Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
In re Review of Alternative Energy Rider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in remanded in part the order of the Public Utilities Commission ordering First Energy companies (collectively, FirstEnergy) to refund more than $43 million to ratepayers and granting several motions for protective orders granting trade-secret protection to certain information related to FirstEnergy’s purchase of renewable-energy-credits (REC). The court held (1) the Commission engaged in unlawful retroactive ratemaking when it ordered FirstEnergy to refund more than $43 million in previously recovered REC costs to ratepayers; and (2) the Commission’s decision to grant trade-secret status to certain information related to FirstEnergy’s in-state REC purchases lacked record support. View "In re Review of Alternative Energy Rider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
In re Review of Alternative Energy Rider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in remanded in part the order of the Public Utilities Commission ordering First Energy companies (collectively, FirstEnergy) to refund more than $43 million to ratepayers and granting several motions for protective orders granting trade-secret protection to certain information related to FirstEnergy’s purchase of renewable-energy-credits (REC). The court held (1) the Commission engaged in unlawful retroactive ratemaking when it ordered FirstEnergy to refund more than $43 million in previously recovered REC costs to ratepayers; and (2) the Commission’s decision to grant trade-secret status to certain information related to FirstEnergy’s in-state REC purchases lacked record support. View "In re Review of Alternative Energy Rider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
State v. Banks-Harvey
A law enforcement agency’s policy that an arrestee’s personal effects must accompany the arrestee to jail, on its own, cannot justify the warrantless retrieval of an arrestee’s personal effects from a location that is protected under the Fourth Amendment. Further, a search of personal effects obtained as a result of following such a policy is not a valid inventory search.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which upheld the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of her purse, and vacated Defendant’s convictions for felony possession of drugs and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and drug-abuse instruments. The court held (1) the removal of Defendant’s purse from a car in which Defendant was a passenger and the subsequent search of the purse was unlawful; and (2) the exclusionary rule applied to require the suppression of the evidence obtained during the unconstitutional search. View "State v. Banks-Harvey" on Justia Law
Cyran v. Cyran
Rebecca and Curtis divorced. A shared-parenting decree was put into effect for their sons. In June 2015, Rebecca sought a domestic-violence civil protection order against Curtis, R.C. 3113.31, stating that she was approaching Curtis’s house to pick up the children when Curtis rushed out and threw her backward into the bushes and said Rebecca was lucky that he did not shoot her. In August 2015, the court entered a permanent domestic-violence civil protection order that expired on June 19, 2016. On September 9, the appellate court issued a show-cause order asking the parties to explain why an appeal should not be dismissed as moot because the protection order had expired. Curtis responded that Rebecca had sought the order as leverage for future post-divorce proceedings and that he faced possible collateral consequences concerning his concealed-firearm permit, his credit report, his ability to obtain housing, drive certain vehicles, and obtain future employment. Rebecca did not respond. The appellate court dismissed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. Absent demonstrated legal collateral consequences, the collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply to an expired domestic-violence civil protection order. The court declined to establish a rebuttable presumption that an appeal from an expired domestic-violence civil protection order is not moot. View "Cyran v. Cyran" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Family Law
In re R.K.
In this termination of parental rights case, the actions of the juvenile court in allowing the attorney for Mother to withdraw from the case at a permanent custody hearing and proceeding with the hearing without Mother present and without an attorney representing her constituted reversible error. The juvenile court granted permanent custody of Mother’s child to Franklin County Children Services after the permanent custody hearing. the court of appeals upheld the permanent custody order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mother did not waive her right to counsel when she did not appear at the final hearing and was improperly denied her right to counsel. View "In re R.K." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
State v. Pountney
Pountney was indicted for theft, identity fraud, and two counts of drug possession—one involving fentanyl and one involving acetaminophen with codeine. Pountney stipulated to the charges of theft, identity fraud, and possession of acetaminophen with codeine. Count 4 alleged that Pountney knowingly obtained, possessed or used at least five but not more than 50 times the "bulk amount" of fentanyl, R.C. 2925.11(A), a second-degree felony under R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(c). The “bulk amount” of a Schedule II opiate or opium derivative, like fentanyl, is an amount equal to or exceeding 20 grams or five times the maximum daily dose in the usual dose range specified in a standard pharmaceutical reference manual. Pountney stipulated that he knowingly obtained 10 three-day transdermal fentanyl patches; each delivered 50 micrograms of fentanyl per hour. If the state proved that 10 patches equaled or exceeded five times the bulk amount of transdermal fentanyl, Pountney would be guilty of a second-degree felony; otherwise, he would be guilty of a fifth-degree felony. The court found Pountney guilty on all counts, including second-degree-felony aggravated possession of fentanyl. The Eighth District reversed with instructions to enter a finding of guilty on Count 4 as a fifth-degree felony. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. Although there is no usual dose range of fentanyl, the state may not rely upon the usual dose range of morphine, the prototype opiate, to establish the bulk amount of fentanyl under R.C. 2925.01(D)(1)(d). View "State v. Pountney" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech
In re D.H.
A juvenile who is bound over to adult court must wait to appeal until the end of the adult-court proceedings.D.H. was a juvenile at the time he was charged with robbery. The juvenile court determined that D.H. was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system and transferred jurisdiction to the adult court. D.H. then pled no contest to the charges in adult court. The court of appeals concluded that because the juvenile court had not articulated the reasons that D.H. was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system, the court erred in transferring D.H. On remand, the juvenile court once again found that D.H. was not amenable to rehabilitation. D.H. immediately appealed the juvenile court’s transfer orders rather than wait until the end of the adult-court proceedings. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the juvenile court’s orders transferring jurisdiction to the adult court are not final orders under Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02(B)(4). View "In re D.H." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Juvenile Law
State v. Beasley
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which concluded that Defendant forfeited her right to challenge the trial court’s policy of refusing to accept no-contest pleas. The court of appeals ruled that the trial court erred in adopting a blanket policy of refusing to accept no-contest pleas but found that Defendant did not preserve the error for appeal. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred by adhering to such an arbitrary policy but held that Defendant preserved the error for appeal. The court remanded the matter to the trial court to allow Defendant to enter a new plea in accordance with Ohio R. Crim. P. 11. View "State v. Beasley" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Lucarell v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
In this case alleging breach of contract, fraud, retaliation, constructive discharge, and invasion of privacy, the Supreme Court held (1) in Ohio, punitive damages may not be awarded for a breach of contract; (2) a party to a contract does not breach the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by seeking to enforce the agreement as written or by acting in accordance with its express terms, and the implied duty is not breached unless a specific obligation imposed by the contract is not met; (3) a release of liability is an absolute bar to a later action on any claim encompassed within it absent a showing of fraud, duress, or other wrongful conduct in procuring it, and a party must prove duress by clear and convincing evidence; (4) the prevention of performance doctrine is not a defense to a release of liability and therefore cannot be asserted as a defense to a release; and (5) a claimant cannot rely on predictions or projections that relate to future performance or that are made to third parties to establish a fraud claim. View "Lucarell v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co.
The 74-acre Washington County parcel, near the Ohio River, is subject to a 1980 oil and gas lease between the then-owners and Collins-McGregor, to permit “mining and operating for oil and gas and laying pipe lines, and building tanks, powers, stations, and structures thereon, to produce, save and take care of said products.” Collins-McGregor committed to make royalty payments based on the gas produced and to deliver a portion of the oil produced from the land to the lessors. The lease “shall remain in force for a term of One (1) years from [the effective] date, and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from said land by the lessee.” A well was drilled in 1981 and has produced oil and gas in paying quantities since then from the “Gordon Sand” formation. The Landowners contend that production of oil and gas has occurred near their property from below that formation but Collins-McGregor has not explored deep formations for lack of equipment or financial resources. They sought a judgment that the portion of the lease covering depths below the Gordon Sand has terminated because it has expired or been abandoned and that Collins-McGregor has breached implied covenants, including implied covenants of reasonable development and to explore further. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed dismissal. Ohio law does not recognize an implied covenant to explore further separate from the implied covenant of reasonable development. View "Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co." on Justia Law