Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A juvenile who is bound over to adult court must wait to appeal until the end of the adult-court proceedings.D.H. was a juvenile at the time he was charged with robbery. The juvenile court determined that D.H. was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system and transferred jurisdiction to the adult court. D.H. then pled no contest to the charges in adult court. The court of appeals concluded that because the juvenile court had not articulated the reasons that D.H. was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system, the court erred in transferring D.H. On remand, the juvenile court once again found that D.H. was not amenable to rehabilitation. D.H. immediately appealed the juvenile court’s transfer orders rather than wait until the end of the adult-court proceedings. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the juvenile court’s orders transferring jurisdiction to the adult court are not final orders under Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02(B)(4). View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which concluded that Defendant forfeited her right to challenge the trial court’s policy of refusing to accept no-contest pleas. The court of appeals ruled that the trial court erred in adopting a blanket policy of refusing to accept no-contest pleas but found that Defendant did not preserve the error for appeal. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred by adhering to such an arbitrary policy but held that Defendant preserved the error for appeal. The court remanded the matter to the trial court to allow Defendant to enter a new plea in accordance with Ohio R. Crim. P. 11. View "State v. Beasley" on Justia Law

In this case alleging breach of contract, fraud, retaliation, constructive discharge, and invasion of privacy, the Supreme Court held (1) in Ohio, punitive damages may not be awarded for a breach of contract; (2) a party to a contract does not breach the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by seeking to enforce the agreement as written or by acting in accordance with its express terms, and the implied duty is not breached unless a specific obligation imposed by the contract is not met; (3) a release of liability is an absolute bar to a later action on any claim encompassed within it absent a showing of fraud, duress, or other wrongful conduct in procuring it, and a party must prove duress by clear and convincing evidence; (4) the prevention of performance doctrine is not a defense to a release of liability and therefore cannot be asserted as a defense to a release; and (5) a claimant cannot rely on predictions or projections that relate to future performance or that are made to third parties to establish a fraud claim. View "Lucarell v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The 74-acre Washington County parcel, near the Ohio River, is subject to a 1980 oil and gas lease between the then-owners and Collins-McGregor, to permit “mining and operating for oil and gas and laying pipe lines, and building tanks, powers, stations, and structures thereon, to produce, save and take care of said products.” Collins-McGregor committed to make royalty payments based on the gas produced and to deliver a portion of the oil produced from the land to the lessors. The lease “shall remain in force for a term of One (1) years from [the effective] date, and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from said land by the lessee.” A well was drilled in 1981 and has produced oil and gas in paying quantities since then from the “Gordon Sand” formation. The Landowners contend that production of oil and gas has occurred near their property from below that formation but Collins-McGregor has not explored deep formations for lack of equipment or financial resources. They sought a judgment that the portion of the lease covering depths below the Gordon Sand has terminated because it has expired or been abandoned and that Collins-McGregor has breached implied covenants, including implied covenants of reasonable development and to explore further. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed dismissal. Ohio law does not recognize an implied covenant to explore further separate from the implied covenant of reasonable development. View "Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co." on Justia Law

In 2005, Roark, a Sunesis laborer, was working alone at the bottom of a trench, when the trench collapsed, killing him. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded Roark’s dependent children benefits. The dependents sought an additional award based on violations of specific safety requirements for sloping, shoring, and bracing. A hearing officer concluded that Roark’s death was the result of Sunesis’s failure to properly support the trench and ordered Sunesis to pay an additional award based on violations of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-13. On remand, a hearing officer issued factual findings based on photographs and testimony: Three sides of the trench were adequately shored. The fourth wall, which caved in on Roark, consisted of soil that Sunesis attempted to shore up by sloping the wall and inserting a steel plate above the slope. The hearing officer found no evidence that Roark disregarded instructions to work inside a large underground pipe. On rehearing, in 2012, a hearing officer identified the soil involved as soft material, Class C soil with groundwater, stating that Code Table 13-1 addresses the approximate angle of repose for sloping: The presence of groundwater requires special treatment. The commission, the Tenth District, and the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the award. It was within the commission’s discretion to conclude that the trench was not properly shored or braced, exposing employees to the danger of moving ground and that failure to comply with the regulations proximately caused Roark’s death. View "Sunesis Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

Notestine, a nonprofit corporation with 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) status as a charitable institution, owns the 11-unit residential rental property developed as low-income housing under 12 U.S.C. 1701q. Construction costs were $1.5 million. The federal capital advance was $1.3 million. The “project rental assistance” contract requires tenants to be at least 62 years old and have income under 50 percent of the area median. Rent is tied to tenant income at $407 per month, including utilities, with any overage payable to HUD. Tenants pay up to 30 percent of their adjusted gross income on rent, with HUD subsidizing any difference. Capital Advance Program Use and Regulatory Agreements were recorded on title, in effect at least 40 years from 2013, unless released by HUD. An auditor valued the property at $811,120 for 2013, a Logan County reappraisal year. Notestine sought a reduction, arguing that the building's value was $165,000, based on actual rent and expenses. The Board of Tax Appeals adopted the opinion of Notestine’s appraiser, who valued the property at $75,000. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. Although market rents and expenses constitute a “rule” when valuing low-income government housing generally, that rule is presumptive, not conclusive. In this case, the rents are minimal, and federal subsidization is strictly controlled by HUD-imposed restrictions on the accumulation of surpluses. There is no evidence that any adjustment from contract rent to market rent would eliminate the “affirmative value” of government subsidies. View "Notestine Manor, Inc. v. Logan County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The 36-unit North Canton apartment complex went into foreclosure.The lender obtained a judgment of $1,700,000. There were no bids at a sheriff’s sale with a minimum bid of $1,400,000. The receiver marketed the property through a national brojkerage firm, which, in a mass-mailing flyer showed a price of $1,325,000. The marketing materials did not mention the sheriff’s sale. There were 17 inquiries and at least six offers to purchase, ranging from $820,000 to $1,200,000, from LFG. There was no relationship between LFG and the receiver or the former owner. The court approved a sale as “commercially reasonable.” Title transferred to LFG in 2011. LFG sought to reduce the property’s tax-year-2012 valuation from $1,841,300 to $1,200,000. The Board of Education filed a counter-complaint. The board relied on “strong testimony” by LFG and “good evidence” that the property was marketed over time and that the price represented fair market value. The Board of Tax Appeals reinstated the auditor’s valuation. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, with the instruction that the $1,200,000 sale price be used as the property’s true value for tax purposes. Under the “forced sale” provision of R.C. 5713.04, a forced sale gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the sale price is not the true value. In this case, the presumption was rebutted by ncontradicted evidence that the transaction at issue was at arms length. View "North Canton City School District Board of Education v. Stark County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

OP receives bales of recycled paper bound with wire, which are loaded onto a conveyor for transport into a pulper. An overhead saw cuts the wire. Most wires end up in the pulper, but some get wrapped around the conveyor's shafts and gears. For routine maintenance, the conveyor operator, who worked inside a control shack, switched the machine to maintenance mode. Ruckman and Horvath began following the company’s required lock-out/tag-out procedures and shut down the machine. They removed a guard to remove wires from chains and sprockets. After Horvath left the area, Ruckman, trying to remove wires that were stuck, unlocked and activated the conveyor and reached in. His hand was pulled into the machine. Ruckman was unable to reach the emergency-stop button. Ruckman’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for left-hand amputation and replantation, major depressive disorder, and total loss of use of the hand. He obtained an additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), alleging that OP had violated regulations that require guards and emergency-shut-off buttons on power-driven conveyors. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. OP provided an emergency-stop button within reach of the operator and guards around pinch points during normal operations. When the machine was undergoing maintenance, OP required that the conveyor be shut down and locked. Rules intended to protect the employees while the conveyor is operating do not apply during maintenance when there is no power. Ruckman's violation of safety protocol was the proximate cause of his injury; only acts within the employer’s control can be the basis for a VSSR. View "Ohio Paperboard v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

In 2004, McCain was charged with felony murder, aggravated robbery, and falsification. Judge Froelich, of the Montgomery County Court, entered a not-guilty plea on McCain’s behalf after McCain “stood mute.” McCain’s later claimed that he attempted to plead guilty at his arraignment. Later, before Judge Huffman, McCain pleaded guilty to felony-murder and aggravated-robbery. Judge Huffman erroneously informed McCain that he would be subject to postrelease control on the felony-murder charge. Felony murder is an unclassified felony to which the postrelease-control statute does not apply. The sentence erroneously included postrelease control on both convictions. Judge Huffman later issued a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the error. McCain requested records relating to his arraignment, including video and transcripts. Judge Huffman denied his request. In 2016, McCain sought a writ of mandamus in the Second District, claiming that his attempt to enter a guilty plea at his arraignment divested Judge Huffman of jurisdiction; demanding a full copy of the arraignment transcripts, Referee Report and Video; and claiming constitutional deprivations and ineffective assistance of counsel. He sought to invalidate his plea agreement. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed dismissal. Habeas corpus, not mandamus, is the appropriate action when an inmate seeks release. The court rejected McCain’s argument that his alleged attempt to enter a guilty plea divested Judge Huffman of jurisdiction; a trial court’s jurisdiction does not end until a final judgment has been entered. Judge Huffman properly corrected the sentencing error. View "McCain v. Huffman" on Justia Law

From 2008-2015, Mason was a judge on the Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas. In 2014, Mason assaulted his estranged wife in a moving car, with their children (ages four and six) in the backseat, then drove off, leaving her on the ground. His wife sustained severe harm to her head, face, and neck, including an orbital blowout fracture under her eye, and required surgery. Mason pled guilty to attempted felonious assault, a third-degree felony, and domestic violence, a first-degree misdemeanor. Mason was removed as a judge, was incarcerated, and settled his wife's civil suit for $150,000. The Board of Professional Conduct found that Mason violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (a judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety); Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (a lawyer shall not commit an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness), and 8.4(h) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). After weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, the Board recommended disbarment. The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed that Mason committed the violations but imposed an indefinite suspension with added conditions for reinstatement., noting noted that the attack was not premeditated or part of a pattern of behavior. View "Ohio State Bar Association v. Mason" on Justia Law