Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) valuing Appellant’s property in accordance with a sale price and determining that Appellant’s appraisal evidence did not negate the presumption that the sale was characteristic of true value.For tax year 2011, the Franklin County auditor valued one of Appellant’s parcels of property at $132,700 and the second parcel at $1,717,300, for a total valuation of $1,850,000. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) assigned a total value to the subject property of $1,602,700 for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013, thus rejecting the Hilliard City Schools Board of Education’s (BOE) argument that a 2009 sale price established the property’s value. The BTA determined that the property’s value should be a total of $2,313,490 for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013, finding that the sale price presumptively established the subject property’s value and that Appellant had failed to rebut that presumption by showing that the sale was not a recent arm’s-length transaction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not bear its burden at the BTA to negate the sale price as the criterion of value. View "Hilliard City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Lorain County Board of Revision (BOR) had continuing-complaint jurisdiction to determine the value of a property for tax years 2012, 2013, and 2014 and therefore, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) erred in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over tax year 2014.Appellant sought a reduction from the value determined by the Lorain County auditor for the three years at issue by asserting a continuing complaint. Appellant predicated its claim on its originally filed complaint, which had challenged the property valuation for tax year 2009. That complaint was finally determined in 2014. Appellant’s continuing complaint sought to apply the same value determined in that case to 2012, 2013, and 2014. The BOR retained the auditor’s valuation. The BTA adopted Appellant’s appraiser’s valuation of $750,000 for 2012 and 2013 but concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the value for tax year 2014. Specifically, the BTA found that the BOR lacked jurisdiction over tax year 2014 because a proper complaint was not filed for that tax year. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the BOR had jurisdiction to determine the property’s value for tax years 2012, 2013, and 2014; and (2) an aggregate value of $750,000 shall be assigned to the property for all three tax years. View "Novita Industries, LLC v. Lorain County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a trial court must inform an offender at the time of sentencing that the commission of a felony during a period of post-release control permits a trial court to impose a new prison term for the violation to be served consecutively with any prison term for the new felony.Defendant was convicted of rape of victims less than thirteen years of age and three counts of gross sexual imposition regarding victims less than thirteen years of age. At sentencing the trial court imposed the mandatory term of postrelease control and informed Defendant that if he were convicted of a new felony offense while on post-release controversy, the sentencing court could impose a prison term for the new felony offense, along with an additional consecutive prison term for the post-release control violation. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error when it sentenced him without properly giving him all of the required notifications as required by Ohio Rev. Code 2929.19(B)(4) and concerning post-release control. The court of appeals rejected the argument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 2929.19(B)(2)(e) does not require that a trial court notify an offender at his or her initial sentencing hearing of the penalty provisions contained in Ohio Rev. Code 2929.141(A)(1) and (2). View "State v. Gordon" on Justia Law

In this real-property-valuation case, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) finding that the appraisal report presented by the Washington County Board of Revision and Washington County auditor (collectively, the County) constituted the most competent and probative evidence of the value of the subject property for tax year 2013.The BTA relied on the County’s report to value a property owned by Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc./Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC (collectively, Lowe’s), even though Lowe’s presented its own appraisal report. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding (1) the Court’s decisions in Steak ’N Shake, Inc. v. Warrant County Board of Revision, 48 N.E.3d 535 (Ohio 2015), Rite Aid of Ohio, Inc. v. Washington County Board of Revision, 54 N.E.3d 1177 (Ohio 2016), and Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc. v. Washington County Board of Revision, 49 N.E.3d 1266 (Ohio 2016), provide the proper guideposts for resolving this controversy; and (2) because the BTA had yet to evaluate the evidence in light of the legal standards articulated in these three decisions, the case must be remanded for further proceedings. View "Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. v. Washington County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of aggravated murder with a death specification, felony-murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and other crimes and the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty.On appeal, Defendant presented eighteen propositions of law. The Supreme Court examined each of Defendant’s claims and found that none had merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence of death, holding that there was no reversible error committed in the proceedings below and that Defendant was not entitled to relief. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) following the Court’s remand in Navistar I, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in upholding the tax commissioner’s reduction of Navistar Inc.’s commercial-activity-tax (CAT) credit to zero.In Navistar I, the Supreme Court concluded that the BTA had ignored the testimony of Navistar’s experts in upholding the commissioner’s reduction of Navistar’s CAT credit to zero, an omission that made the BTA’s decision unreasonable and unlawful. After the BTA again upheld the tax commissioner’s decision, Navistar appealed, objecting to the BTA’s findings and its conclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA’s findings were supported by reliable and probative evidence and that the BTA’s conclusion was reasonable and lawful. View "Navistar, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the complaint filed by Relator seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Ohio Secretary of State, the Franklin County Board of Elections, and the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections, to preserve digital ballot images created by voting equipment used in the May 8, 2018 election.Relator alleged that the digital ballot images were public records that, under Ohio Rev. Code 149.351(A), may not be removed, destroyed, or disposed of, and that elections officials were under an affirmative duty, under 52 U.S.C. 20701, to preserve these records. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that Relator was attempting to prevent an injury that has not yet occurred by that she anticipates will occur, which request was better suited for an action seeking a request for a writ of mandamus in the nature of a prohibitory injunction, over which this Court does not have original jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Gadell-Newton v. Husted" on Justia Law

In adoption proceedings, a probate court must consider the existence of pending parenting matters when determining whether an exception to the requirement of parental consent to adoption applies.Stepfather filed petitions to adopt the minor children of his wife and Father, her ex-husband. Stepfather’s adoption petition stated that Father’s consent was not required under an exception set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 3107.06 because Father failed without justifiable cause to provide more than a de minimis contact with the children for at least a year immediately preceding the filing of the petitions. While Stepfather’s adoption petitions were pending in the probate court, proceedings in domestic-relations court remained ongoing, specifically, Father’s motion to reestablish parenting time. The probate court determined that Father’s consent was not required. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the probate court had jurisdiction to proceed on the adoption petitions despite the pending parenting matter in the domestic-relations court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probate court failed to consider Father’s motion to reestablish parenting time in determining whether Father’s consent to the adoption of his children was required. View "In re Adoption of M.G.B.-E." on Justia Law

The tort of intentional interference with or destruction of evidence does not include claims alleging interference with or concealment of evidence that disrupt a plaintiff’s underlying case.Appellee filed an action against a school district, its board of education, and five board members (collectively, school defendants) alleging wrongful termination and sex discrimination. Appellants were attorneys who represented the school defendants in the wrongful termination case. While the wrongful termination case was pending, Appellee filed the instant action against Appellants, alleging intentional spoliation of evidence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Appellants because Appellee was unable to establish that Appellants had physically destroyed evidence. The appellate division reversed, concluding that the intentional concealment, interference with, or misrepresentation of evidence was sufficient to establish a viable spoliation claim. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that allegations of intentional interference with or concealment of evidence are not actionable under the independent tort of intentional spoliation of evidence. View "Elliott-Thomas v. Smith" on Justia Law

The law of the case from the first appeal in this case was not relevant in the second appeal because, on remand from the first appeal, the trial court had relied on new evidence to decide that Nicholas Giancola had signed an arbitration agreement.Plaintiff brought this survival action and wrongful death action, claiming that Giancola’s death was caused by injuries that he sustained while he was at Walton Manor Health Care Center. Walton Manor moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Giancola had entered into a binding arbitration agreement with Walton Manor. The trial court ordered arbitration of the survival action, finding that Giancola’s mother had signed the arbitration agreement and that she had apparent authority to bind her son to its terms. The appellate court reversed. On remand, the trial court referred the appropriate counts to arbitration, concluding that Giancola had signed the arbitration agreement. The appellate court held that the trial court had violated the law-of-the-case doctrine when it reconsidered the issue of who had signed the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not prevent the trial court on remand from considering new evidence as to whether Giancola signed the arbitration agreement. View "Giancola v. Azem" on Justia Law