Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the two courts of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and Appellant’s petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus.Appellant was convicted in two separate common pleas cases, one involving the murder and robbery of Christine Kozak (the Kozak case) and the other case involving the robberies of David Sotka and the Lawson Milk Company (the Sotka case). In both of his petitions, Appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the general division of the common pleas court in both the Kozak case and the Sotka case. Both petitions alleged that there was an allegedly defective transfer from the juvenile division. The Supreme Court held (1) the court of appeals correctly dismissed Appellant’s habeas petition for failure to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus; and (2) Appellant had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to challenge the validity of the bindover, and therefore, Appellant’s request for writs of prohibition and mandamus were properly dismissed. View "Johnson v. Sloan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of habeas corpus sought by Tyrone Oliver and commanded Oliver’s immediate release from incarceration.In 1993, Oliver was sentenced to an indeterminate prison sentence of eight to twenty-five years for involuntary manslaughter. The Bureau of Sentence Computation calculated his maximum-sentence release date as January 9, 2018. Oliver received parole release in July 2003. In February 2005 he pleaded guilty to a domestic violence charge and received a two year sentence. On January 26, 2018, Oliver filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Oliver’s 2005 sentence for domestic violence was to be served concurrently with, not consecutively to, his 1993 sentence for involuntary manslaughter, and therefore, Oliver had served his maximum sentence and was entitled to immediate release. View "State ex rel. Oliver v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of habeas corpus sought by Tyrone Oliver and commanded Oliver’s immediate release from incarceration.In 1993, Oliver was sentenced to an indeterminate prison sentence of eight to twenty-five years for involuntary manslaughter. The Bureau of Sentence Computation calculated his maximum-sentence release date as January 9, 2018. Oliver received parole release in July 2003. In February 2005 he pleaded guilty to a domestic violence charge and received a two year sentence. On January 26, 2018, Oliver filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Oliver’s 2005 sentence for domestic violence was to be served concurrently with, not consecutively to, his 1993 sentence for involuntary manslaughter, and therefore, Oliver had served his maximum sentence and was entitled to immediate release. View "State ex rel. Oliver v. Turner" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the Ohio use tax applied to Lafarge North America, Inc.’s purchases of fuel and repair parts for equipment used to break up and transport solidified slag, a by-product from molten ore during steelmaking, from the “slag mountain," a large slag mass. Whether the tax applied depended on whether the activity was part of Lafarge’s “manufacturing operation” under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.02(B)(42)(g).The Department of Taxation assessed a use tax and penalty against Lafarge for purchases for the equipment at issue. Lafarge challenged the assessment. The tax commissioner determined that the breaking up and transport of slag from the slag mountain preceded Lafarge’s manufacturing operation and that equipment used to move raw materials prior to the start of the manufacturing process was taxable. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the tax assessment and penalty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Lafarge’s manufacturing operation began once Lafarge cut slag from the mountain and continued as the material was crushed, placed in dump trucks, and transported to a screening plant. View "Lafarge North America, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) valuing Appellant’s property in accordance with a sale price and determining that Appellant’s appraisal evidence did not negate the presumption that the sale was characteristic of true value.For tax year 2011, the Franklin County auditor valued one of Appellant’s parcels of property at $132,700 and the second parcel at $1,717,300, for a total valuation of $1,850,000. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) assigned a total value to the subject property of $1,602,700 for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013, thus rejecting the Hilliard City Schools Board of Education’s (BOE) argument that a 2009 sale price established the property’s value. The BTA determined that the property’s value should be a total of $2,313,490 for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013, finding that the sale price presumptively established the subject property’s value and that Appellant had failed to rebut that presumption by showing that the sale was not a recent arm’s-length transaction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not bear its burden at the BTA to negate the sale price as the criterion of value. View "Hilliard City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Lorain County Board of Revision (BOR) had continuing-complaint jurisdiction to determine the value of a property for tax years 2012, 2013, and 2014 and therefore, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) erred in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over tax year 2014.Appellant sought a reduction from the value determined by the Lorain County auditor for the three years at issue by asserting a continuing complaint. Appellant predicated its claim on its originally filed complaint, which had challenged the property valuation for tax year 2009. That complaint was finally determined in 2014. Appellant’s continuing complaint sought to apply the same value determined in that case to 2012, 2013, and 2014. The BOR retained the auditor’s valuation. The BTA adopted Appellant’s appraiser’s valuation of $750,000 for 2012 and 2013 but concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the value for tax year 2014. Specifically, the BTA found that the BOR lacked jurisdiction over tax year 2014 because a proper complaint was not filed for that tax year. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the BOR had jurisdiction to determine the property’s value for tax years 2012, 2013, and 2014; and (2) an aggregate value of $750,000 shall be assigned to the property for all three tax years. View "Novita Industries, LLC v. Lorain County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a trial court must inform an offender at the time of sentencing that the commission of a felony during a period of post-release control permits a trial court to impose a new prison term for the violation to be served consecutively with any prison term for the new felony.Defendant was convicted of rape of victims less than thirteen years of age and three counts of gross sexual imposition regarding victims less than thirteen years of age. At sentencing the trial court imposed the mandatory term of postrelease control and informed Defendant that if he were convicted of a new felony offense while on post-release controversy, the sentencing court could impose a prison term for the new felony offense, along with an additional consecutive prison term for the post-release control violation. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error when it sentenced him without properly giving him all of the required notifications as required by Ohio Rev. Code 2929.19(B)(4) and concerning post-release control. The court of appeals rejected the argument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 2929.19(B)(2)(e) does not require that a trial court notify an offender at his or her initial sentencing hearing of the penalty provisions contained in Ohio Rev. Code 2929.141(A)(1) and (2). View "State v. Gordon" on Justia Law

In this real-property-valuation case, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) finding that the appraisal report presented by the Washington County Board of Revision and Washington County auditor (collectively, the County) constituted the most competent and probative evidence of the value of the subject property for tax year 2013.The BTA relied on the County’s report to value a property owned by Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc./Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC (collectively, Lowe’s), even though Lowe’s presented its own appraisal report. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding (1) the Court’s decisions in Steak ’N Shake, Inc. v. Warrant County Board of Revision, 48 N.E.3d 535 (Ohio 2015), Rite Aid of Ohio, Inc. v. Washington County Board of Revision, 54 N.E.3d 1177 (Ohio 2016), and Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc. v. Washington County Board of Revision, 49 N.E.3d 1266 (Ohio 2016), provide the proper guideposts for resolving this controversy; and (2) because the BTA had yet to evaluate the evidence in light of the legal standards articulated in these three decisions, the case must be remanded for further proceedings. View "Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. v. Washington County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of aggravated murder with a death specification, felony-murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and other crimes and the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty.On appeal, Defendant presented eighteen propositions of law. The Supreme Court examined each of Defendant’s claims and found that none had merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence of death, holding that there was no reversible error committed in the proceedings below and that Defendant was not entitled to relief. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) following the Court’s remand in Navistar I, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in upholding the tax commissioner’s reduction of Navistar Inc.’s commercial-activity-tax (CAT) credit to zero.In Navistar I, the Supreme Court concluded that the BTA had ignored the testimony of Navistar’s experts in upholding the commissioner’s reduction of Navistar’s CAT credit to zero, an omission that made the BTA’s decision unreasonable and unlawful. After the BTA again upheld the tax commissioner’s decision, Navistar appealed, objecting to the BTA’s findings and its conclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA’s findings were supported by reliable and probative evidence and that the BTA’s conclusion was reasonable and lawful. View "Navistar, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law