Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Elvin Maldonado was convicted in 2019 of multiple counts of felonious assault and discharging a firearm, with accompanying firearm specifications, and was sentenced to nine years in prison and ordered to register as a violent offender. Maldonado successfully appealed, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the firearm specification sentence and the violent offender registration requirement. On remand, the trial court refused to hold a hearing and issued a new sentencing entry as directed.Maldonado appealed again, arguing that he was entitled to a hearing and that the trial court failed to properly calculate his jail-time credit. The Eighth District Court of Appeals identified a conflict between two of its prior decisions on whether a defendant is entitled to a hearing when part of a sentence is vacated. Before the panel issued its decision, the court decided to resolve the conflict en banc. The en banc court held that a defendant does not have a right to a resentencing hearing in such circumstances, and the panel affirmed the trial court’s judgment based on this en banc decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and agreed that the Eighth District violated App.R. 26(A)(2) by conducting en banc review before the panel decision was released. However, the Supreme Court found that Maldonado was not prejudiced by this procedural error. The court noted that even if a hearing had been held, Maldonado’s sentence would not have changed, as the remand was only to vacate specific parts of the sentence without altering the overall sentence. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Maldonado" on Justia Law

A labor dispute arose between the City of Cleveland and the Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (the union representing dispatch supervisors) over overtime scheduling. The dispute was submitted to arbitration, where the arbitrator denied the union's grievance. The union then sought to vacate the arbitration award by filing an application in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, serving the city but not the attorneys who represented the city in the arbitration.The Common Pleas Court initially denied the city's motion to dismiss the union's application, but later reversed its decision after the Eighth District Court of Appeals ruled in a different case that failure to serve the adverse party's counsel deprived the court of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Common Pleas Court dismissed the union's application and confirmed the arbitration award in favor of the city. The Eighth District affirmed this decision, citing two defects: the union's application was in the form of a pleading rather than a motion, and it failed to serve the city's arbitration counsel.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that under R.C. 2711.13, a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award must serve either the adverse party or its counsel, not necessarily both. However, the court also held that the union's application did not meet the statutory requirements because it was filed as a pleading (a complaint) rather than a motion. The court emphasized that a motion must state with particularity the grounds for the requested order, which the union's filing failed to do. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District's decision regarding the service requirement but affirmed the decision that the union's application did not meet the statutory form requirements, leaving the arbitration award in favor of the city intact. View "Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a public-records request dispute between Kimani Ware and Glenn Booth, the public-information officer at the Trumbull Correctional Institution. Ware alleges that he personally handed over a request for public records to Booth, who signed for it and promised to process it the following week. However, Ware claims he never received the records and, after sending three follow-up letters to Booth, decided to sue him for a writ of mandamus and statutory damages. Booth, on the other hand, denies receiving any follow-up letters from Ware and asserts that Ware has submitted fabricated evidence to the court.Previously, Booth filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Ware failed to verify his mandamus complaint with a proper affidavit and that the evidence of delivery of Ware's public-records request is at best "evenly balanced". However, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the motion, stating that a motion for judgment on the pleadings does not allow a court to weigh the evidence; instead, it simply tests the sufficiency of the complaint.The Supreme Court of Ohio decided to grant an alternative writ and refer the case to a master commissioner for a full evidentiary hearing. This decision was made due to Booth's allegations that Ware has committed fraud and submitted a fraudulent document. The court noted that either Booth or Ware is lying, and the best way to determine the truth is to conduct an evidentiary hearing where witnesses can be called to testify and be subject to cross-examination. The hearing will also allow the court to decide whether a writ of mandamus is appropriate and if Ware should be sanctioned for presenting fabricated evidence. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Booth" on Justia Law

The case involves East Ohio Gas Company, doing business as Dominion Energy Ohio ("Dominion"), and J. William Vigrass, individually and as executor of Virginia Vigrass’s estate. Dominion had requested access to Virginia's residence to inspect the gas meter located inside. However, due to Virginia's immunocompromised state and susceptibility to COVID-19, she denied Dominion access. Despite her account being paid in full, Dominion disconnected its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence in January 2022. The disconnection resulted in freezing temperatures inside the residence, causing the water pipes to burst and damage the property. Virginia was later found dead in her residence.In the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Vigrass sued Dominion on claims relating to the shutoff of its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence. Dominion moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims as they related to a service issue. However, Judge Peter J. Corrigan denied Dominion’s motion, reasoning that he had jurisdiction over the complaint because Vigrass had asserted common-law claims.Dominion then filed an original action in prohibition in the Supreme Court of Ohio, asserting that Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over Vigrass’s action. Dominion sought an order to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction and to vacate the orders he has issued in the underlying case.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, ordering Judge Corrigan to cease exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case and directing him to vacate the orders that he had previously issued in the case. The court concluded that both parts of the test set forth in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. were met, indicating that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The court also granted in part and denied in part Dominion's motion to strike certain parts of Vigrass's brief. View "State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a lease agreement between Tera, L.L.C., and Rice Drilling D, L.L.C., and Gulfport Energy Corporation. The lease granted Rice Drilling and Gulfport Energy certain mineral rights in the geological formations known as the Marcellus Shale and the Utica Shale beneath Tera’s land. The dispute arose when Tera claimed that the defendants had intentionally drilled six wells into the Point Pleasant formation, which Tera argued was not included in the lease agreement.The trial court awarded summary judgment to Tera, concluding that the lease agreement clearly limited the rights granted to the defendants to the Marcellus and Utica formations and reserved rights to all other formations. The court also found that the defendants had trespassed in bad faith, and a jury awarded Tera over $40 million in damages.The Court of Appeals for Belmont County affirmed the trial court's decision. The court concluded that the lease language was unambiguous and that the phrase "Utica Shale" had a technical stratigraphic meaning that did not include the Point Pleasant formation.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the lease agreement was ambiguous because it did not clearly establish whether the Point Pleasant was or was not to be considered part of the Utica Shale. The court concluded that resolving the meaning of ambiguous terms in a contract is a matter of factual determination for the fact-finder. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Tera, L.L.C. v. Rice Drilling D, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Andre M. Yeager, an inmate at the Richland Correctional Institution, represented himself in a trial where he was found guilty of grand theft, breaking and entering, and vandalism. He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 39 months. Yeager appealed his convictions to the Eleventh District, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself. The Eleventh District affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction.Yeager then filed an action in the Eleventh District, seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing his convictions and a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate his convictions. He claimed that his case was improperly assigned to the trial-court judge, the trial court violated his right to counsel, and the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence. The Eleventh District dismissed Yeager’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Eleventh District Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court found that Yeager had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to raise his claims, as he had already exercised that remedy by filing a direct appeal from the trial court’s judgment of conviction. The court also found that the trial court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction. Therefore, Yeager was not entitled to a writ of prohibition precluding the trial court from enforcing his convictions or a writ of mandamus vacating his convictions. View "State ex rel. Yeager v. Lake Cty. Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Alphonso Mobley Jr., who filed a writ of mandamus against Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose, seeking a certified copy of a document in response to a public-records request. Mobley also sought statutory damages and court costs under R.C. 149.43(C). The document in question was the "Certified Bond of Director of Ohio Department of Rehabilitations and Corrections for year 2021-2022." Mobley had initially received an uncertified copy of the bond, and upon his second request, he enclosed a check for $5 for a certified copy. However, he alleged that the secretary had not responded to his request for a certified copy, leading him to file this action.The secretary's office sent Mobley a certified copy of the bond six business days after he filed the action. The secretary denied liability under the Ohio Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43 et seq., and stated that he had provided the requested record. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted an alternative writ and set a schedule for the parties’ submission of evidence and merit briefs.The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that the mandamus claim was moot as the secretary had provided Mobley with a certified copy of the record he had requested. Mobley argued that the record was incomplete, but the court found no merit in his argument. The court also denied Mobley's request for statutory damages, stating that the failure to provide a certified copy within a reasonable time is not a failure to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B). The court also denied Mobley's claim for court costs, as he had filed an affidavit of indigency and therefore had no obligation to pay costs. View "State ex rel. Mobley v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The case revolves around James E. Mitchell, an inmate serving a 160-year prison sentence for a 1994 conviction in Summit County, which is to be served consecutively to a 3- to 15-year prison sentence imposed for a June 1994 conviction in Portage County. Mitchell filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Warden George A. Fredrick and the Ohio Adult Parole Board, arguing that the Portage County trial court lacked jurisdiction when it sentenced him on his guilty plea to burglary and gross sexual imposition. He claimed that no judgment of conviction and sentence had been imposed on him regarding the indicted offenses of rape and aggravated burglary, rendering his prison sentence void.Mitchell's petition was initially reviewed by the Third District Court of Appeals, which dismissed his petition. The court concluded that Mitchell failed to raise a claim cognizable in habeas corpus and failed to show that his prison sentence had expired. It also noted that Mitchell had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law to raise his claims.The case was then reviewed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The court affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals, dismissing Mitchell's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court found that the Portage County trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to accept Mitchell’s guilty plea to burglary and gross sexual imposition and to sentence him accordingly. Any defects in the trial court’s sentencing entry were deemed to implicate the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Mitchell’s criminal case, not the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also noted that Mitchell had adequate remedies, which he pursued. Therefore, the court concluded that the dismissal of Mitchell's petition was correct based on adequate-remedy grounds. View "State ex rel. Mitchell v. Fredrick" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over child support between Deborah Belleville and David Ayers, who were married in 2006 and had three children. In July 2019, Belleville filed for divorce. At the time, both parties were employed with comparable incomes. However, in February 2020, Ayers lost his job due to organizational changes at his company, CSX Transportation, and remained unemployed at the time of the final divorce hearing in late 2020. Ayers testified that he was seeking employment but that the job market was very small due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Belleville, on the other hand, believed that Ayers could get a new job.The trial court issued an order in December 2020, designating Belleville as the residential parent and legal custodian of the children and ordering Ayers to pay child support. The court calculated child support based on the "potential income" of Ayers, who was unemployed. The court imputed potential income to Ayers based on his previous earnings at CSX. Ayers appealed the trial court's judgment, arguing that the court had erred in imputing his potential income for child-support purposes.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the domestic-relations court must expressly find that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed as a condition precedent to imputing potential income for child-support-calculation purposes. The court found that the trial court had failed to make an express determination of voluntary unemployment, which was a reversible error. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Ayers v. Ayers" on Justia Law

The case involves Damon L. Taylor, who was charged with felony murder in the adult court after the juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Taylor was complicit in a murder. The adult court convicted Taylor of felony murder, but the Tenth District Court of Appeals vacated the conviction, arguing that the adult court lacked jurisdiction to convict Taylor of felony murder as the juvenile court had not found probable cause for that specific offense. The appellate court also ruled that Taylor's statements to the police should have been suppressed as his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated.The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed with the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the adult court did have jurisdiction over the felony-murder charge against Taylor. The court reasoned that the felony-murder charge was rooted in the same acts and events as the complicity-to-commit-murder charge, which was the subject of the juvenile complaint. Therefore, under former R.C. 2151.23(H), the adult court had jurisdiction over the felony-murder charge.Regarding Taylor's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Supreme Court held that this right did not attach until a criminal prosecution had commenced, which occurred after the police interrogated Taylor. Therefore, the state did not violate Taylor's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it interviewed him in the absence of his attorney. Even if the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached, Taylor validly waived it when he relinquished his Fifth Amendment right to counsel after he received the Miranda warnings.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanded the matter to that court for further proceedings. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law