lafarge North America, Inc.’s purchases of fuel and repair parts for equipment used to break up and transport solidified slag, a by-product from molten ore during steelmaking, from the “slag mountain," a large slag mass. Whether the tax applied depended on whether the activity was part of Lafarge’s “manufacturing operation” under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.02(B)(42)(g).The Department of Taxation assessed a use tax and penalty against Lafarge for purchases for the equipment at issue. Lafarge challenged the assessment. The tax commissioner determined that the breaking up and transport of slag from the slag mountain preceded Lafarge’s manufacturing operation and that equipment used to move raw materials prior to the start of the manufacturing process was taxable. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the tax assessment and penalty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Lafarge’s manufacturing operation began once Lafarge cut slag from the mountain and continued as the material was crushed, placed in dump trucks, and transported to a screening plant. View "Lafarge North America, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) valuing Appellant’s property in accordance with a sale price and determining that Appellant’s appraisal evidence did not negate the presumption that the sale was characteristic of true value.For tax year 2011, the Franklin County auditor valued one of Appellant’s parcels of property at $132,700 and the second parcel at $1,717,300, for a total valuation of $1,850,000. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) assigned a total value to the subject property of $1,602,700 for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013, thus rejecting the Hilliard City Schools Board of Education’s (BOE) argument that a 2009 sale price established the property’s value. The BTA determined that the property’s value should be a total of $2,313,490 for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013, finding that the sale price presumptively established the subject property’s value and that Appellant had failed to rebut that presumption by showing that the sale was not a recent arm’s-length transaction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not bear its burden at the BTA to negate the sale price as the criterion of value. View "Hilliard City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Lorain County Board of Revision (BOR) had continuing-complaint jurisdiction to determine the value of a property for tax years 2012, 2013, and 2014 and therefore, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) erred in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over tax year 2014.Appellant sought a reduction from the value determined by the Lorain County auditor for the three years at issue by asserting a continuing complaint. Appellant predicated its claim on its originally filed complaint, which had challenged the property valuation for tax year 2009. That complaint was finally determined in 2014. Appellant’s continuing complaint sought to apply the same value determined in that case to 2012, 2013, and 2014. The BOR retained the auditor’s valuation. The BTA adopted Appellant’s appraiser’s valuation of $750,000 for 2012 and 2013 but concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the value for tax year 2014. Specifically, the BTA found that the BOR lacked jurisdiction over tax year 2014 because a proper complaint was not filed for that tax year. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the BOR had jurisdiction to determine the property’s value for tax years 2012, 2013, and 2014; and (2) an aggregate value of $750,000 shall be assigned to the property for all three tax years. View "Novita Industries, LLC v. Lorain County Board of Revision" on Justia Law