Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a group of landowners (“Landowners”) seeking an order compelling the Ohio Department of Natural Resources’ Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (“the Division”) and its chief to commence appropriation proceedings to compensate Landowners for their land that was included in an oil and gas drilling unit. Landowners objected an an order issued by the chief requiring that a reservoir of oil and gas underlying multiple tracts of land be operated as a unit to recover the oil and gas, arguing that the order amounted to a taking of their property for which they must be compensated. The Supreme Court denied Landowners’ petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that Landowners had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to the county court of common pleas. View "State ex rel. Kerns v. Simmers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a group of landowners (“Landowners”) seeking an order compelling the Ohio Department of Natural Resources’ Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (“the Division”) and its chief to commence appropriation proceedings to compensate Landowners for their land that was included in an oil and gas drilling unit. Landowners objected an an order issued by the chief requiring that a reservoir of oil and gas underlying multiple tracts of land be operated as a unit to recover the oil and gas, arguing that the order amounted to a taking of their property for which they must be compensated. The Supreme Court denied Landowners’ petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that Landowners had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to the county court of common pleas. View "State ex rel. Kerns v. Simmers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the decision of the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (BOR) dismissing the complaint filed by Life Path Partners, Ltd. seeking to challenge the valuation of its property for tax year 2012 under the continuing complaint provision in Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D), which provides an exception to the requirement that a taxpayer protesting the valuation of property must file a complaint by march 31 of the year succeeding the tax year in question. The BOR dismissed the case because Life Path had not asked it to exercise its continuing-complaint jurisdiction prior to the deadline that would have applied if Life Path had filed a new complaint challenging the 2012 valuation. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s decision affirming the BOR’s dismissal, holding that Life Path properly invoked the BOR’s continuing- complaint jurisdiction pursuant to section 5715.19(D). View "Life Path Partners, Ltd. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the decision of the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (BOR) dismissing the complaint filed by Life Path Partners, Ltd. seeking to challenge the valuation of its property for tax year 2012 under the continuing complaint provision in Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D), which provides an exception to the requirement that a taxpayer protesting the valuation of property must file a complaint by march 31 of the year succeeding the tax year in question. The BOR dismissed the case because Life Path had not asked it to exercise its continuing-complaint jurisdiction prior to the deadline that would have applied if Life Path had filed a new complaint challenging the 2012 valuation. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s decision affirming the BOR’s dismissal, holding that Life Path properly invoked the BOR’s continuing- complaint jurisdiction pursuant to section 5715.19(D). View "Life Path Partners, Ltd. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in remanded in part the order of the Public Utilities Commission ordering First Energy companies (collectively, FirstEnergy) to refund more than $43 million to ratepayers and granting several motions for protective orders granting trade-secret protection to certain information related to FirstEnergy’s purchase of renewable-energy-credits (REC). The court held (1) the Commission engaged in unlawful retroactive ratemaking when it ordered FirstEnergy to refund more than $43 million in previously recovered REC costs to ratepayers; and (2) the Commission’s decision to grant trade-secret status to certain information related to FirstEnergy’s in-state REC purchases lacked record support. View "In re Review of Alternative Energy Rider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in remanded in part the order of the Public Utilities Commission ordering First Energy companies (collectively, FirstEnergy) to refund more than $43 million to ratepayers and granting several motions for protective orders granting trade-secret protection to certain information related to FirstEnergy’s purchase of renewable-energy-credits (REC). The court held (1) the Commission engaged in unlawful retroactive ratemaking when it ordered FirstEnergy to refund more than $43 million in previously recovered REC costs to ratepayers; and (2) the Commission’s decision to grant trade-secret status to certain information related to FirstEnergy’s in-state REC purchases lacked record support. View "In re Review of Alternative Energy Rider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

A law enforcement agency’s policy that an arrestee’s personal effects must accompany the arrestee to jail, on its own, cannot justify the warrantless retrieval of an arrestee’s personal effects from a location that is protected under the Fourth Amendment. Further, a search of personal effects obtained as a result of following such a policy is not a valid inventory search.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which upheld the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of her purse, and vacated Defendant’s convictions for felony possession of drugs and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and drug-abuse instruments. The court held (1) the removal of Defendant’s purse from a car in which Defendant was a passenger and the subsequent search of the purse was unlawful; and (2) the exclusionary rule applied to require the suppression of the evidence obtained during the unconstitutional search. View "State v. Banks-Harvey" on Justia Law

Rebecca and Curtis divorced. A shared-parenting decree was put into effect for their sons. In June 2015, Rebecca sought a domestic-violence civil protection order against Curtis, R.C. 3113.31, stating that she was approaching Curtis’s house to pick up the children when Curtis rushed out and threw her backward into the bushes and said Rebecca was lucky that he did not shoot her. In August 2015, the court entered a permanent domestic-violence civil protection order that expired on June 19, 2016. On September 9, the appellate court issued a show-cause order asking the parties to explain why an appeal should not be dismissed as moot because the protection order had expired. Curtis responded that Rebecca had sought the order as leverage for future post-divorce proceedings and that he faced possible collateral consequences concerning his concealed-firearm permit, his credit report, his ability to obtain housing, drive certain vehicles, and obtain future employment. Rebecca did not respond. The appellate court dismissed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. Absent demonstrated legal collateral consequences, the collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply to an expired domestic-violence civil protection order. The court declined to establish a rebuttable presumption that an appeal from an expired domestic-violence civil protection order is not moot. View "Cyran v. Cyran" on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case, the actions of the juvenile court in allowing the attorney for Mother to withdraw from the case at a permanent custody hearing and proceeding with the hearing without Mother present and without an attorney representing her constituted reversible error. The juvenile court granted permanent custody of Mother’s child to Franklin County Children Services after the permanent custody hearing. the court of appeals upheld the permanent custody order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mother did not waive her right to counsel when she did not appear at the final hearing and was improperly denied her right to counsel. View "In re R.K." on Justia Law

Pountney was indicted for theft, identity fraud, and two counts of drug possession—one involving fentanyl and one involving acetaminophen with codeine. Pountney stipulated to the charges of theft, identity fraud, and possession of acetaminophen with codeine. Count 4 alleged that Pountney knowingly obtained, possessed or used at least five but not more than 50 times the "bulk amount" of fentanyl, R.C. 2925.11(A), a second-degree felony under R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(c). The “bulk amount” of a Schedule II opiate or opium derivative, like fentanyl, is an amount equal to or exceeding 20 grams or five times the maximum daily dose in the usual dose range specified in a standard pharmaceutical reference manual. Pountney stipulated that he knowingly obtained 10 three-day transdermal fentanyl patches; each delivered 50 micrograms of fentanyl per hour. If the state proved that 10 patches equaled or exceeded five times the bulk amount of transdermal fentanyl, Pountney would be guilty of a second-degree felony; otherwise, he would be guilty of a fifth-degree felony. The court found Pountney guilty on all counts, including second-degree-felony aggravated possession of fentanyl. The Eighth District reversed with instructions to enter a finding of guilty on Count 4 as a fifth-degree felony. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. Although there is no usual dose range of fentanyl, the state may not rely upon the usual dose range of morphine, the prototype opiate, to establish the bulk amount of fentanyl under R.C. 2925.01(D)(1)(d). View "State v. Pountney" on Justia Law