Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Since 1996, Ohio Department of Health regulations have required ambulatory surgical facilities to have a written transfer agreement with a hospital to facilitate treatment in the event of an emergency beyond the capability of the facility. ODH interprets Ohio Adm.Code 3701-83-19(E) to require ambulatory surgical facilities to have a transfer agreement with a hospital within 30 minutes’ transport from the facility. In 2013, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3702.303(A), expressly requiring written transfer agreements to be negotiated with local hospitals. Capital operated with a negotiated written transfer agreement with the University of Toledo Medical Center but in April 2013, the university advised Capital that it would not renew its contract, which expired in July 2013. Capital continued operating without an agreement until January 20, 2014, when it negotiated a new agreement with the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor,52 miles from Capital’s facility. ODH revoked Capital’s health care facility license. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the law, rejecting an argument that its enactment impedes rights guaranteed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. The matter is a policy decision made by the legislature, vesting the authority to license ambulatory surgical facilities in the ODH and defining the scope of judicial review of its decisions. Adhering to the doctrine of separation of powers, the court held that the order revoking Capital’s license was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. View "Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Department of Health" on Justia Law

Since 1996, Ohio Department of Health regulations have required ambulatory surgical facilities to have a written transfer agreement with a hospital to facilitate treatment in the event of an emergency beyond the capability of the facility. ODH interprets Ohio Adm.Code 3701-83-19(E) to require ambulatory surgical facilities to have a transfer agreement with a hospital within 30 minutes’ transport from the facility. In 2013, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3702.303(A), expressly requiring written transfer agreements to be negotiated with local hospitals. Capital operated with a negotiated written transfer agreement with the University of Toledo Medical Center but in April 2013, the university advised Capital that it would not renew its contract, which expired in July 2013. Capital continued operating without an agreement until January 20, 2014, when it negotiated a new agreement with the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor,52 miles from Capital’s facility. ODH revoked Capital’s health care facility license. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the law, rejecting an argument that its enactment impedes rights guaranteed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. The matter is a policy decision made by the legislature, vesting the authority to license ambulatory surgical facilities in the ODH and defining the scope of judicial review of its decisions. Adhering to the doctrine of separation of powers, the court held that the order revoking Capital’s license was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. View "Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Department of Health" on Justia Law

The delayed damage rule, which modifies the general rule for when a cause of action accrues, did not apply to this cause of action alleging negligence related to the procuring of a professional-liability insurance policy.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint filed by Appellee as untimely, holding (1) the delayed-damage rule does not apply to a cause of action alleging negligent procurement of a professional-liability insurance policy or negligent misrepresentation of the terms of the policy when the policy contains a provision specifically excluding the type of claim that the insured alleges it believed was covered by the policy; (2) the cause of action in such a case accrues on the date the policy is issued; and (3) therefore, the complaint filed by Appellee in this case was untimely. View "LGR Realty, Inc. v. Frank & London Insurance Agency" on Justia Law

The delayed damage rule, which modifies the general rule for when a cause of action accrues, did not apply to this cause of action alleging negligence related to the procuring of a professional-liability insurance policy.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint filed by Appellee as untimely, holding (1) the delayed-damage rule does not apply to a cause of action alleging negligent procurement of a professional-liability insurance policy or negligent misrepresentation of the terms of the policy when the policy contains a provision specifically excluding the type of claim that the insured alleges it believed was covered by the policy; (2) the cause of action in such a case accrues on the date the policy is issued; and (3) therefore, the complaint filed by Appellee in this case was untimely. View "LGR Realty, Inc. v. Frank & London Insurance Agency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court did not commit plain error in joining for trial two indictments charging Defendant first for aggravated robbery and related charges and later for attempting to intimidate a witness in the robbery case. Although Defendant did not object to the joinder in the trial court, he argued on appeal that the joinder prejudiced him and constituted plain error. The appellate court agreed that the joiner prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no plain error in joining the two cases. View "State v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court did not commit plain error in joining for trial two indictments charging Defendant first for aggravated robbery and related charges and later for attempting to intimidate a witness in the robbery case. Although Defendant did not object to the joinder in the trial court, he argued on appeal that the joinder prejudiced him and constituted plain error. The appellate court agreed that the joiner prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no plain error in joining the two cases. View "State v. Gordon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a group of landowners (“Landowners”) seeking an order compelling the Ohio Department of Natural Resources’ Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (“the Division”) and its chief to commence appropriation proceedings to compensate Landowners for their land that was included in an oil and gas drilling unit. Landowners objected an an order issued by the chief requiring that a reservoir of oil and gas underlying multiple tracts of land be operated as a unit to recover the oil and gas, arguing that the order amounted to a taking of their property for which they must be compensated. The Supreme Court denied Landowners’ petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that Landowners had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to the county court of common pleas. View "State ex rel. Kerns v. Simmers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a group of landowners (“Landowners”) seeking an order compelling the Ohio Department of Natural Resources’ Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (“the Division”) and its chief to commence appropriation proceedings to compensate Landowners for their land that was included in an oil and gas drilling unit. Landowners objected an an order issued by the chief requiring that a reservoir of oil and gas underlying multiple tracts of land be operated as a unit to recover the oil and gas, arguing that the order amounted to a taking of their property for which they must be compensated. The Supreme Court denied Landowners’ petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that Landowners had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to the county court of common pleas. View "State ex rel. Kerns v. Simmers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the decision of the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (BOR) dismissing the complaint filed by Life Path Partners, Ltd. seeking to challenge the valuation of its property for tax year 2012 under the continuing complaint provision in Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D), which provides an exception to the requirement that a taxpayer protesting the valuation of property must file a complaint by march 31 of the year succeeding the tax year in question. The BOR dismissed the case because Life Path had not asked it to exercise its continuing-complaint jurisdiction prior to the deadline that would have applied if Life Path had filed a new complaint challenging the 2012 valuation. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s decision affirming the BOR’s dismissal, holding that Life Path properly invoked the BOR’s continuing- complaint jurisdiction pursuant to section 5715.19(D). View "Life Path Partners, Ltd. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming the decision of the Cuyahoga County Board of Revision (BOR) dismissing the complaint filed by Life Path Partners, Ltd. seeking to challenge the valuation of its property for tax year 2012 under the continuing complaint provision in Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D), which provides an exception to the requirement that a taxpayer protesting the valuation of property must file a complaint by march 31 of the year succeeding the tax year in question. The BOR dismissed the case because Life Path had not asked it to exercise its continuing-complaint jurisdiction prior to the deadline that would have applied if Life Path had filed a new complaint challenging the 2012 valuation. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s decision affirming the BOR’s dismissal, holding that Life Path properly invoked the BOR’s continuing- complaint jurisdiction pursuant to section 5715.19(D). View "Life Path Partners, Ltd. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law