Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the complaint filed by Relator seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Ohio Secretary of State, the Franklin County Board of Elections, and the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections, to preserve digital ballot images created by voting equipment used in the May 8, 2018 election.Relator alleged that the digital ballot images were public records that, under Ohio Rev. Code 149.351(A), may not be removed, destroyed, or disposed of, and that elections officials were under an affirmative duty, under 52 U.S.C. 20701, to preserve these records. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that Relator was attempting to prevent an injury that has not yet occurred by that she anticipates will occur, which request was better suited for an action seeking a request for a writ of mandamus in the nature of a prohibitory injunction, over which this Court does not have original jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Gadell-Newton v. Husted" on Justia Law

In adoption proceedings, a probate court must consider the existence of pending parenting matters when determining whether an exception to the requirement of parental consent to adoption applies.Stepfather filed petitions to adopt the minor children of his wife and Father, her ex-husband. Stepfather’s adoption petition stated that Father’s consent was not required under an exception set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 3107.06 because Father failed without justifiable cause to provide more than a de minimis contact with the children for at least a year immediately preceding the filing of the petitions. While Stepfather’s adoption petitions were pending in the probate court, proceedings in domestic-relations court remained ongoing, specifically, Father’s motion to reestablish parenting time. The probate court determined that Father’s consent was not required. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the probate court had jurisdiction to proceed on the adoption petitions despite the pending parenting matter in the domestic-relations court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probate court failed to consider Father’s motion to reestablish parenting time in determining whether Father’s consent to the adoption of his children was required. View "In re Adoption of M.G.B.-E." on Justia Law

The tort of intentional interference with or destruction of evidence does not include claims alleging interference with or concealment of evidence that disrupt a plaintiff’s underlying case.Appellee filed an action against a school district, its board of education, and five board members (collectively, school defendants) alleging wrongful termination and sex discrimination. Appellants were attorneys who represented the school defendants in the wrongful termination case. While the wrongful termination case was pending, Appellee filed the instant action against Appellants, alleging intentional spoliation of evidence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Appellants because Appellee was unable to establish that Appellants had physically destroyed evidence. The appellate division reversed, concluding that the intentional concealment, interference with, or misrepresentation of evidence was sufficient to establish a viable spoliation claim. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that allegations of intentional interference with or concealment of evidence are not actionable under the independent tort of intentional spoliation of evidence. View "Elliott-Thomas v. Smith" on Justia Law

The law of the case from the first appeal in this case was not relevant in the second appeal because, on remand from the first appeal, the trial court had relied on new evidence to decide that Nicholas Giancola had signed an arbitration agreement.Plaintiff brought this survival action and wrongful death action, claiming that Giancola’s death was caused by injuries that he sustained while he was at Walton Manor Health Care Center. Walton Manor moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Giancola had entered into a binding arbitration agreement with Walton Manor. The trial court ordered arbitration of the survival action, finding that Giancola’s mother had signed the arbitration agreement and that she had apparent authority to bind her son to its terms. The appellate court reversed. On remand, the trial court referred the appropriate counts to arbitration, concluding that Giancola had signed the arbitration agreement. The appellate court held that the trial court had violated the law-of-the-case doctrine when it reconsidered the issue of who had signed the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not prevent the trial court on remand from considering new evidence as to whether Giancola signed the arbitration agreement. View "Giancola v. Azem" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ of mandamus sought by Appellant seeking to compel the Industrial Commission to vacate its order retroactively adjusting Appellant’s benefit rate.After Appellant was injured in a work-related motor vehicle accident he began receiving workers’ compensation benefits. After the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation discovered that Appellant’s benefit rates had been incorrectly calculated, it recalculated Appellant’s full weekly wage and average weekly wage. The Commission affirmed the Bureau’s order and instructed the Bureau to determine how much Appellant had previously been overpaid and to recoup that amount through reduction of his future benefits. The court of appeals concluded that the Commission had not abused its discretion in upholding the Bureau’s adjustment of Appellant’s benefit rate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief requested or a clear legal duty on the part of the Commission to provide it. View "State ex rel. Witt v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Secretary of State Jon Hosted did not abuse his discretion when he determined that Heidi R. Carroll had the requisite seventy-two months of legal-practice experience to qualify for a seat on the common-pleas-court bench.In these consolidated expedited election cases Relators sought writs of mandamus and/or prohibition to prevent Carroll from appearing on the May 8, 2018 ballot as a candidate for the Republican Party nomination for Medina County Common Pleas Court judge, Domestic Relations Division. Relators argued that Husted employed the incorrect legal framework in deciding that Carroll satisfied the seventy-two month requirement. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Secretary Husted did not abuse his discretion by placing Carroll’s name on the May 2018 ballot as a judicial candidate. View "State ex rel. Emhoff v. Medina County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the adoption decree entered in the probate court, holding that the probate judge Mark Costine patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to grant Elizabeth Garrett’s petition to adopt G.G.G.G. was the granddaughter of Tamalie Garrett, who was the mother of Elizabeth. A West Virginia family court designated Elizabeth, the birth mother’s sister, as G.G.’s legal guardian and awarded Tamalie visitation. Elizabeth and G.G. subsequently moved to Ohio and filed a petition to adopt G.G. in Belmont County Probate Court. Judge Costine issued a final decree granting Elizabeth’s adoption petition. The Supreme Court vacated the adoption decree, holding that because neither the West Virginia court nor the Ohio court made a determination that the relevant persons no longer resided in West Virginia, Judge Costine’s granting of Elizabeth’s petition for adoption was a “modification” of the West Virginia order in violation of 28 U.S.C. 1738A(h). View "State ex rel. Garrett v. Costine" on Justia Law

In this real property valuation case involving tax year 2012, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopting the Franklin County Board of Revision’s (BOR) rejection of the sale price of the property at issue as the criterion of value and instead retaining the county auditor’s valuation. On appeal, the BTA found that the sale was too remote in relation to the tax-lien date. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions that the BTA use the sale price to value the property for tax year 2012, holding that the BTA misapplied court precedent in determining that the sale was too remote. View "Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Ohio, Inc. v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

At issue in this valuation case was the 2011 value, with carryover to 2012 and 2013, of a nursing home that was purchased by its former lessee in April 2011 and to what extent the sale price ought to have been allocated to assets other than the real estate.The Board of Revision (BOR) ordered a small reduction in value to $7,202,900 after making a small deduction for furniture, fixtures, and equipment. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reinstated the entire sale price of $7,490,000 as the value of the real estate. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the BTA neglected to exercise its statutory authority to obtain a complete record and predicated its decision in part on legal errors. View "Arbors East RE, LLC v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

When reviewing a decision of a common pleas court confirming, modifying, vacating, or correcting an arbitration award, an appellate court should accept finding of fact that are not clearly erroneous but should decide questions of law de novo.The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court vacating an arbitration award and reinstated the arbitration award, holding that the court of appeals conducted a proper de novo review of the trial court’s decision. Because the court of appeals’ judgment conflicted with judgments of the Eighth District and the Twelfth District, where the court of appeals concluded that the standard of review for an appellate court reviewing a trial court decision confirming or vacating an arbitration award is an abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court determined that a conflict existed and agreed to resolve the matter. View "Portage County Board of Developmental Disabilities v. Portage County. Educators' Association for Developmental Disabilities" on Justia Law