Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue was how to determine whether a plaintiff who alleges that he or she suffers from lung cancer as a result of asbestos exposure is a “smoker” who needs to satisfy the requirements listed in Ohio Rev. Code 2307.92(C)(1), including a medical diagnosis that exposure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor to a plaintiff’s primary lung cancer.Plaintiff in this case did not attempt to make the prima facie showing required under section 2307.92(C)(1). Union Carbide argued that medical records showed that Plaintiff had a history of smoking and, therefore, Plaintiff should be required to prove that he is a nonsmoker by means of a written medical report. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that whether someone is a smoker is a question of fact, rather than a medical determination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a defendant can require a plaintiff to make a prima facie case that satisfies the requirements listed in section 2307.92(C)(1) only by submitting a written report from a “competent medical authority” that specifies that the plaintiff has smoked the equivalent of “one-pack year” during the last fifteen years. View "Turner v. CertainTeed Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio’s (PUCO) motion to dismiss LMD Integrated Logistic Services, Inc.’s appeal from a civil forfeiture order, holding that a party appealing an order of the PUCO pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4923.99 is not required to file a notice of appeal with PUCO to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court.LMD initiated its appeal in this case by filing its notice of appeal with the court of appeals and serving a copy of that notice on the member of PUCO, in accordance with section 4923.99(D). PUCO, however, argued that the appeal should be dismissed because LMD did not file its notice of appeal with PUCO. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the appellate court did not err in ruling that its jurisdiction had been properly invoked. View "In re LMD Integrated Logistics Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this real-property tax case, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopting a certain property’s sale price without considering the appraisal offered by the property owner, holding that the BTA did not properly perform its fact-finding duties.The property at issue was a single-tenant office building occupied by J.P. Morgan Chase under a net lease. On appeal, the BTA noted that under the applicable version of Ohio Rev. Code 5713.03, the fee-simple estate must be valued as if unencumbered. Nonetheless, the BTA adhered to caselaw applying an earlier version of the statute that emphasized the use of the sale price to determine value. The BTA then adopted the November 2013 sale price as the property value for tax year 2013. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that appraisal evidence is relevant and admissible, that no threshold showing was required before a tax tribunal must give full consideration to appraisal evidence, and that remand was required for further proceedings. View "Westerville City School District Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

In this real-property tax case, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopting a certain property’s sale price without giving full consideration to the appraisal offered by the property owner, holding that the BTA did not act reasonably and lawfully.At issue was the tax-year 2014 value of a single-tenant building occupied by J.P. Morgan Chase under a net lease. Although, under the amended version of Ohio Rev. Code 5713.03 appraisal evidence is admissible and competent alongside sale-price in determining a property’s value, the BTA adopted the property’s sale price without giving full consideration to appraisal evidence. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the BTA, holding that the BTA did not properly perform its fact-finding duties in this case. View "GC Net Lease @(3)(Westerville) Investors, LLC v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Ohio Supreme Court centered on whether whether oil-and-gas land professionals, who help obtain oil-and-gas leases for oil-and-gas-development companies, must be licensed real-estate brokers when they engage in the activities described in R.C. 4735.01(A) with respect to oil-and-gas leases. Specifically, the Court addressed address whether R.C. 4735.21 precluded a person not a licensed real-estate broker from bringing a cause of action to recover compensation allegedly owed for negotiating oil-and-gas leases. The Court concluded the plain language of R.C. 4735.01 did not exclude oil-and-gas land professionals or oil-and-gas leases from the relevant definitions set forth in the statute; appellants Thomas Dundics and his company, IBIS Land Group, Ltd., engaged in activities that required a real-estate-broker’s license and were precluded from bringing a cause of action to recover compensation for those activities. View "Dundics v. Eric Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought Relators seeking to compel the Board of Trustees of Perry Township in Stark County to place a tax levy on the November 6, 2018 ballot, holding that Relators did not establish that they were entitled to a writ of mandamus.The Board disqualified the proposed levy from the November 2018 ballot because Relators’ resolution and the proposed ballot language stated that the renewal and increase would have commenced in tax year 2018, the final year of the existing levy. The Supreme Court denied Relators’ request for a writ of mandamus, holding that Relators failed to establish that (1) the Board had a clear legal duty to place the proposed renewal-and-increase levy, commencing in the final year of the existing levy, on the ballot; or (2) Secretary of State Jon Husted failed to perform any clear legal duty. View "State ex rel. Perry Township Board of Trustees v. Husted" on Justia Law

In this expedited election case, the Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Relators seeking to compel the Lucas County Board of Elections to place a proposed charter amendment on the November 6, 2018 general-election ballot, holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion.Relators submitted part-petitions in support of a proposed amendment to the Toledo City Charter entitled the Lake Erie Bill of Rights (LEBOR). The Board verified a sufficient number of petition signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot but refused to place the charter amendment on the ballot on the ground that it contained provisions that were beyond the authority of the City to enact. Relators then filed this expedited election complaint. The Supreme Court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion when it relied on this Court’s decision in State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, 95 N.E.3d 329 (Ohio 2017) to deny the request to place the LEBOR charter amendments on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Twitchell v. Saferin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of aggravated murder and sentence of death, imposed after the case was remanded for resentencing, holding that none of Defendant’s propositions of law on appeal warranted reversal.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not err when it excluded testimony that Defendant sought to present as additional mitigating evidence in the time between the two sentencing hearings; (2) the trial court did not violate Defendant’s due process rights by refusing to empanel a new jury for the resentencing hearing; (3) trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance at the resentencing hearing; (4) Defendant was not denied the opportunity to deny or explain evidence at the resentencing hearing; and (5) Defendant’s sentence of death was appropriate and proportional. View "State v. Goff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Board of Beavercreek Township Trustees and its members (collectively, the Board) to rescind two resolutions setting the annual salaries for two assistants to the Beavercreek Township Fiscal Officer and to consider a new compensation proposal submitted by the Fiscal Officer.The Supreme Court held (1) Ohio Rev. Code 507.021(A) authorized the Fiscal Officer to hire two assistants and to set compensation for those positions, subject to prior approval by the Board; (2) the Fiscal Officer’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to approve and fund the two assistant positions at the specific salaries proposed is denied because the Fiscal Officer did not demonstrate that the Board abused its discretion in denying her specific salary requests; but (3) the Board exceeded its authority when it adopted the resolutions setting the annual salaries for the two assistants. View "State ex rel. Beavercreek Township Fiscal Officer v. Graff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals denying the request for a writ of mandamus sought by the Cincinnati Enquirer and granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the Enquirer was entitled to review certain documents in the custody of the coroner’s office.An Enquirer reporter made a request to view preliminary autopsy and investigative notes and findings relating to the homicides of eight individuals in Pike County. The Pike County prosecuting attorney and Pike County’s medical examiner and coroner denied the request to review the records. The Enquirer then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus asking the court of appeals to order the respondents to make the records available. The court of appeals denied the request, concluding that the autopsy reports were properly withheld because they constituted confidential law-enforcement investigatory records of the eight decedents and, therefore, were not subject to the journalist exception in Ohio Rev. Code 313.10(D), which provides that journalists be given access to review the preliminary autopsy reports of a county coroner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals disregarded the plain language of section 313.10(D) in denying the Enquirer’s request for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Pike County General Health District" on Justia Law